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**The U.S. Humanitarian Interventions as a Unipolar Power in the  
Post-Cold War Era: The Case of Kosovo's Idealistic Assumptions  
vs Realpolitik**

Thesis Submitted to the Department of English in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctorate Es-Science in American Civilization

Submitted by:

Selma BENZID

Supervised by:

Prof. Hachemi ABOUBOU

**Board of Examiners**

Chairman: Prof. Amor GHOUAR (Professor) University of Batna 2

Supervisor: Prof. Hachemi ABOUBOU (Professor) University of Batna 2

Examiner: Prof. Ladi TOULGUI (Professor) University of Guelma

Examiner: Prof. Abdelhak ELAGGOUNE (Professor) University of Guelma

Examiner: Dr. Houda BOUHIDEL (MCA) University of Batna 2

Examiner: Dr. Samih AZOUI (MCA) University of Constantine 3

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## **Declaration**

I hereby, **Selma BENZID**, declare that this doctoral thesis entitled “**The U.S. Humanitarian Interventions as a Unipolar Power in the Post-Cold War Era: The Case of Kosovo’s Idealistic Assumptions vs Realpolitik**” and supervised by Prof. **Hachemi ABOUBOU** is written up by me and data collection, their analyses and description have been carried out by me. Moreover, I have diligently undertaken the task of guaranteeing the authenticity of this work, ensuring its originality, and providing due credit whenever necessary by appropriately citing and acknowledging any external sources employed within the text. This thesis is submitted to Batna 2 University only in fulfillment of the requirements of ‘Doctorate Es-Sciences’ in American Civilization. Therefore, the thesis is not submitted to any other institutions or publication, except one of the pedagogical implications which is about “U.S. Mass Media, American Public Opinion and the Kosovo War: Insinuating Belligerence or Soothing Political Tension?”.

Batna

Doctoral candidate:

**Selma BENZID**

## Dedication

In loving memory of my dearest sister **Dr. Narimane BENZID** who, unfortunately, lost her severe battle and quit us forever a few months before submitting my thesis. I dedicate this humble work as a tribute to the courageous spirit of the bravest woman who ever lived. My heart still longs for the piece that was taken away by her departure, and nothing or nobody else has been able to fill it up. My love for her, my dearest Oukhti, is equally matched by how much I miss her.

To the memory of my paternal grandfather Elhouas and my niece Lyna.

You will always be in my heart and mind my beloved angels.

It is with great honor to dedicate this work to my beloved parents, to my source of strength and self-confidence, my dear Baba Messaoud, and to my dear Yemma Micha who has been my constant shelter, offering me a safe haven where I can seek solace and find the encouragement to pursue my dreams.

To my one and only, my hubby Mounir, and to our precious daughter Julia, you are the best gift that God has bestowed upon me

This work is also dedicated to my dearest siblings Nassima, Redha, Amine, and Abdelhak, my brothers-in-law, Redha and Lotfi, my sisters-in-law Wahiba, Nawel, and Kaouthar, my nieces Assil, Nor Elimane, Yasmine, Meriem, Maria, Dalia, and Layane, my nephews Younes, Zakaria, Yacine, Wassim, Skandar, Taha, and Djad.

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### Abstract

During the Post-Cold War Era, the United States ascended to a global superpower, whereas former Soviet Union countries were embroiled in territorial and ethnic disputes, leading to numerous crises. As a result, the U.S. intervened in various ways, primarily through humanitarian interventions, to address these international issues. This study focuses on the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, which has engendered divergent opinions among scholars, experts, and politicians regarding the underlying motives that prompted American intervention. While some perceive the actions of the U.S. as a display of goodwill and commitment to human rights and autonomy, others contend that it was driven by “realpolitik” considerations to pursue its interest. This is particularly evident in the fact that the U.S. encouraged NATO to launch airstrikes without seeking the approval of either its Congress or the United Nations. The objective of this study is to search for the reasons behind the U.S. involvement in humanitarian interventions, specifically in Kosovo in the Post-Cold War Era. It seeks to identify the mechanisms, legitimacy, and real motives driving these interventions and tackle the factors influencing the decision to intervene in Kosovo over other nations. The research relies on a historical and descriptive methodology by drawing on primary and secondary sources to synthesize historical perspectives relevant to the studied issue. Primary sources relied on in the data gathering included the U.S. Constitution, official documents from the U.S. Congress and government agencies, and the UN and NATO reports. Secondary sources included books, encyclopedias, and varied historical serial publications. The findings of this research speculated that the U.S. humanitarian intervention during the Kosovo Crisis was an extension of Cold War ideology, and the U.S. used a form of duplicity in its foreign policy approach by appearing idealistic while practicing realpolitik.

Keywords: U.S. foreign policy; humanitarian intervention; Kosovo War; idealism; realism; realpolitik.

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### List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AAK</b>	<b>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo</b>
<b>CEFTA</b>	<b>Central European Free Trade Agreement</b>
<b>CIA</b>	<b>Central Intelligence Agency</b>
<b>CRS</b>	<b>Congressional Research Service</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union</b>
<b>FRY</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</b>
<b>GDP</b>	<b>Gross Domestic Product</b>
<b>HRW</b>	<b>Human Rights Watch</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>JIC</b>	<b>Joint Implementation Commission</b>
<b>KFOR</b>	<b>Kosovo Force</b>
<b>KLA</b>	<b>Kosovo Liberation Army</b>
<b>KPS</b>	<b>Kosovo Police Service</b>
<b>KSF</b>	<b>Kosovo Security Force</b>
<b>LDK</b>	<b>Democratic League of Kosovo</b>
<b>MNCs</b>	<b>Multinational Corporations</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>Non-governmental Organizations</b>
<b>NSC</b>	<b>National Security Council</b>
<b>OAS</b>	<b>Organization of American States</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</b>
<b>OSCE-KVM</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – Kosovo Verification Mission</b>

<b>PDK</b>	<b>Democratic Party of Kosovo</b>
<b>R2P</b>	<b>Responsibility to Protect</b>
<b>SEED</b>	<b>Support for East European Democracies Act</b>
<b>SFRY</b>	<b>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNHCR</b>	<b>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b>
<b>UNMIH</b>	<b>United Nations Mission in Haiti</b>
<b>UNMIK</b>	<b>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</b>
<b>UNOSOM</b>	<b>United Nations Operation in Somalia</b>
<b>UNSCR</b>	<b>United Nations Security Council Resolution</b>
<b>USAID</b>	<b>U.S. Agency for International Development</b>

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### Résumé

### ملخص

# **General Introduction**

## General Introduction

The genesis of the United States of America's foreign policy can be traced back to the nascent years of its establishment, as the Founding Fathers endeavored to create a government free from the influence of external forces. Throughout the nineteenth century, America expanded its borders and pursued economic interests through the Manifest Destiny doctrine, aiming to establish its supremacy over North America. This era of expansionism coincided with a burgeoning sentiment of national pride and an ardent aspiration to champion American principles and virtues on a global scale. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and global challenges continue to arise, the development of U.S. foreign policy continues to be a critical issue for policymakers and citizens alike. Foreign policy has played an integral role in shaping the nation's identity and trajectory. The country has vacillated between non-interventionism and interventionism. However, many scholars concur that over the past century, America has consistently embraced interventionism as a guiding principle. The United States foreign policy, as articulated by the State Department, aims to cultivate a safer, more democratic, and economically prosperous global community for the betterment of Americans and the international community. This pursuit has earned the country the moniker of the Global Policeman.

The conclusion of the Cold War marked a significant shift in the global hierarchy, dismantling the previous bipolarity. As several Soviet nations broke away from the Union to establish their independent states, the United States emerged as the ultimate leader of the world. This historic transition set the stage for a new era of international relations. This gave rise to various crises in that region that compelled the United States, as a unipolar power, to intervene and take appropriate actions aligned with the principles enshrined in the global human rights Charter. Kosovo was one of the European countries where this happened. It was

embroiled in a brutal conflict between Serbian and Yugoslav security forces and Albanian separatists led by the Kosovo Liberation Army. The latter group was formed in the 1990s to fight for their country's independence. The conflict gained international attention and was ultimately resolved through the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which provided humanitarian aid from March 24<sup>th</sup> to June 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999. While the status of Kosovo remained unresolved at that point, the region was granted political and economic autonomy under the administration of the United Nations Resolution 1244.

This research seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the factors that contributed to the war in Kosovo and the extent of American involvement from various perspectives. It explores a sensitive topic that raised questions among the international community about America's true intentions and its use of NATO in similar situations. The study delves into the historical context of the conflict, the political climate during President Bill Clinton's second term, and the relationship between America and Kosovo. Furthermore, it thoroughly examines America's stance on such matters, which many believe that it fell into a type of duplicity in its foreign policy.

On that account, this study tackles a critical issue at the heart of American foreign policy and which is the underlying reasons that prompt the U.S. to engage in humanitarian interventions across the globe. Focusing on the case of the Interim Administration Mission of the United Nations in Kosovo during the late 1990s Post-Cold War Period, the current research project attempts to search for the mechanism and real factors driving such interventions.

The transformation of American foreign policy from isolationism to interventionism has sparked contemplation regarding the underlying factors for this shift in ideology. To gain a comprehensive understanding of this intricate matter, the primary goals of this investigation can be delineated into two categories. The first objective is to search for the real motives that

propelled the United States of America to engage in humanitarian interventions in different geopolitical spheres with varying levels of engagement. The second objective of this piece of work is to investigate the rationale behind the United States' decision to intervene in Kosovo, as opposed to other nations, and to analyze the underlying factors that influenced this intervention.

The United States is often considered a leading nation in upholding human rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. However, the issue of humanitarian intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, including other recent matters, raises questions about these ideals. While some appreciate the American efforts to help conflicted nations restore these values, others argue that the U.S. operates based on the principles of *realpolitik* and does not act out of pure altruism.

The purpose of conducting this research is to uncover and present the key problematic aspects of the ongoing debate regarding the veracity of allegations of duplicity in American foreign policy. Specifically focused on the Kosovar case, this study aims to delve deep into the historical underpinnings that have shaped the relationship between the United States and Kosovo and to explore the who, why, when, and how of the mission to assist this Eastern European nation.

The present study aims to answer an important question that can be resumed in the following terms: what were the underlying reasons that compelled the U.S. to undertake humanitarian missions across various regions of the globe during the Post-Cold War Period, particularly in Kosovo? This critical query is accompanied by related inquiries that warrant exploration.

Numerous scholars contend that American interventions in foreign countries during the Post-Cold War Period were motivated by idealist aims of preserving peace, promoting human rights, and preventing dictatorship. Nonetheless, other scholars argue that the

motivations were based on *realpolitik* and its pragmatic considerations. So, what prompted their inquiry into this matter? Or what caused their division on the issue? Is it accurate to assert that there is a certain level of duplicity in American foreign policy regarding Kosovo specifically? In addition, what methods and protocols do American authorities utilize to carry out such interventions? Are the results of these conflicts consistently predictable? Do Americans ultimately achieve their objectives? These are all critical questions that warrant further exploration.

To attain satisfactory answers to these research questions, the study at hand necessitates a historical and descriptive approach due to the nature of the topic, which primarily focuses on past events. As academic papers in this research field typically aim to provide a fresh interpretation of existing data, the methodology employed involves the description and synthesis of various historical perspectives related to the contentious issue of the United States' humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in the Post-Cold War Era. Formulating new insights and arguments would be accomplished by drawing upon primary and secondary sources.

The historical context that has shaped American foreign policy and its relationships with other countries, particularly Kosovo, during the end of the Cold War Era, is extensively documented in the vast international literature available. Alan R. Gitelson, Robert L. Dudley, and Melvin J. Dubnick's book "American Government" was heavily relied on in the first chapter of this research as it thoroughly explained the historical development and the four schools of U.S. foreign policy. This latter was well-explained in Walter Russell Mead's "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World." The book "A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy" by Joyce P. Kaufman was also a vital reference for all chapters of this research.

The second chapter of this thesis was based on a variety of sources that tackled the history of Kosovo and its crisis including books such as “Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo” by Fred Abrahams as a project coordinator, “The History of Kosovo in the History Textbooks of Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia” by Shkëlzen Gashi, “Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know” by Tim Judah and “Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo” by Miranda Vickers.

To address the background history of the Balkan Peninsula and the U.S. interventionism there, books such as “War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia” edited by Richard C. Hall and the collection of lectures entitles “Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History” by Steven W. Sowards were relied on.

The bibliography of the fourth chapter, on the other hand, draws upon different journal and newspaper articles following the chapter’s overarching aim. This abundance of resources highlights the intricate and multifaceted nature of international politics. It also emphasizes the significance of comprehending the shared past of the worldwide nations to steer toward a successful future.

To effectively conduct this research project, it was essential to employ a strategic blend of primary and secondary sources. The data collection process was meticulously chosen to ensure objectivity and avoid potential bias. Primary sources included government documents such as the U.S. Constitution, official documents from U.S. Congress and government agencies, and reports from credible organizations such as the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secondary sources included books, encyclopedias, and historical serial publications such as book reviews, review articles, journals, newspaper articles, essays, and conferences. This comprehensive method assumingly produced a well-rounded and persuasive outcome.

The present thesis comprises six distinct parts. These parts are: a general introduction, four chapters, and a general conclusion. Each chapter of this research work is further divided into two parts that delve deeply into the most crucial concepts and ideas surrounding the subject matter.

The research's first chapter is dedicated to thoroughly examining the various interpretations of political terminology and concepts, presidential doctrines and schools of thought, as well as the constitutional process underlying the decision-making process of the United States of America's foreign policy. This contributes to comprehending the mechanism that orchestrated the intervention in Kosovo, the rationale behind this intervention, and how it was executed.

Chapter two explores the historical context and evolution of Kosovo as a country, highlighting the various elements that triggered the outbreak of its civil conflict in the late 1990s. It also deals with the aftermath of the war, its consequences, and its standing on the global stage.

The third chapter presents a comprehensive overview of the U.S. relationship with the Balkan peninsula, focusing on Kosovo, serving as a case study of this research. Moreover, it examines the multi-layered levels of U.S. intervention in the area and the role of international organizations such as the UN and NATO in this intervention. The chapter cites numerous newspaper articles that provide firsthand accounts of the events to maintain an objective perspective.

The fourth chapter of this research starts with defining the scope and meaning of the core terminology of this research and providing instances of U.S. humanitarian interventions in diverse continents. It proceeds to a nuanced description of the United States' interventionism in Kosovo, exploring the underlying assumptions that shaped their actions and examining whether they acted out of idealist principles or strategic *realpolitik*.

Additionally, it evaluates the extent to which their conduct adhered to established international norms.

Though not a pioneering case of the United States humanitarian intervention, the juxtaposition of realpolitik and idealism regarding the American intervention in Kosovo in the Post-Cold War Era presents an intriguing discourse. It led to contemplating the United States' duplicitous standards in foreign policy and the ethical implications of intervening in other nations' affairs.

# **Chapter One**

## **Historical Background and**

## **Development of the U.S.**

## **Foreign Policy**

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## **Chapter One**

### **Historical Background and Development of the U.S. Foreign Policy**

#### **Introduction**

Any foreign policy conducted by a nation in this vast world is never on the spur of the moment. It is, in fact, a determined and continuous work of different contributing parts, whether in the governmental body or outside it, to figure out the country's most suitable policy.

In order to have a better understanding of the American strength in the international arena and the basis of its decision-making in recent times, this chapter, under the title of "Historical Background and Development of the U.S. Foreign Policy," is designed to dive deep in the evolution and history of the foreign policy of this country. Therefore, the chapter is divided into two parts. The first one, entitled "Overview of the American Foreign Policy History," discusses the historical development of American foreign affairs from its beginning to the Post-Cold War Era, especially since the Kosovo Crisis as a primary interest of this piece of research happened during that period. Furthermore, this part tackles the four visions or schools of U.S. foreign policy attributed to four of its prominent presidents and historical figures (Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson). Finally, this part ends with a statement and a discussion of the United States' foreign policy goals.

The second part of the first chapter is entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making." It illustrates the notable glossaries related to the subject matter. It also deals with the most vital U.S. presidential doctrines and theories that contributed to changing and amending the U.S. worldwide position and revolutionizing global politics.

## **1.1. Overview of the American Foreign Policy History**

On the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, 1776, thirteen small British colonies on the eastern coast of the newly discovered continent adopted The American Declaration of Independence during their delegates' meeting at the Continental Congress. The document was not a mere independence announcement, but, with the assistance of other ensuing official records such as The American Constitution, it articulated all the necessities under which an afresh independent country might be governed (Watts 67). Regardless of having well-organized domestic affairs, organizing foreign affairs has always been one of the main objectives of establishing a prosperous country. That is why the United States of America's Founding Fathers, as a newly formed nation, were proactive in regulating issues related to their international relations from the start.

Even though any country's creation process can take centuries and sometimes go through numerous ups and downs and a plethora of bitter experiments, the U.S., in turn, managed to show the world how to divert its vulnerability into strength and power in a very short period through making a rich history that is worth studying and reflecting on.

### **1.1.1. Historical Account of the U.S. Foreign Affairs**

The colonial period in American history might be seen as a trial in terms of the political organization of what came afterward. It is historically acknowledged that the first successful English settlement in the New World was Jamestown in the Colony of Virginia. The Virginia General Assembly was created by the London Company in 1619, and in 1639, the House of Burgesses assembled, and both were deemed to be the first miniature system of government in the soon-to-be USA (Ciment 332). Thus, a sense of organized politics has been developed since the beginning of the U.S. formation as an independent country.

According to the Office of the Historian<sup>1</sup>, the origins of the American diplomatic tradition go back to 1757 when Benjamin Franklin was a colonial agent of several colonies in

London. Despite his futile attempts to prevent the outbreak of the war through secretive negotiations in 1774, Franklin ultimately gained valuable diplomatic skills. Hence, with the succor of other leading figures<sup>2</sup> of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress designated the Committee of Secret Correspondence in November 1775, right after the battles of Lexington and Concord which officially started the American Revolutionary War. The main objective of such a committee was sending diplomats to the European countries to assess their point of view of the revolution with a particular inclination to France, which eventually supported the Americans in their war against Great Britain starting from 1778 (Ciment 166). That was carried out because Americans precociously realized the importance of building diplomatic relations with the world's powers at that time to follow their lead and be a superpower and gain substantial knowledge of administering foreign affairs.

After the victory at the Battle of Saratoga and signing the Franco-American Treaty of Alliance in Paris in 1778, Benjamin Franklin was appointed as the inaugural American Minister to represent the country abroad. He was also part of a Peace Commission that additionally included John Adams and John Jay and who successfully negotiated the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. In the meantime, the first United States system of government, The Articles of Confederation, was codified, under which the Department of Foreign Affairs, nowadays the Department of State, was created in 1781 under the leadership of Robert R. Livingston as the first U.S. Secretary for Foreign Affairs (“The Development of Foreign Policy”). Nonetheless, regardless of The Articles of Confederation’s failure on the national level, the idea of a country with a single voice on foreign policy was conceived (Kaufman 32). This confirms the fact that the U.S. started to have a notable position in the international arena as early as its formation as a newly independent and unified country.

The systematic organization of the foreign affairs offices was a persistent process. Congress began appointing American consuls to different parts of the world to handle

business matters overseas. Subsequently, the new American Constitution, which replaced The Articles of Confederation, remodeled the foreign affairs responsibilities by addressing them to the government's executive and legislative branches ("The Development of Foreign Policy") with a differing power vested in each, depending on the circumstances, the era and the people in power.

In their book "American Government," the authors: Alan R. Gitelson, Robert L. Dudley, and Melvin J. Dubnick divided the epochs of the American foreign and defense policies into six. The early years from 1789 to 1823 were considered the years of the American foreign policy foundation, where two prominent political figures, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, laid two distinct approaches to foreign affairs conduct. With the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, isolationism was opted for as a policy for decades. Nonetheless, the second period from 1823 to 1914 was labeled by two other policies, unilateralism, and expansionism (425-427). These policies were characterized by an unwavering commitment to pursuing the national interests of the United States and a drive to expand the country's influence on the international arena.

After the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and until 1960, America emerged as a world leader. This phase was characterized by adopting distinct stances depending on the international circumstances. The foreign policy of the U.S. vacillated between neutrality and the Wilsonian view of playing a significant role on the international level, especially after the Pearl Harbor attack during World War II. Accordingly, the culmination of WWII marked the creation of the United Nations that called for world peace which unfortunately did not last more than two years. World peace was shaken as the Soviet Union and Great Britain skirmished over different occupied areas, especially in Eastern Europe. The U.S. first tried to mediate between the two ex-allied powers but ended up openly supporting the British. Thus, the U.S. president at that time, Harry S. Truman, initiated a new method of conducting foreign

affairs by providing economic aid to some afflicted Europeans. This marked the beginning of what is known as the Cold War. The world was perceived as bipolar, and its battles were primarily ideological (democracy vs. totalitarian regimes/ capitalism vs. communism) except for a few direct confrontations (The Korean War 1950-1953), crisis (The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962), and blockades (Berlin 1948). The second phase of the Cold War was from the 1960s to the 1980s. Some Third World and Eastern European countries (Albania, for instance) wanted to conduct their foreign policies. Therefore, during the Vietnam War, the Administration of Nixon shifted to a “Détente Policy”<sup>3</sup> and a “Balance of Power approach.”<sup>4</sup> That was ultimately revoked by the 39<sup>th</sup> American President, Jimmy Carter, who focused more on promoting human rights. His successor, Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, had an approach to promoting the worldwide strong position of the United States of America. His policy paved the way for America to lead the world as a unipolar power (Gitelson et al. 427- 434). In essence, throughout the Cold War Era, the United States of America’s foreign policy underwent various stages and phases that were characterized by a multitude of approaches and strategies.

The Post-Cold War Era pointed to a new method of conducting foreign affairs known as humanitarian intervention in some threatened areas in Eastern Europe (Kosovo, for instance) and the Middle East. However, the era that followed, starting from the 2000s, was marked principally by a war against terrorism and countries developing weapons of mass destruction, even though the approaches that were applied by the U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama were dissimilar (Gitelson et al. 434- 440). On account of the preceding, the development of American foreign policy was not a linear process. It instead had historical peaks and valleys throughout its history, depending on many contributing factors.

Unequivocally and as in his 2009 review essay entitled “A Hegemon’s Coming of Age: A Brief History of U.S. Foreign Relations” of George C. Herring’s book, the American academic and professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities Walter Russell Mead constantly confirmed that the American foreign affairs’ history could not be abridged in one-volume work no matter how excellent it might be. For this reason, what has been presented in this part of the present research is seen as a drop in the ocean and a humble attempt to summarize the development of the defense and foreign policy of a great world power such as the United States of America. Nevertheless, Mead stipulated four schools or visions better to describe the different trends of the foreign policy of America. Consequently, most of the political doctrines of certain American presidents’ administrations would fall under the principles of one, or a mixture of more, of these visions.

### **1.1.2. The Four Visions of U.S. Foreign Policy**

Americans have an equally -yet different- dilemmatic feeling about both their domestic and foreign policies. Based on this, two complementary myths had a persisting impact on their foreign and defense policies throughout U.S. history. “The Myth of Vulnerability” and “The Myth of the American Project” were always the foundation of American international relations. Starting from the colonial period onward, Americans had a feeling of vulnerability toward the world’s superpowers that they could not control. On the other hand, they developed a feeling of responsibility, and thus, their involvement in international affairs was inevitable to preserve peace and order in the world (Gitelson et al. 420). The Americans’ abomination of this, somehow, weakness feeling compelled them to work on minimizing it. Since everything has a reason and can be justified, the foreign policy conducts, such as the humanitarian intervention in some Eastern European countries like Kosovo in the late 1990s, emanating from one of American academic and historian Walter

Russel Mead's, one or more, visions of the Myth of the American Project that are explained below.

The first American foreign policy vision to be tackled in this piece of research is Hamiltonianism which happens to be the only vision that is not actually linked to a U.S. President but rather its first Secretary of the Treasury. Between 1787 and 1788, with the help of James Madison and John Jay, Alexander Hamilton discerned his views on foreign policy in "The Federalist Papers" (Kaufman 33). Indeed, they were mostly his ideas and ideals, but the aid of other political figures must not be denied. Also, due to Alexander Hamilton's position as a Secretary of the Treasury in the American government at that time, he prioritized the United States' economic interests to preserve the world order (Gitelson et al. 422). In doing so, there was an obligation to provide equal importance to regularizing domestic and foreign affairs. Videlicet, to have a country that is an economically strong one, has to be protected through a strong navy since most of the U.S. commerce and business affairs, at that time, were with the European countries on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. As a consequence, "Hamiltonians regard a strong alliance between the national government and big business as the key to both domestic stability and effective action abroad, and they have long focused on the nation's need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms" (Mead, *Special Providence* xv). Their ultimate goal is to improve the United States' economic position in the global market, which marks an essential factor in keeping world peace. Mead added that Presidents and policymakers with phrases like "the national interest" and "the balance of powers" tend to be Hamiltonians, just like George Herbert Walker Bush (the father) (*Special Providence* 100; *All the Presidents' Men*), who manifested this in plenty of his foreign policy decisions.

Stipulated from the third American President, Thomas Jefferson's views on foreign policy, the second vision of the American Project is the Jeffersonian school. Jefferson deemed

the American experiment in democracy a role model for other nations to follow, yet the United States has to uphold a neutralist international stance to preserve its domestic well-being (Gitelson et al. 422). In this regard, unlike the Hamiltonian ideals, Jefferson believed in the limited monetary expenditure on the military and navy through building amicable trade relations with the non-threatening nations and thus spending that money on domestic issues such as internal expansion. Just like his predecessors, George Washington and John Adams, Thomas Jefferson favored domestic tranquility over involving themselves in a war with Europe that might demolish the newly formed nation (Kaufman 33). They preferred to work on making democracy and national affairs flourish better than wasting time, energy, and money on distrustful international relations. Thence, “Jeffersonians hold that American foreign policy should be less concerned about spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home; they have historically been skeptical about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies that involve the United States with unsavory allies abroad or that increase the risks of war” (Mead, *Special Providence* xv), even though the premier Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians were contemporary. In that vein, as mentioned before in this part of the chapter, historians contemplate the views of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton antithetical as they were both the foundation of two different theories in foreign policy conduct (unilateralism/ isolationism or interventionism) (Kaufman 31). These theories will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

The third vision is the Jacksonian school which is associated with the seventh U.S. President, Andrew Jackson. It concurs with Jeffersonianism on the notions of exceptionalism but tends to be internationally pugnacious and authoritarian (Gitelson et al. 422). Having the same nationalist feelings as the Jeffersonians did not hinder the Jacksonians, like President Ronald Reagan, from being hostile and ready to be belligerent. The Jacksonian populist school “believes that the most important goal of the U.S. government in both foreign and

domestic policy should be the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people... Jacksonians believe that the United States should not seek out foreign quarrels” (Mead, *Special Providence* xv). However, in the case of foreign hegemony, the U.S. must not only fight back but must also be victorious no matter what the consequences may be to maintain its position.

The fourth and last U.S. foreign policy vision is the Wilsonian vision associated with the 28<sup>th</sup> American President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921). This school is considered moral, derived from the truth that the United States is responsible for upholding global harmony through universal bodies like the former League of Nations and the United Nations (Gitelson et al. 421). Wilson’s view is an idealist/ liberal approach that justifies the U.S. interventionism for the world’s need for freedom and democracy. He summarized the ideals of his new notion of “collective security”<sup>5</sup> in a speech addressed to Congress in 1918, which historically gained the name of “Wilson’s Fourteen Points” (Kaufman 12, 49). Moreover, W. R. Mead emphasized that “Wilsonians believe that the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law” (*Special Providence* xv). In other words, America sees itself as a world savior, particularly following the triumph of the Bolsheviks in the 1918 Russian Civil War, signifying the conclusion of an epoch dominated by the European Continental Empires. These international circumstances led American President Woodrow Wilson to prevail in his newfangled vision of a world where multilateral organizations such as the League of Nations would promote notions of “collective security and national self-determination” (Gavrilis 2). The best example of a recent U.S. president who fulfilled the values of this vision is George W. Bush (Kaufman 12) and John F. Kennedy. Bill Clinton’s tendency to rely on the United Nations to resolve the humanitarian

crisis occurring in a remote area such as Kosovo is part of the Wilsonian view of foreign policy.

Despite the distinct appellations of these so-called schools, visions, or even foreign policy theories by different historians, the explanation of the American academic Walter Russell Mead in his distinguished book under the title of “A Hegemon’s Coming of Age: A Brief History of U.S. Foreign Relations” remains unparalleled. In just a few pages, he tried to make the American background and contemporary history as a world power clearer than ever.

### **1.1.3. Stated Goals of the American Foreign Policy**

The American Department of State describes its mission on its official website as: “To protect and promote U.S. security, prosperity, and democratic values and shape an international environment in which all Americans can thrive.” It is not only about “protecting” or safeguarding but also “promoting,” elevating, and fostering the United States of America’s security against different kinds of threats like terrorism, environmental degradation, narcotics, or pandemics. However, achieving a satisfying level of security is a matter of contention, as doing this depends on many factors, such as world circumstances and events, policymakers, and the era itself. The pursuit of prosperity is also an American Foreign Policy stated goal, necessitating a worldwide collaboration that transforms the vast expanse of the planet into a tightly-knit community. Since it mainly touches the economy, making the world a global marketplace where economic transactions and trade are organized and facilitated via international economic organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization is a vital step in achieving prosperity, according to the scholar Duncan Watts (112). He further argued on the same page that in fostering democratic values, Americans encourage the advance of human rights notions, promote political choice through fighting tyranny and dictatorship, propagate the principles of self-determination by helping some troubled countries realize their ultimate right in determining their form of government,

fate, and future and promote the rule of law by denouncing the arbitrary use of power and substituting it to trustworthy and lawful leaders. This will create a healthy international environment for the American citizens and the worldwide community “to thrive.” At last, this saying makes people cherish such a noble goal, especially if it is genuinely fulfilled to the fullest.

Moreover, inspecting the state and situation of American citizens, both domestically and internationally, it becomes evident that their government is committed to prioritizing their well-being. As a result, the American Secretary of State and other governmental entities strive to promote transparency in the workplace, enabling them to establish clear objectives and set an agenda that can be communicated to the public, both in a broad sense and with precise details.

In this regard, on March 3; 2021, five weeks after his inauguration, the current U.S. Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, delivered a speech in Ben Franklin Room in Washington D.C. entitled “A Foreign Policy for the American People.” Blinken initiated his speech by defining the general purpose of his job, which is “to represent the United States to the world, [and] to fight for the interests and values of the American people.” Additionally, Antony J. Blinken pledged to make the lives of American citizens more secure, create opportunities and tackle global crises that have, in one way or another, an impact on their future. The U.S. Department of State generally adheres to a standard set of goals, yet each Secretary of State sets objectives that might differ, during their term, depending on many factors.

## **1.2. U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making**

The composition of any government is like a family. Decision-making happens at the higher level of these institutions but the opinions and participation of many other parts have to be considered. The parents are the responsible entity that makes everything work, yet, the

participation of mainly the children, community, and circumstances counts too. Be it the primary concern in this research, the American government goes through the same process to make decisions in each branch of its government.

According to the American Political Science professors Alan Gitelson, Robert Dudley, and Melvin Dubnick, the U.S. foreign and defense policies' decision-making depends on a different set of institutions in addition to other factors. Moreover, the era of international events plays a crucial role too. For instance, during the Cold War Era, a select group at the heart of the White House was responsible for making different defense and foreign affairs decisions with a glimpse of influence from the public. Nevertheless, the public and U.S. Congress dominated foreign and defense policymaking during the post-Cold War Era (463, 464). On this account, this part of the chapter attempts to elucidate the process of foreign policy decision-making in the United States, since it is always interesting to know the state of mind and attitude of the people behind momentous historical decisions.

### **1.2.1. Who Makes What?**

This part of the chapter passes from explaining the “what” which attempts to answer basic questions such as whether they make policy or affairs and whether or not there is any difference between political terms such as diplomacy, duplicity, foreign policy, foreign affairs, and international relations... to dealing with the “who” by trying to understand the people and institutions behind the major foreign policy decisions in the American history forasmuch that it will provide a background comprehension of who was behind making the Kosovo intervention's decision.

Globalization made America today change the primary focus of the issues related to its “foreign and defense policies” from “territorial disputes and economic trade issues” in its nascent days to social, environmental, and humanitarian issues (Gitelson et al. 424) such as the ethnic cleansing that happened in Kosovo during the closing years of the twentieth

century. This change is accompanied by the advent of “new actors,” in its policymaking, as the authors Alan R. Gitelson, Robert L. Dudley, and Melvin J. Dubnick elaborated, and this will be tackled later on.

Apart from that, in a Sidebar document entitled “Constitutional Limits on States’ Power over Foreign Affairs,” which is prepared by the Congressional Research Service<sup>6</sup> (CRS), the American Legislative Attorney Stephen P. Mulligan discussed the constitutional constraints imposed on states’ involvement in foreign affairs and the prospective intervention of the U.S. Congress. He noted that, in Article I Section 10, the U.S. Constitution restricted the American states’ engagement in activities related to foreign affairs, giving the power primarily to the federal government to manage them. Regardless of these clearly stated congressional limits even assisted by other constitutional provisions, the American states started to have a hand in international relations such as trade and diplomatic delegations and written pacts on trade, environment, and tourism. Mulligan concluded his Sidebar with some considerations for the Congress of the United States of America which, assert the Department of State, like any other institution, passed and still can go through adjustments to make the most suitable policymaking decisions.

#### **1.2.1.1. Policy vs. Affairs**

In any field of study, some terminology might be interchangeably used, which is not always feasible. The same thing occurs in the domain of political science. Most of the time, the terms policy and affairs are used like two peas in a pod, but do they denote the same thing?

First, the term “policy,” as mentioned in the online dictionary Merriam-Webster, refers to “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures, especially of a governmental body.” Its etymology goes back to the “Middle English” words “*policie, pollecye*” which mean “art or practice of government, system of government,

commonwealth, organization or conduct of affairs, practical skill, prudence, borrowed from Anglo-French *policie, pollecie*” referring to “governance, system of government, borrowed from Late Latin *polītīa*” which refers to “citizenship, political organization, government”. Like many words in English, the origin of the word “policy” is Latin, which definitely has a relation to the modern word “politics.” The evolution of the word reached its actual form, “policy.” On its turn, according to Peter Hodgson Collin’s Dictionary of Politics and Government, “policy” is a noun that stands for “a detailed plan of how something will be done” (182). That is to say, when the government makes a policy, it is setting a plan of how a particular department should work.

On the other hand, according to the online dictionary Merriam-Webster, the word “affairs” consistently appears in the plural form when it indicates the “commercial, professional, public, or personal business.” The etymology of the term is associated with the Middle English word *aferes* which means “activities,” and *affaire*, which refers to “enterprise,” and which, in their turn, are borrowed from Anglo-French *affaire, affere* from the phrase *a faire* which means “to do” in English. Consequently, relying on this origin, the denotation of the term policy used as “a plan” is the same as the denotation of the term affairs used as “to do.”

In general, “affairs of state” is a plural noun that stands for “government business” (Collin 7) which implies putting the government’s policy as a theoretical framework into practice through making affairs or business. Nonetheless, the subsequent title is composed of brief definitions of some glossaries related to the subject matter, among which “foreign affairs” and “foreign policy,” where there will be an attempt to check the interchangeability of these two phrases used in the political science field.

### **1.2.1.2. Diplomacy, Duplicity, Foreign Affairs and Policy or International Relations?**

The terminology in the field of political science is colossal. Nevertheless, some terms are pillars to fully comprehending this interesting domain. The main concern of this part is the foreign policy issues of the USA. But first, is it diplomacy, duplicity, international relations foreign affairs, or foreign policy?

The first definition of “diplomacy” in Collin’s dictionary is “the management of a country’s interest in another country” (73). This involves many different tasks, including assessing the interests of the country, managing relationships with other countries, and making decisions about how to best pursue those interests. In addition, the online dictionary Merriam-Webster’s definition of the term “diplomacy” is divided into two. The first definition refers to “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations,” and the second points to a “skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility.” In other words, negotiation is an indispensable art and skill and essential in tackling foreign affairs without resorting to being belligerent.

Furthermore, in the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, defining “diplomacy” started with an overview of the word’s etymology which goes back to the Greeks and was used again in Medieval Europe. Nonetheless, it has been noted that there are “distinct styles of diplomacy” depending on the area and the era. Overall, diplomats “represent to their home government and to their host government the views and interests of the other and, in negotiation, attempt to reconcile the two” (204). They provide governments with assistance to understand each other. They try to negotiate compromise solutions that attempt to satisfy both sides.

The Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, David Robertson, on his turn, stated in his Routledge Dictionary that “diplomacy” as a “behavior and political strategy” is relatively ancient, yet, diplomacy as an idea derived and developed its techniques and styles

from the eighteenth century European representatives of foreign affairs. Thereupon, diplomats professionally represent the interests of their home countries on the international level. The diplomatic activity ranges from consular functions to international negotiations and representation. In general, diplomacy works to avoid any kind of armed entanglements between nations. Robinson went further to explain the notion of “Shuttle Diplomacy,” that is, most of the time, “exclusively engaged” by the United States of America, which does not tend to save any efforts in intermediating between conflicting nations to settle down the issues that caused unrest (147). Though it dates back to antiquity, modern Europeans set a solid ground for today’s diplomatic conducts to better suit the needs of the countries involved and promote their best interests. America is not exempt from this situation. It is instead a leading country in terms of following diplomatic traditions and initiating unique strategies to make the world a better, more peaceful place.

In the Post- WWII Era, the U.S. Presidents utilized a variety of strategies to achieve the goals of their foreign policy that ranged from providing economic aid, economic sanctions, and breaking off diplomatic relations to military interventions and other methods. This epoch was marked by the tendency that foreign policy was the president’s policy with the deliberate ratification of Congress. Howbeit, during the Post-Cold War Era, America shifted its interest to not only being the most powerful country in terms of its military forces but also economically. This strategic redirection necessitated the active engagement of America in various international organizations. Despite the “lofty rhetoric” of the American foreign policy, it contradicted its actions in many global hotspots, which made critics accuse the U.S. policymakers of being “Machiavellian” and hypocritical (Watts 113). This called for the notions of what is known as duplicity. “Duplicity” in foreign affairs, as opposed to diplomacy, is “the belying of one’s true intentions by deceptive words or action”

(“Duplicity”). It can be used to disguise a country’s true intentions, which can be harmful to another country.

Foreign policy, as an attempt to define it, is a term that first appeared in 1804 and which refers to “the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states” (“Foreign policy”). It is a deliberate effort to preserve a balance of power while advancing the state’s interests. Foreign affairs, on the other hand, “generally refers to decisions made by one country or nation-state that directly affect another” (Kaufman 9). These decisions made by a nation can significantly affect another nation, whether in the areas of commerce, political affairs, or military operations. “Foreign affairs” is a much older phrase that first appeared in 1611, meaning “matters having to do with international relations and with the interests of the home country in foreign countries” (“Foreign affairs”). These issues are complex and often involve a great deal of diplomacy.

On the same page of his dictionary of politics and government, the author P. H. Collin defined foreign affairs as “matters concerning other countries.” In contrast, foreign policy was defined as “the policy followed by a country when dealing with other countries” (99). Distinguishing between foreign affairs and foreign policy is relevant in comprehending a nation’s approach to international relations. Foreign affairs involve all of the issues and concerns that a country has with other countries. In contrast, foreign policy is the specific set of decisions and actions that a country takes in order to achieve its goals concerning other countries.

As a final point, though its importance in today’s branch of political science, the phrase “international relations” is relatively recent, as it was first uttered in 1914. “International Relations” is “a branch of political science concerned with relations between nations and primarily with foreign policies,” as defined by the online dictionary Merriam-Webster. This field of study is about how nations interact with each other, and it is focused

primarily on the policies of foreign governments. It can be used to understand the relationships between different nations and provide insights into the work of international politics. The author P. H. Collin has provided two definitions of international relations in his dictionary, and the first one is “political activities undertaken between two or more countries,” and the second one, alternatively, is “the branch of political science that studies relations between different countries” (125). The spectrum of actions that can be employed ranges from diplomatic negotiations and contractual agreements to military force. Such endeavors wield immense influence over the global political sphere and may frequently instigate tension or conflict. The international relations discipline is complex and challenging, yet it remains an essential component of comprehending the intricacies of the global community. Ultimately, the phrase stands for “the discipline that studies interactions between and among states, and more broadly, the workings of the international system as a whole. It can be conceived of either as a multidisciplinary field, gathering together the international aspects of politics, economics, history, law, and sociology, or as a meta-discipline, focusing on the systemic structures and patterns of interaction of the human species taken as a whole” (“Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics” 357). It embodies the profound comprehension of how nations engage in diplomatic, economic, and military exchanges, alongside their significance as participants within various international organizations.

The international relations field holds immense significance in delineating the spatial demarcations among nations across the globe. These countries often work together to address common issues in their foreign policies through diplomacy. A thing that often makes international borders disappear as the nations involved work together to resolve conflicts. This process can be helped by international organizations, which can provide support and resources to their member countries.

### 1.2.1.3. The Executive vs. the Legislative

In discarding the tyranny of the European monarchy (mainly the British), the American Founding Fathers attempted gradually to draft the best-regulating documents for their promising government. As has previously been mentioned in this chapter, after the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation were doomed to failure. Therefore, they drafted and ratified a substitute which is the U.S. Constitution in 1788 and which made the USA a constitutional federal republic. In other words, the supreme law of the nation is this Constitution. In its articles, the American Constitution defined the powers and limits of both federal and state governments, subtly acknowledging that sovereignty is indirectly vested in the hands of the people<sup>7</sup> (Arnold 3). American people elect, both directly and indirectly, the decision-makers in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, which implies their participation in their country's politics. Foreign and defense policy-making is no less important than any other aspect of governance. The U.S. Constitution wisely allocated specific roles to each branch of government, ensuring that the highest caliber of decisions would be made in international relations.

Traditionally, foreign policy was about countries' relations but under the notions of globalization, and it includes a country's relations with not only other countries but also organizations (UN, EU, NATO), multinational corporations (Walmart), stateless and nonstate actors<sup>8</sup> or non-governmental organizations (Sierra Club or Amnesty International) (Kaufman 9). The divergence of these influential institutions came from the complexity of the modern world, which called for new actors in this field. Still, the power to make foreign and defense policies in the U.S. is chiefly shared by the legislative and executive branches of the government.

The Congress is the collective name of the House of Representatives and the Senate, which are the two elected chambers of the legislative branch of the United States federal

government (Watts 53). The first Article of the Constitution defined the composition of this branch of the government in addition to its role. With American foreign policy, different clauses of the eighth Section of the first Article of the U.S. Constitution address the legislative branch's powers in this domain. Clause 3 provides Congress with the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations...". Clause 11 grants it the power "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." Clause 12 is about the power "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." Lastly, Clause 13 is about "To provide and maintain a Navy." The 18<sup>th</sup> and last Clause of the same Section of the U.S. Constitution's Article I accords Congress the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers..." ("Constitution of the United States"), which is a clear statement that the legislative branch of the American government has the authority to pass whatever necessary law, including those which have a relation to the American foreign affairs. Despite these de facto constitutional powers, the era of foreign policymaking is a crucial factor in the involvement of the Congress, which is proven to be increasing (Watts 446). Most of the time, it was the executive branch's decision in foreign affairs, yet this became relative due to the American Congress growing involvement.

Constitutionally speaking, the preponderance of foreign policymaking power is vested in the hands of the American President. Nevertheless, throughout the inception of the nation, the President used to get help from his Secretary of State. The Cold War incidents, in their turn, led Congress to create the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947, composed of "the president, the vice president, the secretaries of defense and state, and other officials that the president wished to invite, such as the secretary of commerce, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It is worth mentioning

that the NSC is not a decision-making body but can be summoned in case of need for advice and opinions (Gitelson et al. 441). Even so, the power is still in the hands of the American government's executive branch.

The second Article of the United States of America's Constitution addresses the executive branch. Clause 1 of its second Section addresses the powers that are vested in the American President, among which to "be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States...". Furthermore, the second Clause of the same first Section of Article II addresses more powers related to foreign affairs, which are "to make Treaties" and "appoint Ambassadors." These powers cannot be fulfilled without the consent and advice of at least two-thirds of the Senate. A procedure that falls under what is called the "system of Checks and Balances," which divides the governing powers between the three branches of the American government, giving the right to a particular branch to lawfully exercise some form of power over others (Arnold 4, 35). This system was created to oversee the excellent and coordinated work of the United States federal government's three branches. The judicial branch, on the other hand, gets rarely involved in interpreting specific constitutional issues related to the foreign policy process (Kaufman 20) because, as already mentioned, the American Constitution divides foreign affairs issues between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. federal government.

Another important substantial notion in the American Constitution is the "separation of powers," which is not explicitly mentioned in it. However, the three first Articles thoroughly explained the governmental powers and restrictions of each of the three branches of the American government. The same thing goes for making and implementing foreign policy. Article I of the U.S. Constitution determined certain foreign policy powers to the legislative branch of the government represented by Congress. Some Clauses of the second

Article of the U.S. Constitution, in its turn, granted various crucial roles and foreign policy powers to the American President as head of the executive branch. In addition, being the Nation's Chief Diplomat, the American President assumes the pivotal role in engaging with foreign nations to forge crucial treaties with the approval of the Senate. Also, the American President happens to be the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, given even the authority to make peace or war decisions. In contrast, it is within the prerogative of Congress to exercise the solemn authority to declare war (Watts 115), since such a critical power and decision should be vested in the hands of many experts and not only one incumbent. Nonetheless, this did not prevent certain U.S. Presidents from launching wars without consent from Congress, like the case of President Harry Truman when he took decisive action to send American forces to Korea in 1950, only under a UN resolution. President Bill Clinton also used military forces in many hotspots globally, including Kosovo, the case study of this research, in 1999 without congressional approval claiming that it was a UN mission (Kaufman 22, 23). Moreover, since the U.S. is an active member of such an organization, it has to obey and go along with its decisions.

These conflicting ideas and incidents make readers wonder about the real foreign policy decision-makers. This opens the door to additional actors found, especially in recent decades, to have a hand in the foreign affairs decision-making process of the United States of America.

#### **1.2.1.4. Other Actors**

The dynamic evolution of the United States as a newly-formed nation brought about a transformation in foreign policymaking, among other facets. Those responsible for crucial historical decisions in the eighteenth century differ significantly from their counterparts in subsequent centuries. In the same context, the authors Gitelson et al. mentioned that during the Cold War Era, the arena of foreign policy in the USA was dominated by the executive

branch, namely “the president, his national security advisors and military experts.” They further added that in the Post-Cold War Era, the U.S. Congress, some interest groups, and public opinion all participated in the process of the U.S. foreign policymaking without neglecting the coordination with other departments such as the Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security... departments (440, 441). With the conclusion of the Cold War came a new era of diminished centralization in the realm of United States foreign policy. However, the importance of fostering collaborations among various departments was not disregarded. Indeed, they do not make decisions but at least influence decision-makers. From this point, many actors appeared in the arena of U.S. foreign policymaking.

Primarily, the media is a significant actor in enlightening individuals about critical subjects like foreign policy concerns. Within the realm of international affairs, the media assumes three pivotal objectives. The first is “to define events” to justify the U.S. involvement abroad. The second objective is “to dominate the news” so that the public’s attention to foreign policy priorities would be drawn, giving way to the third objective, “to silence critics.” These media management objectives are administered by the White House and the Defense Department (Gitelson et al. 447). The media’s role in foreign policy is to help define events and draw public attention to foreign policy priorities. This is done by controlling the news and deciding what information should be released to the public, a process managed by a higher authority in the American government.

The second actor is the public. During the Cold War, the American public played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy decisions that aligned with their government’s interests on numerous occasions. Yet, their involvement inadvertently eroded the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. military presence in Vietnam. A pressure that expedited their retreat from there (Kaufman 24). This decision led both conflicting parties to rethink their positions on the issue, leading to a shift in their perspectives. Nevertheless, the participation of the

American public was not always that vital due to the public mood theory. The public mood theory is about whether or not the American public indirectly favors certain U.S. foreign policy decisions. Depending on this theory, many historical events changed their course (The Vietnam War, for instance). During the Clinton presidency, on the other hand, the public did not care about foreign policy (Gitelson et al. 449, 450). The public was much more interested in other domestic issues. Thus, the government could carry out its foreign policy goals without much interference from them.

A portion of the U.S. public is called the “Attentive Public,” which forms less than one-fifth of the U.S. public, but they are very influential in shaping U.S. policies as most of them join interest groups. These interest groups have a diverse range of activities in the foreign and defense domains, among which are supporting the United Nations and promoting human rights. There are even lobbyists representing foreign governments in the White House and Congress (Gitelson et al. 448). This situation harbors the possibility of generating a conflict of interest among government officials while also fostering confusion in the public regarding what is being advocated for. Professor Joyce Kaufman added that lobbyists worked on making the U.S. economy and business interests participate in American involvement abroad (24). Many big businesses have a history of lobbying the government for beneficial policies. They often have connections to foreign policy and security matters, which has often been a reason for American intervention or mediation in many parts of the world. This involvement has ranged from military action to humanitarian assistance to economic assistance.

Many new actors participate in U.S. foreign policymaking, and not all of them are people who have traditionally been involved in foreign policy. For example, some new actors are involved in lobbying and other forms of activism. In other words, the above-mentioned actors in U.S. foreign policymaking are not the only ones in the arena. New actors represented

by international organizations (United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), regional organizations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization of American States (OAS)), Transnational organizations (Médecins Sans Frontières), multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Greenpeace and the Salvation Army) (Gitelson et al. 424, 425) appeared to have a hand in the U.S. international relations with each organization having its agenda.

### **1.2.2. Doctrines and Political Theories**

Even though American history is relatively new as compared to that of other powers in today's world, it is acknowledged that it is one of the richest ever. This is due to the innovative spirit of its leaders and figures. The road toward determining the Americans' position in the world was long. Political leaders often change their views on foreign policy issues and the best way to approach the world based on many different factors, including the era, the world's circumstances, and their country's interests. Some presidents and figures focused on maintaining peace, others on defending America's interests, and others on expanding America's international role. Therefore, putting the theoretical framework of foreign policy orientations into practice resulted in distinct political doctrines.

This section provides an overview of the orientations and options of American foreign policy that have led to the development of important doctrines throughout history and which will be ordered chronologically.

#### **1.2.2.1. Ways of International Conduct**

Throughout history, the political ideologies of United States Presidents and prominent figures have displayed a level of diversity and evolution. Some of these presidents believed in neutrality and isolationism, while others thought interventionism was the best way to go about international relations. This variation in opinion had developed over time into different

foreign policy orientations as scholars like Joyce P. Kaufman divided them into unilateralism, neutrality, isolationism, and engagement. There is a difference in the connotation of such United States' foreign policy conducts, which has led to a visible difference in their principles.

The prevalent foreign policy in the formative years of the USA was unilateralism, i.e., the policy of aloofness, as Americans were allowed to have economic relations with other countries. Nonetheless, they were bounded to no formal treaties. Under the presidency of George Washington, the Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, including other political figures later on, considered this approach the finest in creating a rich country (Kaufman 16). Unilateralism helped Americans focus on their economy and navy, which allowed them to strengthen them and lead the country to become the most powerful in the posterior centuries. The United States' foreign policy approach of restrained engagement, and the deliberate selection of when to engage with other nations, provided the foundation for its diplomatic strategy. The United States of America could achieve its national interests and fulfill its "manifest destiny"- while protecting itself from European intrigues (Kaufman 35, 40). This allowed America to pursue its interests without involving itself in the affairs of other countries. Despite the preceding, international relations involve interactions between states. The goal of these interactions is to maintain peace and stability. In order to achieve this goal, the international community has created institutions, such as the UN, to allow for collective action. States are cautioned against acting unilaterally, as this can often lead to conflict and harm to others (Condé 267). To illustrate, many advocate the opposite of unilateralism, namely multilateralism, on foreign policy issues, because the latter is more effective in resolving issues.

Unilateralism was not a policy of isolationism; it meant that the U.S. would pursue its agenda when it felt it was in the country's best interests (Kaufman 40). Up until the fin-de-

siècle, the United States tended to focus its attention on domestic issues and avoided interfering in the affairs of other countries. Thus, Isolationists believe in a policy of noninterventionism, with solid border controls to prevent international travel and cultural exchange (Watts 154). This approach, for them, was deemed the most optimal to protect U.S. interests. Explicitly, isolationism is a policy of withdrawing from international relationships, which would leave the country isolated from the rest of the world and unable to conduct trade or interact with other countries. This would be particularly difficult for countries with significant trade interests or who rely on international commerce to maintain their economy (Paterson 5). Isolationism, therefore, cannot be equated either with unilateralism or neutrality.

A neutral state, in its turn, means that it does not participate in any international armed conflict. During wartime, this state tends to adopt a policy of impartiality and recognizes all the states at war as belligerents. If it does this, then the belligerent states are prohibited from attacking it (Condé 172). This status allows countries to avoid potential conflicts, tension, or instability and to preserve peace.

Previously, America was a reluctant participant in international affairs. However, recently it has become more involved in the world, taking on a progressively more active role (Watts 113) in order to promote peace and stability. Professor Joyce P. Kaufman used the terms engagement and internationalism interchangeably. She argued that since the conclusion of World War II, this has remained an integral component of the United States foreign policy. Encompassing a comprehensive approach to international affairs, this policy entails engaging proactively across various realms, such as military collaborations and political alliances (18). This differed markedly from the practice before World War II when America was largely indifferent to international affairs. In adherence to the contemporary approach of Manifest Destiny, Americans believed that the country must help uphold democracy worldwide (Watts 185). This belief has been expressed in various ways, including through the establishment of

democracy assistance programs, human rights advancement, and the support of peaceful transitions to democracy.

Succinctly, unilateralism as a U.S. foreign policy option entails cutting off relations with other countries except those that safeguard and promote its economic interests. Isolationism is instead a policy of not having any relations or alliances with foreign nations. The orientation of neutrality, otherwise, is to step away from entangling with other nations, especially in wartime. Last, engagement is the policy of interfering in international affairs in various ways.

### **1.2.2.2. Pivotal Presidential Doctrines**

Most of the forty-six American presidents had a clear doctrine concerning foreign policy orientations. Nonetheless, regarding this research, some of these doctrines were chosen to be tackled.

The first doctrine of American foreign policy to be tackled in this research is the Monroe Doctrine. It was named after the incumbent President, James Monroe, but scholars note that it was a policy developed by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams (Gitelson et al. 441). The United States holds a steadfast commitment to safeguarding the autonomy of its states, particularly against external intrusion, specifically from Europe (Colin 154). This principle is especially fundamental given the historical ties between the United States and Europe. It was designed to keep Europeans from dominating the Americas, and it was based on the three main concepts of separateness, non-intervention, and non-colonization (Watts 197). It signaled a clear break between the New World and the old, autocratic Europe. The Doctrine was crafted to demonstrate to the American populace and the international community that the New World was separate from Europe and that the United States would not be a part of European politics. In addition, as one of the most influential and enduring foreign policies of America, the Monroe Doctrine impacted the development of politics and

economics in the Caribbean and Latin American regions (Paterson 15). It has helped to shape the course of events in these regions.

However, there is an unconventional view of the Monroe Doctrine, which is reckoned by the American journalist Walter Lippmann and is endorsed by the American academic Walter Russell Mead. This view stipulates that the Monroe Doctrine was not only not in support of isolationism, but it was anti-isolationist too. The American interventionist tendency in World Wars I and II and the Cold War was not a sudden departure from the principles of the Monroe Doctrine (*Special Providence* 81). Instead, they were part of a long-standing tradition of American involvement in world affairs. More precisely, the Doctrine was designed to maintain friendly relations with other countries while discouraging their tendency to withdraw from the global community. Therefore, by eliminating competing foreign powers through various means, including warfare, the United States of America could better serve its national interests and priorities (Kaufman 38). This primarily involved cautioning Great Britain and Spain against interfering in the Western Hemisphere's affairs.

The second doctrine is the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In a speech delivered to the U.S. Congress in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt established a policy that upheld the principles outlined in President James Monroe's Doctrine (Kaufman 44, 45). The Doctrine dictates that the United States will prevent foreign entities from extending their sway over the Western Hemisphere and will safeguard the region's stability and sovereignty. Roosevelt believed that America should participate in the world stage, using its power and influence to contribute toward the amelioration of the world. This was in line with his strong belief in a powerful and active foreign policy using the famous motto "speak softly and carry a big stick." He asserted the right of the USA to intervene in Latin America, claiming that the region required strong leadership (Watts 263). President Theodore Roosevelt made this claim in response to the instability and violence rampant throughout the Western Hemisphere. He

believed that his foreign policy interventionist vision would benefit the United States, Latin American regions, and the world as a whole.

The third doctrine is the Truman Doctrine, a policy statement by U.S. President Harry S. Truman that outlined the United States' intent to deter and contain Communist belligerence in threatened nations like Greece by sending U.S. military and economic advisers. He addressed Congress in a speech that outlined the American support for "people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Watts 300). President Truman pledged the United States' unconditional support for these countries to help them improve their governance and stability. He declared that America would do everything possible to help these people achieve their objectives. The Doctrine eventually evolved into "communist containment," the most wide-reaching foreign policy in U.S. history (Paterson 50). This policy was successful in preventing communism from spreading and helped build the foundation for the Cold War. Not only this, the Doctrine had other significant foreign policy implications. One of them marked the inaugural instance where international aid and economic support were strategically employed as foreign policy instruments (Kaufman 88). A policy that continued and evolved in the Cold War and the Post-Cold War Eras.

The last doctrine to be dealt with in this part of this research is the Clinton Doctrine. President Bill Clinton took boldly away from the traditional United States' isolationism, expanding its overseas economic and political initiatives (Paterson 4). This shift was a critical step in helping America become a more influential player on the world stage. The American professor of political science Joyce P. Kaufman asserted that the Clinton Doctrine's ideals have many similar points to those of Jimmy Carter's, and both stem from the Wilsonian views of centralizing human rights in foreign policy. Consequently, Clinton used this as a pretext for the 1999 Kosovo intervention (133). The liberal international order was born during the Cold War as a fledgling effort by the United States to uphold international norms and institutions.

President Bill Clinton kept this order substantial while in Office, supporting democratic ideals and human rights (Paterson 29). He helped to bolster the role of the United Nations and other organizations that promote human rights and peace. This so-called Humanitarian Intervention doctrine will be tackled thoroughly whenever necessary in this research.

In the end, a doctrine is defined as a state or a cluster of countries having a program of action in international relations (Condé 69). This program typically includes different areas of activity, such as diplomacy, economic development, and defense. This program's goal is to achieve the objectives of the state in the international arena and to protect its interests. Throughout history, the USA has been a dominant force in global affairs, guided by its profound foreign policy visions and doctrines that have far-reaching consequences for the nation and the international community.

### **Conclusion**

Throughout its history, the United States of America has consistently demonstrated a commitment to actively participating in global matters, driven by many influential factors. The U.S. involvement has been sporadic at times, but it has always been there. The country has been more isolationist in the past, but it has recently begun to become more involved in world affairs. This involvement has ranged from being a leader in various organizations to providing financial assistance to militarily intervening. In recent years, it has devoted itself to advancing democracy and human rights principles, striving to avert conflicts. All the while, it has remained steadfast in pursuing its national interests.

Many governmental and non-governmental actors contribute to the U.S. foreign policy decision-making as it no longer rests solely in the hands of the American President and the U.S. Congress. Such a change in foreign policy decision-making made other changes compulsory. Presidents would rely on one or more visions of American foreign policy to determine which orientation they will approach facing a particular situation in the world.

Thereupon, the country's interests and how well they align with the president's values are key priorities.

This chapter is an attempt to provide a framework to comprehend better the mindset of the American administration that played a vital role in helping to alleviate the hardships faced by the Kosovar people during the civil war of the late 1990s. In addition, this historical background surrounding the U.S. foreign policy lays a solid foundation for comprehending the rationale behind and how the United States sought the collaboration of international organizations in its humanitarian intervention in the region of Kosovo.

## Endnotes

1. “The Office of the Historian is responsible, under law, for the preparation and publication of the official documentary history of U.S. foreign policy in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. In addition, the Office prepares policy-supportive historical studies for Department principals and other agencies. These studies provide essential background information, evaluate how and why policies evolved, identify precedents, and derive lessons learned. Department officers rely on institutional memory, collective wisdom, and personal experience to make decisions; rigorous historical analysis can sharpen, focus, and inform their choices. The Office of the Historian conducts an array of initiatives, ranging from briefing memos to multi-year research projects. The Office of the Historian also promotes the declassification of documents to ensure a complete and accurate understanding of the past” (*U.S. Department of State*). For further information, please refer to <https://history.state.gov/>
2. The original members of the committee were Benjamin Franklin, John Dickinson, Robert Morris from Pennsylvania, Benjamin Harrison and Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, and John Jay from New York (Ciment 166).
3. “Détente: The relaxation of tensions between nations. It became the name for President Nixon’s policy of taking a more cooperative approach in dealing with Soviet bloc nations while enhancing U.S. security arrangements with its allies” (Gitelson et al. 430).
4. “Balance of power strategy: a “realist’s” approach to foreign policy, based on the need to offset any imbalance in international relations that might lead to one nation becoming too powerful. Advocated by Henry Kissinger, it was the central premise of American foreign policy for most of the 1970s” (Gitelson et al. 432).
5. “The concept of uniting all states—large and small, powerful and those with less power—into one organization that would allow all of them to work together to thwart the imperialist or expansionist intentions of any one nation” (Kaufman 49).
6. “The Congressional Research Service (CRS), a federal legislative branch agency located within the Library of Congress, serves as shared staff exclusively to congressional committees and Members of Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative process — from the early considerations that precede bill drafting, through committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency activities. CRS approaches complex topics from a variety of perspectives and examines all sides of an issue. Staff members analyze current policies and present the impact of proposed policy alternatives. CRS services come in many forms: reports on major policy issues, tailored confidential memoranda, briefings and consultations, seminars and workshops, expert congressional testimony” (*crsreports*). For further information, please refer to <https://crsreports.congress.gov/Home/About>
7. “As a republic, the ultimate power within the American system rests with the people. This power is exercised through regular, scheduled elections in which voters select the President,

members of Congress, and various state and local officials. These officials and their staffs formulate policy, make laws, and direct the day-to-day operations of government” (Arnold 3).

8. According to the professor of Political Science Joyce P. Kaufman, stateless actors that might be part of making foreign policy of other countries are people like the Palestinians. Furthermore, the nonstate actors are those entities that exist outside the boundaries of any established country, like Al Qaeda or ISIS (9).

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## **Chapter Two**

# **Historical Background and Development of Kosovo War**

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## **Chapter Two**

### **Historical Background and Development of Kosovo War**

#### **Introduction**

A country is more than just a geographical spot and boundaries on a map. It is instead a feeling of unity and togetherness that connects a group of people with shared characteristics. This feeling can be powerful and inspiring, helping people to come together and work toward common objectives. Therefore, these people's shared history, culture, and values make them unique and special. The lure of stability and interest in such a feeling motivates them to do whatever it takes to reach it. World history is full of fascinating stories of how new nations have been formed. The history of Kosovo as a newly independent country is one of courage and resilience. It has a long and illustrious history of overcoming adversity and several historical atrocities. Nonetheless, after centuries of persecution, the country has recently achieved formal independence, which marked a significant change in its history.

This second chapter of the current research is entitled "Historical Background and Development of Kosovo War." It is divided into two parts. The first part is also divided into two other subparts. The first is an overview of the historical background of this novice country, a crossroad of different civilizations that connected the East to the West. It also focuses on Kosovo's strained relationship with Serbia and Yugoslavia because it has had a profound impact on its development over the years. The second subpart tackles the diverse direct and indirect causes that gradually led to its bloody civil war, which ravaged it in the late 1990s.

The second part of this chapter, in turn, deals with the aftermath of the war there, considered a turning point in Kosovo's history. It initially contemplates the consequences of the 1999 ethnic cleansing, along with an evaluation of the subsequent response from the

global community toward the conflict and the ensuing NATO humanitarian intervention.

Then, the second subpart of the chapter's second part deals with the geopolitical standing of the Kosovo Republic in the international arena, particularly in the period following the war and in more recent times. It mainly focuses on the country's current political and economic situations.

### **2.1. Overview of a Country and a War**

The purpose of this part of the chapter lies in delving into the historical background of Kosovo as a country, subsequently shedding light on the civil war that ravaged the region during the late 1990s.

Kosovo is a rich cultural landscape with a lengthy controversial historical background. Before it was created, it was home to many great civilizations. Different ethnic groups belonged to this piece of land, and they developed a strong feeling of patriotism and community togetherness toward it. Their unyielding determination to prove their existence ultimately led to a ravaging civil war, engulfing society during the closing years of the previous century. The causes that led to this so-called "ethnic cleansing" are numerous, and will be discussed thoroughly to understand, later on in other occasions in this research, the United States of America's inducement to intervene.

Geographically speaking, Kosovo is a newly independent landlocked Eastern European country. It is located in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula in the Southeastern part of Europe. Nestled amidst the Republic of Serbia from the eastern and western fronts, Kosovo borders the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Albania, and Montenegro to the south, the southwest, and the northwest, respectively. As the map below reveals, the country's capital is Pristina, and there are six other district capitals: Peja, Mitrovica, Prizren, Ferizaj, Gjakovë, and Gjilan (see Fig. 1). Additionally, Kosovo as a country is relatively small in surface compared to other world countries and even its neighbors.



Fig. 1. Political Map of Kosovo from Nations Online Project; “Map of Kosovo;”  
nationsonline.org, 20 Feb 2021,

<https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/Kosovo-map.htm>

### 2.1.1. A New Nation Making Its History

Some historical records suggest that the name “Kosovo” may have originated from the Serbian language, specifically the word “Kos” which means blackbird. The Serbian government has always considered Kosovo and Metohija to be the same, referring to them as Kosmet, an appellation that is never used by Albanians (Judah 31). “Kosovo,” primarily significant for the Albanian community, has its roots in Turkish-Albanian ancestry and is

derived from the Kosovo Vilayet. This region, prior to the Balkan Wars of 1912, covered the lands of “Sandjak, Gornje Polimlje, Kosovo and Metohija, as well as northern Macedonia up to Veles, and eastern Macedonia up to the Bregalnica catchment” (Vickers xiv, xv).

Accordingly, this nation’s journey toward freedom was not a facile task at all. Like many other nations worldwide, the country has weathered numerous challenges and passed through several periods of colonization. Nonetheless, its ultimate enemy was the Serbs, before achieving full independence in 2008. For that reason, Kosovo’s historical and cultural heritage is diverse and rich, encompassing many different traditions and beliefs.

The history of Kosovo as a region spans a period of two different eras- the early years and the modern era. This knowledge is essential to know about the different people that made up this country’s descendants and heritage. It is crucial to acknowledge, nonetheless, that the narrative of a burgeoning nation such as Kosovo is being recounted through various lenses and viewpoints across the expanse of the Balkan Peninsula, and there is much confusion among credible sources. Thus, the information chosen in this research reflects what will be needed in the later discussion.

#### **2.1.1.1. Precocious History of Kosovo**

Many scholars such as Shkëlzen Gashi<sup>9</sup>, Miranda Vickers, Tim Judah, and others have concluded that the Balkan nations do not share a common understanding of the origins of the Kosovars for the purpose that each one of them would be able to justify the legitimacy of their conquest convincingly.

Nevertheless, the roots of the Kosovo populace can be traced as far back as ancient times. The Illyrians were descended from the Pelasgians, whose language, traditions, and customs were very similar to those of the Illyrians. However, Kosovars are believed to have originated specifically from the Dardanians (Gashi 10, 11). It is widely believed that these early civilizations were the original settlers of present-day Kosovo and Albania. However,

some Serbian archaeologists have challenged this notion, claiming that Albanians are not of Illyrian descent but rather a blend of Daco-Moesian groups who emerged in the early medieval period through intermarriage between migrant shepherds and local populations that had not yet adopted Roman customs, including remnants of the Illyrian and Dardanian peoples (Vickers 3). Moreover, since 395, the lands of Kosovo have been under the dominion of the empires that emerged from the division of the Roman Empire - the Western Roman Empire, seated in the city of Rome, and the Eastern Roman Empire, known as Byzantium, with its capital in Constantinople. Nevertheless, Kosovo had retained its nominal allegiance to the Eastern Roman Empire. Even if the region was technically at the crossroad of the two empires and closer to the Western part.

In the 547-548 timeframe, the Slavs seized control of the land now recognized as Kosovo and forged ahead into Greece (Gashi 22). As they embarked on their journey across the Danube into the Balkans, it became apparent that the grand Avaro Slav migrations had only a nominal impact on the established societies of the central Balkans (Vickers 4). However, later on, the Slavs expanded their territory in the area. After that, during the 610-620 period, the Serbs successfully seized control of the Rashka region in the northwest of Kosovo and the neighboring Montenegro region (Gashi 22). This success allowed them to consolidate their hold over these regions and establish a more substantial presence. The Balkan emerged as a focal point of fierce competition and animosity between the Byzantine Empire and the Bulgarian tsars Simeon and Samuel (Vickers 5). For over a millennium, the Bulgarians have held a significant presence in Kosovo, dating back to the year 850. Nonetheless, in the early eleventh century, the demise of King Samuel's Empire resulted in the region falling under the rule of the Byzantine Empire. This hegemony lasted almost 200 years, with minimal intervention from other contemporaneous powers. In 1180, Stefan Nemanja conquered the weakened Byzantine Empire, and with Hungary and Venice's

support, he extended his territory even further, including Eastern Kosovo (Gashi 22, 32). This expansion helped make him one of the most powerful rulers in Europe, and he is still remembered as one of the most successful Serbian monarchs as he established the Nemanjić State. Thus, Kosovo has been at the crossroads of critical Balkan routes for centuries. It has been a center of culture and administration for the Nemanjić dynasty since the fall of Constantinople in 1204 (Vickers 7). Late in the fourteenth century, a group of lords from different parts of southeastern Europe banded together to resist the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Empire. Led by the Serbian prince Lazar, this alliance included figures from Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and various other noble realms (Gashi 33). The Balkans early realized that power is most effectively wielded when united. Nevertheless, when the two armies clashed, both leaders, the Turkish Murad, and the Serbian Lazar, were killed. As the battle ended, the surviving troops of Serbia and Bosnia retreated. Subsequently, the Turks also made a withdrawal (Vickers 13). This deadly battle that ensued in the year 1389 is famously referred to as the Battle of Kosovo.

The historic Battle of Kosovo, which transpired in the present-day region of Fushë Kosovë, remains an important event with a long-lasting legacy and enduring impact that persists to this day. It took place during Ottoman rule in the Balkans, marking the beginning of this dynasty's rule, and thus, this victory ensured Ottoman dominance in the region. Following the Ottoman invasion, significant devastation was wrought upon the region. During this time, Islam began to take root in the lands of Arberia (Gashi 34, 48). This process was helped by the Ottoman authorities' active encouragement of the conversion to Islam. However, the Ottoman government created a social-cultural construct called *the millet*, which was founded not on ethnic identity but on religious affiliation to manage the Empire's growing diverse ethnic and religious groups (Vickers 19). This system helped to keep the Empire's various groups in line and working cohesively. In the same regard, during the late

seventeenth century, the Ottoman government pressured Serbs and Albanians to convert to Islam to escape the financial and military burdens. Serbs were more reluctant as they firmly held their Christian beliefs compared to the Albanians. This is seen as the beginning of a separation between the neighboring Serbs and Albanians (Vickers 24, 26). Consequently, the Serbs' migration resulted in a visible alteration in the demographics of Kosovo (Judah 33). This marked the onset of a never-ending ethnic conflict in the region.

Throughout the 1830s, a series of reforms were put into effect that helped improve government efficiency, financial stability, military strength, and educational standards. In addition, the Albanian land was divided into four Vilayets (Gashi 61). These reforms resulted from the ongoing political and social turmoil of the time, which had made life difficult for some people, especially after the Serbian revolution of 1804-15 (Vickers 30), which lasted for a decade. On this account, the Albanian National Awakening, which commenced during the 1830s, was a vocal movement aiming to unify Albania into a single, independent state. This was fulfilled in 1912 with the creation of Albania as an independent country. Nevertheless, simultaneously, in 1877-8, the Serbian army executed horrific acts of genocide and forced relocation upon the Albanian populace, forcing many to flee to remote areas of the Kosovo Vilayet (Gashi 61). The Albanian people faced the dual challenge of enduring the oppression of the Ottoman Empire and the devastating effects of Serbian ethnic cleansing. Thus, the Albanians created the League of Prizren as a response to these incidents to call for a common national interest (Judah 35, 36). The significance of these events in Kosovo's history lies in their testament to resilience in becoming a self-governing republic.

#### **2.1.1.2. Contemporary History of Kosovo**

The modern history of Kosovo is marked by the very early years of the twentieth century. Subsequently, at the end of 1915, the forces of Serbia and Montenegro found themselves compelled to retreat from Kosovo after attacks by Austro-Hungarian forces. Then,

Kosovo “was divided into two Austro-Hungarian occupational zones: Metohija” under Montenegro, “while a smaller part of Kosovo with Mitrovica and Vucitrn became part of Serbia.” “The greater part of Kosovo - Pristina, Prizren, Gnjilane, Urosevac, Orahovac - was included in the Bulgarian Military Region of Macedonia” (Vickers 92). Yet, three years later, Serbia, the country that inflicted terror and state genocide against the Albanians, successfully reestablished governance over Kosovo and other Albanian territories by implementing a military and police administration. The Serbs burned and destroyed whole villages in the process (Gashi 83). During the World War I period, Kosovo was plagued by violence from all sides. Afterward, it was often the victim of power struggles between several of its neighboring countries. In the inter-World Wars period, Kosovo joined the new “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 which was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929” (Ker-Lindsay 9). The Serbs, then, persecuted their lifelong enemies, the Albanians, in a variety of ways.

Throughout WWII, the territory of Kosovo was partitioned into three strategic zones of operation under the Axis alliance: Italian, German, and Bulgarian (Gashi 92). After that, at the culmination of the war, the establishment of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia bestowed upon Kosovo the distinguished status of an autonomous region called “Kosovo and Metohija” within Serbia. This process demarcated the boundaries of present-day Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay 10). Under the 1946 socialist state’s constitution, Kosovo-Metohija’s designation as an autonomous region meant giving its local administration limited authority in creating their branches of government (Vickers 146). This led to exercising more political oppression in the region. Due to this situation, the people in Kosovo province have formed various militant organizations to show their resistance.

The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ensured that Kosovo and Vojvodina, two Autonomous Provinces which were constituent parts of Serbia, would have a similar status to the six Yugoslav republics. This provision allowed

them to have more control over their economic decisions and some areas of foreign policy (Gashi 103). It was true that “Kosovo remained a part of Serbia but was almost a full federal entity: It had its own national bank, parliament, government, and police” (Judah 57). This designation gave them some autonomy, but they were still under the control of the federal government. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December in 1989, the Albanian intelligentsia established the Democratic League of Kosovo with the intent of resolving the pressing matter of Kosovo and the Albanian inhabitants within the confines of Yugoslavia by way of the principle of self-determination (Gashi 105). With Ibrahim Rugova at its helm, this party embraced former Communist Party members and became the primary opponent of Serbian rule for a decade. The name “League” was chosen to evoke the 1878 League of Prizren (Judah 69). The league served as a platform for Albanian intellectuals and activists to share their ideas and work together to resolve the Kosovo issue and its breakaway from the Serbs’ control.

Throughout the 1990s, many struggle events took place in the region. The Kosovo Assembly proclaimed on July 2, 1990, the sovereignty and equal status of Kosovo within the Yugoslav realm (Gashi 105). Earlier, Kosovo’s parliament was coerced into voting to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy. However, 114 out of 123 Albanian MPs voted “to establish Kosovo as a republic on equal terms with the other six Yugoslav republics” (Judah 69). This was a pivotal moment in Kosovo’s history, setting the stage for the country’s future success. Posteriorly, on 7 September 1990, Kosovar deputies met in secret in Kaçanik to vote for a constitution for their republic (Gashi 105; Judah 69), marking a remarkable milestone in the history of the nation. “In September 1991, a referendum was held on Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state” (Gashi 105). The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of independence, and Kosovo became a sovereign state in its own right. The Serbian authorities regarded the referendum as illegal but ultimately, independence was confirmed in parliament on October 19, 1991 (Judah 69). Serbs were still dissenting to this decision. The repressive actions of the

Serbian government led to protests breaking out among students and the broader population on 1 October 1997. In response to the egregious acts committed by the police and army of Serbia against the Albanian population in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged to protect and liberate their fellow populace (Gashi 106). Consequently, the KLA played an instrumental role in liberating Kosovo from Serbian occupation.

The background history mentioned in the above section is only a drop in the ocean. The focus was on the most notable events in the formation of the new country. The causes, consequences, and aftermath of the civil war that ravaged Kosovo during the latter part of the 1990s will be discussed in the coming parts.

### **2.1.2. Causes of the War**

On February 28, 1998, the Serbian government undertook a regrettable operation in the central Drenica Valley, a significant bastion of the KLA, as a direct response to the organization's repeated ambushes targeting the Serbian police force (Abrahams et al. 30). This momentous occasion signified the commencement of Kosovo's armed strife. Accordingly, the Kosovo War was an intra-state conflict between the ruling powers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the separatist fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Egorov 183). The war lasted from 1998 to 1999 and had wide international attention. The subsequent year saw the commencement of a 78-day NATO bombardment of Serbia, encompassing Kosovo and Montenegro (Judah 75), ending this ethnic conflict on 11 June 1999. The military operation in Kosovo, known as "Allied Force," was undertaken by NATO. This operation was conducted independently of the United Nations Security Council's endorsement (Egorov 183). The stated goal of such an operation was to curtail the upheaval and acts of genocide perpetrated by Serbia's armed forces upon the Kosovar Albanian populace.

The causes that led to this ethnic war were numerous. Some of its reasons were indirect and gradual, while others were more immediate. The war has been fueled by historical tensions and hostilities involving the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs, resulting in its eruption in 1998.

But first, what about the country responsible for such a calamity? Are the appellations Serbia and Yugoslavia used interchangeably? Definitely not! This research title, then, is devoted to clarifying this issue.

So, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) used to be an official name of a federation of countries situated in the Balkan peninsula in the southeastern part of Europe.



Fig. 2. 1993 Map of the Former Yugoslavia from the Office of the Historian; “The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992”; history.state.gov, 25 Mar 2021, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia>

According to the map above (see Fig. 2), the boundaries of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia extended northward, bordered by Austria and Hungary. To the east, it shared its borders with Romania and Bulgaria, while to the south, it embraced the territories of Greece and Albania. Finally, its western frontiers were bordered by Italy and the Adriatic Sea. It boasted a composition of six republics: Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia. Serbia encompassed two autonomous Yugoslav provinces, namely Vojvodina and Kosovo, in addition to Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. Consequently, Serbia held a vital position as a distinguished republic within the entity of the former Yugoslavia.

The origins of forming this federation of countries go back to the First World War Period. On December 1, 1918, a new kingdom emerged, informally known as Yugoslavia, which united the people of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Kosovo was part of Serbia, making the Albanians there a minority. A few decades later, Josip Broz Tito was the president of the Jajce meeting that helped to create the new Yugoslavia in 1943. This meeting excluded Kosovo Albanian delegates. After several other events and on June 25, 1991, the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia was instigated by the proclamation of the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia (Judah 41, 49, 68). This was followed by a series of conflicts and wars which destroyed the country and its people no longer than 1992. The Albanians, under Yugoslav rule, have generally been subjected to systematic ethnic discrimination by the Serbs to avenge what happened to them in the late 1870s.

The KLA emerged as the second party in the Kosovo conflict, having been established during the early 1990s and gaining significant recognition after the chaotic period of 1996-1998 in Albania. In 1998, it took control of a significant portion of Kosovo. At first, America and other Western nations condemned the KLA as a terrorist organization. Their focus remained on Bosnia, where President Slobodan Milosevic was seen as the eventual

peacekeeper. The Serbs adopted this perspective as a means to justify their assaults (Freedman 347). Similarly, the Kosovo Liberation Army was founded with a unique and mysterious history. According to certain sources, the origins of the KLA can be traced to a web of intertwined Marxist-Leninist factions dating back to the Second World War. Nonetheless, this theory has sparked controversy as it has been argued that these groups were not truly Marxists but instead adhered to traditional nationalist ideals (Judah 75-76). Specifically, on November 28, 1997, the cluttered KLA made its public debut during the funeral of a Kosovar Albanian teacher, Halit Gecaj. In the village of Lausa, where Gecaj lost his life in a battle against Serbian police, three masked men delivered a speech to the crowd (Abrahams et al. 30). This appearance was a sign of the KLA's growing power and popularity among Kosovar Albanians. Contradictorily, the KLA is deemed a triumphant military organization not because of its battlefield successes but rather due to its timely emergence to make NATO win the war (Judah 75). The leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the ethnic war in Kosovo deserves praise for their efforts, direct or indirect, in liberating Kosovo from the longstanding Serbian oppression, which makes it worthy of the nickname of liberator or emancipator.

In addition to that, tracing the roots of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo reveals its genesis dates back several centuries ago. However, the primary reasons that led to the violence that ensued in 1998 and 1999 can be attributed to the decade-long suppression of ethnic Albanians by the Serbian government. This has led to much resentment and eventually to form the KLA (Daalder and O'Hanlon). The Serbs and Albanians early recognized the importance of Kosovo to their cultures and political futures. They have, as a consequence, demonstrated a willingness to fight for its control (Abrahams et al. 21). Each of these opposing entities wanted, throughout their history, to exercise control and annex Kosovo to their territories.

Furthermore, throughout the era of Ottoman reign, Kosovo witnessed a remarkable transition toward an Albanian majority, reaching its zenith in the late seventeenth century with a sizeable Serbian exodus ensuing a shift in the ethnic composition of the region (Daalder and O'Hanlon). This exodus changed the ethnic makeup of the Kosovar population, with the Albanian population becoming the majority. Additionally, after occupying Bosnia in 1878, the Austro-Hungarians opposed Serbian and local Slav nationalism and supported the Albanians (Judah 37). The decision to ally with the Albanians was based on the belief that they considered the Serbs a more sinister force. Nevertheless, Serbia reclaimed its sovereignty during the dawn of the nineteenth century, and it was granted official state status through the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. With the Ottoman Empire's collapse in the early twentieth century, Serbia reasserted control over Kosovo in 1912. This year they have too, marked the creation of the state of Albania for the first time (Daalder and O'Hanlon). Albanians somehow relinquished their claim to Kosovo, allowing the region to fall under Serbian domination. This was mainly due to the Conference of Ambassadors or the London Peace Conference in December, which was summoned to decide the borders of today's Albania. Yet, the region of today's Kosovo was divided between Serbia and Montenegro. As a result, the Kosovo issue was not yet resolved at that time. Accordingly, the years from 1878 to 1912 were marked by a state of unrest and instability in the Balkans region, particularly in Kosovo and Macedonia. This was further exacerbated by Serbia's acquisition of significant territory in Kosovo following the conclusion of hostilities in 1912 (Judah 37, 38). This 1912 conflict was part and parcel of the ongoing Balkan Wars.

There exists a renowned and universally familiar narrative, transmitted in history classrooms across the globe, recounting the act of a Bosnian-Serb, whose assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand catalyzed the eruption of the First World War. The other "marginalized" half of this story is that this incident only made the situation worse

in the Balkan region over territorial disputes. After World War I, Serbia lost control over Kosovo as both became part of the new informally called country of Yugoslavia (Daalder and O'Hanlon). Over the next few decades, however, Kosovo was officially incorporated into Serbia in September 1945 as an "autonomous region" (Judah 49), and since 1974, Kosovo has enjoyed autonomous status under the new Yugoslav constitution (Daalder and O'Hanlon). But shortly after 1988, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic made the statement, "Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia, it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia," and then changed the Serbian constitution ending the Kosovo autonomy (Judah 66). So, in 1989, Milosevic officially stripped Kosovo of this autonomy. The Albanian response was to establish a parallel government led by Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Rugova was elected and re-elected in Kosovar Albanian-only elections, establishing himself as the de facto "president" of Kosovo (Daalder and O'Hanlon). On the 24<sup>th</sup> of May in 1992, Kosovo Albanians conducted their parliamentary elections. Although the Serbs deemed these elections unlawful due to their supposed illegitimate location in private residences instead of public establishments, they chose not to obstruct them (Judah 70). They thought that this would not last because despite all these historical ups and downs, the Serbs, being a minority in Kosovo, ended up always formally ruling the Albanian majority there.

In addition to the multitude of historical and political events, the economic situation of the Kosovars also held crucial weight. Kosovo, primarily dependent on agriculture, stood as the most indigent territory in Yugoslavia, except for the Trepca mines. The pervasive poverty and lack of progress experienced by all ethnic groups were critical factors contributing to the province's unrest (Abrahams et al. 21). These tensions escalated mainly in the late 1990s when the famous Yugoslav, specifically Serbian, insurgencies started.

On 28 February 1998, the Yugoslav Army began its historical brutal attacks on Kosovar villages allegedly linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Freedman 347). This date marked the start of the known armed conflict under study, culminating in the agony endured by countless innocent individuals.

The two warring parties launched several raids against each other. But, the brutality of the massive Yugoslav campaign on March 1999 was mainly due to two reasons. The first reason was that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission's monitors withdrew on March 20 in a mass exodus, in addition to most international nongovernmental organizations' personnel. This departure deprived Kosovo of crucial witnesses and deterrents against possible attacks. The report of the OSCE on its operations in Kosovo during the period of October 1998 to June 1999 provides compelling evidence that the distressing surge in occurrences of indiscriminate and widespread killings experienced a sharp and unprecedented increase following the organization's withdrawal on March 20, 1999 (Abrahams et al. 75). The report found that the majority of the interviewed refugees said that the level of killings increased after the withdrawal without any justification. This proves that KVM has been a key factor in preventing bloodshed, protection, and stability in Kosovo. Yet, their withdrawal made Kosovo vulnerable.

The second reason that led to this brutal campaign was the failure of the Rambouillet talks. On February 6 to 22, 1999, representatives from various countries met in Rambouillet, France, to negotiate a settlement for the Kosovo conflict. The foreign ministers of Great Britain and France were co-sponsors, with the United States, Austria, and Russia participating as negotiators. Hashim Thaci, leader of the KLA, was elected spokesman for the Kosovar Albanian delegation. Milosevic denied the talks' attendance, sending Serbian President Milan Milutinovic in his stead. This attempt to demonstrate his inclusive and accepting stance toward Kosovo's diverse ethnicities fell short of its intended effect (Abrahams et al. 39). The

initial Rambouillet agreement sought to establish a temporary truce of three years while permitting some Serbian and Yugoslav forces to maintain a presence in Kosovo. Kosovo would have been granted autonomy within Serbia; its safeguarded security was entrusted to a NATO-led force. However, the disarmament of the KLA was required to ensure the realization of this vision. Milosevic rejected the plan, citing concerns over NATO troops' unrestricted mobility throughout Yugoslavia. Conversely, the KLA expressed their objections as the agreement hindered their aspirations for true independence (Judah 85). The negotiations were difficult, with both sides, especially the Serbs, refusing to compromise. The talks came to an end with no agreement being reached. This failure led to further conflict in Kosovo, with the KLA taking control of much of the territory.

Three weeks after the Rambouillet negotiations in Paris, Albanian delegates signed the peace plan on March 18, while the Serbs did not. After further unsuccessful negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic, NATO launched its first airstrikes on the night of 24 March (Freedman 350). This action responded to continued reports of human rights violations by Milosevic's forces. The strikes were the beginning of a campaign that would eventually lead to Milosevic's downfall. NATO's decisive action in launching an aerial and maritime offensive played a pivotal role in galvanizing the global community's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict (Egorov 183), ensuring that all sides were held to the same standards. This internationalization of the issue supposedly helped settle it earlier than expected.

The "overt" purpose of NATO participation in the Kosovo War was to extend support to a party engaged in this armed conflict of an intra-state nature (Egorov 183). The human rights reports seemed to contradict the Serbian claim that they were the victims of this conflict. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supported the Kosovars being the actual victims.

## **2.2. The Aftermath of the War**

The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo occurred between 1998 and 1999 and was devastating. It did not only cause the forced relocation of countless individuals from their abodes, the loss of many innocent lives, and severe damage to the province's infrastructure, but also its atrocities constituted violations of human rights and international humanitarian laws. Nevertheless, sooner or later, everything comes to an end. The international community eventually did not pay a blind eye to the crisis, even if it was considered an intrastate conflict. The world's attention was drawn to Kosovo due to the extreme brutality perpetrated by the governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia's forces against the ethnic Albanian Kosovars.

The aftermath of the conflict has roots that extend beyond the end of the fighting campaigns. Studies to determine the war crimes and casualties started as early as the onset of the hostilities. In addition, the circumstances surrounding the NATO intervention there made it a controversial decision that many countries opposed. Nonetheless, the different international community resolutions that addressed the Kosovo issue after the NATO campaigns helped in one way or another to gradually settle the situation there, which ultimately secured the position of Kosovo in the world as officially an independent country in 2008.

### **2.2.1. Consequences of the Conflict**

After the 78-day NATO bombardment of Milosevic's troops, a ceasefire agreement was achieved. The war in Kosovo finally concluded on June 9, 1999, as the Military Technical Agreement was signed. This so-called "Kumanovo Agreement" was a landmark accord reached in Kumanovo, Macedonia, between the Republic of Serbia's government and that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on one side and KFOR<sup>10</sup> or the Kosovo Force on the other (Weller et al. 976). KFOR is a professional international peacekeeping force operating in Kosovo under NATO leadership. According to an online published version of the

accord on the United Nations Peacekeeper website, this agreement contains decisive provisions that were well explained in six articles and two appendices. These six articles dealt with general obligations, cessation of hostilities, notifications, the establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC), final authority to interpret, and lastly, entry into force (“United Nations Military Technical Agreement”). However, the agreement’s authorization to the Kosovo Force to take actions, “including the use of necessary force,” made its legal validity questionable regarding Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969<sup>11</sup>. This is because NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was carried out without the United Nations and its Security Council’s approval. The parties of the agreement nevertheless agreed to sign it without invoking this defect (Weller et al. 976). Despite this deficiency, the resolution of the Kosovo War was achieved through the Military Technical Agreement, which involved the cooperation of the international Kosovo Force, as well as the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.

It is almost impossible to tackle an end of a particular war without considering the casualties incurred during that conflict. In this regard, a report entitled “List of Kosovo War Victims Published” published in the “Balkan Transitional Justice Platform” tackled this issue. The journalist Milka Domanovic affirmed that to commemorate Human Rights Day, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Centre and the Humanitarian Law Centre Kosovo released, on a website known as the “Kosovo Memory Book,” an extensive list encompassing over 13,517 individuals of different nationalities who perished or went missing in the course of the conflict in Kosovo. This list mainly addressed a protracted period of three years, from January 1998 to December 31, 2000. It reckoned “8,661 Kosovo Albanian civilians [that] were killed or disappeared, as well as 1,797 Serbs and 447 Roma, Bosniaks, and other non-Albanians. The rest of those registered were fighters” (“List of Kosovo”). This publication,

nonetheless, addressed only one part of the Kosovo War casualties as it did not refer to the other losses that the conflicting parties encountered.

According to a preliminary report released on May 1999 by the U.S. Department of State entitled “Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo,” the genocide which was happening in Kosovo falls under “the ethnic cleansing” category. As a term, ethnic cleansing implies “the systematic and forced removal of members of an ethnic group from their communities to change the ethnic composition of a region.” Serbs wanted to clear out the Kosovo area of the ethnic Albanians, and in the process, they violated human rights and humanitarian law. Milosevic’s regime wielded against the Kosovars involuntary displacement, plundering and destruction, arbitrary imprisonments, merciless killings, sexual assaults, disregard for medical ethics, and deliberate erasure of their cultural identity (“Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing”). Howbeit, these atrocities can be carried out by any actor, not only government forces but also rebel groups and paramilitary groups.

A group of Human Rights Watch researchers, by the same token, conducted a thorough investigation on the Kosovo war casualties. Their report mentioned that “[a]ccording to UNHCR statistics, the total number of refugees from Kosovo on June 9 was 862,979,” save “those who had sought asylum in Europe prior to March 1999. No precise figures exist for the total population of internally displaced in Kosovo between March and June 1999 but most estimates range between 500,000 and 600,000, which includes the more than 200,000 persons internally displaced prior to March.” It is worth mentioning again that Yugoslav hostilities aggravated four days before the NATO intervention and which contemporized the withdrawal of the OSCE-KVM and other international organizations from Kosovo. This report provides an in-depth analysis of the hostilities in Kosovo under different titles. Under the title “Geography of Abuses,” the HRW researchers confirmed that the hostilities occurred mainly in regions where the KLA were active but with different intensity

levels depending on the municipality and other factors. Massive killings of males, females, and even children happened in villages due to three motives, as part of the ethnic cleansing process, ties to the KLA, or revenge. The death toll of the war is still controversial mainly because of the Serbian and Yugoslav government's attempts of body removal and destruction. Apart from these widespread killings, "politicians, doctors, human rights activists, and other public figures" faced targeted execution. Concisely, this report presented detailed incidents of deliberate instruments of systematic ethnic cleansing in Kosovo that are forbidden by the laws of war. These atrocities encompassed "rape and sexual assaults, forced expulsions, arbitrary arrests, and detentions, destruction of civilian property and mosques, contamination of water wells, robbery and extortion, detentions, and compulsory labor, the use of human shields and landmines" (Abrahams et al. 75-99). Although this Human Rights Watch report was conducted early and only addressed the short period of NATO airstrikes, it was comprehensive as it touched on all the aspects of the Kosovo War losses.

The international reactions to the Kosovo conflict were varied, depending on which aspect of the war the global community reflected. Reports on this issue were numerous. Some addressed the reaction of the global community toward this crisis and its effect on the nations around, while others tackled the countries' response to NATO intervention there.

A Congressional Research Service report entitled "Kosovo: International Reactions to NATO Air Strikes" reported that 13 of 19 NATO member countries participated in the Kosovo airstrikes. Russia and China were the most vocal international opponents of NATO's Allied Force Operation in Kosovo. Due to their veto power, NATO started its airstrikes without the UN Security Council's approval. France, as a NATO ally, supported the intervention, except for the Communist Party, which opposed it and helped in the warfare. On the other hand, the French declined Kosovars' asylum-seeking based on not participating in Milosevic's ethnic cleansing. The perspectives of other NATO allied nations differed. The

United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Hungary supported the operation with different levels of help and participation. Germany and Turkey also supported the operation and accepted and welcomed the Kosovar refugees, unlike Italy, which limited their entrance. On the other hand, Greece opposed the NATO intervention but consented to a limited number of refugees if necessary. Concerning the reaction of the regional actors, Albania was a great supporter of the intervention, and it welcomed an abundant number of fleeing Kosovars. The other supportive Balkan countries were Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia. Austria and Montenegro, a constituent republic of the FRY, expressed neutrality but hosted refugees. Lastly, the views in Bosnia-Herzegovina were bifurcated as the Bosniak Croats supported NATO operation, whereas the Bosnian Serbs opposed it (Donfried). According to this Congressional report, the international community showed its support for the decision of NATO to intervene in the intrastate crisis of Kosovo. This support ranged from providing the majority consent to the decision to helping the NATO forces with soldiers and weaponry or even opening their air space and military fields of the neighboring Balkan countries.

In another regard, according to a report entitled “International Community Responds to the Kosovo Crisis” and published on the International Monetary Fund website, a high-level meeting of 33 governments (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), World Bank, IMF, and seven international agencies’ representatives was held in Washington on April 27, 1999, to deliberate on the global community’s reaction to the Kosovo predicament and its far-reaching ramifications on the neighboring nations of the Balkans. The primary objective of this meeting is to evaluate the immediate support provided by the global community in addressing the humanitarian, economic, and financial requirements of the six most impacted nations. Furthermore, it serves as a platform to engage in discourse regarding a comprehensive and sustainable strategy for long-term economic reconstruction, recovery, and the pursuit of social

stability in the region. Lastly, the aim is to collaboratively devise a plan of action to ensure effective coordination among international entities in mitigating the economic and social consequences of this crisis (“The International Community Responds”). Several suggestions were discussed and endorsed during this meeting to lift the crisis-ridden situation in the region. Nonetheless, the meeting was held in the midperiod of the Kosovo conflict. Data would definitely change, but the world community’s reaction would be intact, primarily since it was well-studied.

Right after the 1999 Kosovo conflict ended, a framework for determining the political status of the province started to be set forward. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of June in 1999, the Security Council of the United Nations, at its 4011<sup>th</sup> meeting, endorsed the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, also known as UNSCR 1244. The basic notions that this Resolution tackled were reaffirming Kosovo’s “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration,” along with the implementation of international civilian and security presences. Therefore, the international civil presence was represented by the “United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo” (UNMIK), whereas the international security presence was represented by the “Kosovo Force “(KFOR) (“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244”). The accomplishments of UNMIK were far-reaching, spanning from the creation and training of the “Kosovo Police Service” (KPS) to issuing vital documents like passports, as well as overseeing the foundation of the assembly and government (Judah 95). The overarching objective of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 was to establish a tranquil and protected atmosphere in Kosovo while bolstering the nation’s endeavors to attain enduring peace and stability until its independence was accomplished.

In May 2001, the UNMIK implemented a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, intending to establish a legislature consisting of 120 seats. The said legislature would have the privilege of electing a president and a prime minister. As the

UNMIK continued to provide oversight during that interim phase, it pursued to have authority over critical areas of upholding law and order, administering justice, safeguarding individual freedoms, regulating the monetary system, trade and commerce, state-owned enterprises, and foreign policy. This framework represented a significant step forward in Kosovo's efforts to achieve self-government. After the bloody 1999 civil war, the inaugural elections in Kosovo took place in November 2001. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) emerged victorious with a tally of 47 seats, while the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) secured 26 seats, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) garnered 8 seats. Serbian parties won 22 seats, making a 47% turnout. The second election of October 2002 confirmed the LDK's position as the premier party. However, Serbian electorate participation fell to a mere 20% due to alleged police intimidation ("Constitutional History of Kosovo"). On another prospect, the political leaders in Kosovo were urged by some Western officials to focus on overseeing the excellent work of the new institutions and then discuss the issue of their independence later ("Kosovo: Landmark Election"). Unfortunately, this demand seemed hard compared to the Kosovars' militancy in the past years to achieve their independence.

The Guardian newspaper reported that on March 17, 2004, Kosovska Mitrovica experienced the most aggressive ethnic violence since the resolution of the Kosovo Crisis. Hundreds of people were wounded, and 14 others were killed as a preliminary result in different areas. In response to the loss of two young Albanian lives in the river Ibar, Albanian citizens took action by storming the divided town's Serbian portion. The children had drowned fleeing Serbian pursuers with a dog. This incident and others demonstrated the still-intense relationship between the ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo despite UN peacekeeping efforts in the last five years (Traynor, *Fourteen Dead as Ethnic*). In the aftermath of the violence, a more accurate report on the casualties was that nineteen people were killed, eleven of them Albanians and eight Serbs. Nearly a thousand individuals suffered

injuries, and several Serbian places of worship, including 29 churches and monasteries, were burned and damaged. By March 24, the UN reported that “4,366 people were displaced. 360 of them were Albanians and a similar number were Romas. The rest were Serbs” (Judah 110). The outburst of violence was seen as a natural result of years of frustration among Kosovo Albanians. This frustration had built up gradually until it manifested itself in a violent reaction represented by burning down the Serbian Orthodox churches in addition to assaults and killings. In this regard, political commentators and analysts Muharrem Nitaj and Imer Mushkolaj deemed the Mitrovica clashes the worst moments in Kosovo’s post-war history as they damaged the image of Kosovo (Çollaku). Such events can only be considered attempts by the Albanian Kosovars to take revenge for the atrocities committed against them by the Serbs during the 1999 ethnic cleansing.

November 2005 was an essential milestone in Kosovo, marking two momentous events in its post-war history. The first one was the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s appointment of the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead the status process for Kosovo (“Constitutional History of Kosovo”), and the second was that the Contact Group in Kosovo issued the talks guidelines. On January 31, 2006, they made a statement on these talks about Kosovo’s final status. The talks were mainly held in Vienna and were divided into rounds depending on the issues that were to be negotiated. These issues comprised talks about decentralization, religious heritage, economic issues and community rights (Ker-Lindsay xiv). The High-Level meeting that was held on July 24, 2006, datelined the meeting of leaders from Serbia and Kosovo for the first time in eight years in an attempt to find a resolution to the longstanding dispute over the province of Kosovo (Traynor, *Serbia and Kosovo*). This meeting was a step forward, though there was still a long way to go before a resolution was reached. In addition to these talks, further discussions, meetings, missions, and proposals were made. The Kosovo status Troika discussions (the United States, Russia,

and the EU), indirect or face-to-face, were held in Vienna, London, and New York... In the end, on February 17, 2008, declared its independence (Ker-Lindsay xv). Despite the adversities encountered during Kosovo's formative years, the nation has persevered and achieved remarkable strides in pursuing a prosperous, democratic society.

### **2.2.2. Kosovo in the Current International Arena**

Kosovo has faced many significant obstacles, challenges, and successes in its independence quest. Despite this, the 2008 newborn country has managed to achieve a great deal by overcoming its history of instability. It finally achieved and declared independence on February 17, 2008 (Ker-Lindsay xv), and since then, it has continued to move forward in its pursuit of self-determination.

According to the website "Be In Kosovo"<sup>12</sup>, which mainly promotes tourism and business affairs there, the nation's official name is the Republic of Kosovo. It has three local short names, Kosova, Kosovë, and Kosovo. Its capital city is Prishtina, Prishtinë, or Pristina ("Visit Kosovo"). The Constitution of Kosovo was finalized on April 2, 2008, and was signed on April 7, 2008. It was ratified on April 9, 2008, and enacted on June 15, 2008 ("Kosovo Government"). It is regarded as a cornerstone of the nation's democracy. Thence, the political system in Kosovo is a multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic. This means that the prime minister heads the multi-party system and the government. This latter is exercised by the executive branch ("Visit Kosovo"), which is composed of the President as the state's chief, the Prime Minister as head of government, and the cabinet. The Kosovo Assembly<sup>13</sup> elects the cabinet. The President of Kosovo and his appointed Prime Minister are elected by the Assembly through an indirect process. A two-thirds majority vote of its members is required for a five-year term. If a candidate does not secure a majority of votes in the first or second rounds, the candidate who garners the most votes in the third round is appointed ("Kosovo Government"). The current President of the Republic is Vjosa Osmani,

who has been in the position since April 2021. She was elected with a majority of 71 votes after the resignation of the ex-president Hashim Thaci in November 2020 who was charged with war crimes (“Kosovo Mps Elect Vjosa Osmani”). Hence, Osmani was elected President earlier than the next set of elections were expected.

On the other hand, the Kosovo legislative branch rests with both the government and the Assembly of Kosovo (“Visit Kosovo”). Thus, as mentioned above, the legislative branch in Kosovo is responsible for electing the executive branch’s members. The Kuvendi i Kosoves/Skupstina Kosova, also known as the unicameral Assembly of Kosovo, constitutes a deliberative body of 120 seats. Among these, 100 are directly elected by the people through open-list proportional representation. Notably, the remaining 20 seats are allocated for ethnic minorities, with 10 reserved for Serbs and another 10 for other ethnic minority groups (“Kosovo Government”). These non-majority communities are “Turk, Bosnian, Roma, Ashkali, Goran, and Egyptian.” In addition, the Assembly has a “gender quota” to ensure that women are fairly represented among its MPs, and at least one-third of its general composition is made up of them (“Role and Competencies of the Assembly”). The Assembly members (MPs) are elected for a four-year term (“Role and Competencies of the Assembly;” “Kosovo Government”), and thus, they carry out a series of essential duties during their parliamentary mandate. “They review and adopt draft laws and decisions, represent and defend rights and interests of the citizens, oversee the work of the government and independent institutions, and they approve the budget of Kosovo” (“Role and Competencies of the Assembly”). Subsequently, the executive and legislative branches work together in Kosovo to ensure that each branch’s work is carried out effectively.

Finally, in Kosovo, the judiciary operates independently from the legislative and executive branches (Visit Kosovo). Nevertheless, the President of the Republic holds the power to appoint some judges to the highest courts. Members of the Kosovo Assembly have

the privilege of nominating additional Constitutional Court judges, who are then appointed by the President of the Republic to serve singly. Therefore, the judicial branch in Kosovo comprises the highest courts and subordinate courts. The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court represent the highest courts. This latter is composed of the president of the court, his vice president, and seven judges, whereas the Supreme Court comprises the president of the court and judges. The Basic Court and the Court of Appeals make up the subordinate courts, which are structured into four departments: “General, Serious Crime, Commercial Matters, and Administrative Matters.” The Basic Court presides over seven municipalities with numerous branches within each jurisdiction (“Kosovo Government”). This arrangement gives everyone a fair chance to have their case heard.

Economically speaking, Kosovo’s economy is thriving, thanks partly to the market-based economy transition and a commitment to fiscal stability. However, Kosovo still relies on foreign assistance to meet its basic needs. Remittances from the diaspora and donor-financed aid account for a quarter of the GDP of the nation. The average citizen earns only around \$3,800 a year, making them one of Europe’s poorest populations (“Visit Kosovo”). This contrasts with the wealth of many other European countries and leaves Kosovo’s citizens struggling to get by. Thus, the economy in Kosovo is continuously progressing, but unemployment and living standards have not been improved because there have been no economic reforms or investments (“Kosovo Government”). These unemployment rates in the Republic, affecting a significant portion of the population, are a crucial issue pushing black market activities and outward migration. The majority of the population of Kosovo resides in rural and outlying areas, which makes it difficult for them to find work. Privatization of government-owned businesses, on the other hand, has been successful in Kosovo thanks to international assistance (“Visit Kosovo”). However, there is still much work to be done.

Kosovo has successfully joined many important international organizations, most recently the “World Bank and International Monetary Fund” in 2009, the “Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)” in 2006, the “European Bank for Reconstruction and Development” in 2012, and the “Council of Europe Development Bank” in 2013. In 2016, the nation successfully negotiated an Association Agreement with the European Union, which focused on trade liberalization (“Kosovo Government”), especially since its official currency is the Euro, with the Serbian dinar used in local communities. Due to this Euro assistance, core inflation has decreased, and Kosovo is considered one of the region’s leading open economies. Despite this, many challenges prevented Kosovo’s economic development, including unreliable and limited electricity supply (“Visit Kosovo”). Kosovo is making a considerable effort to overcome its challenges, and it is sensible for a new country to face such struggles. The crucial factor is concentrating on its capabilities and taking advantage of the opportunities that arise.

### **Conclusion**

Knowing the history of the Kosovars was vital to understanding why they were subjected to a bloody civil war and why the international community felt compelled to take action, especially the United States of America. Such a diverse country like Kosovo in such a strategic position in Europe, liaising Eastern Europe to its West, attracted the other countries to fight to control it.

Kosovo is a relatively recent country, only coming into existence in 2008 after a long and complicated process. The history of its formation is full of important moments and events. Some of the more notable ones include the breakup of Yugoslavia, the wars between Kosovo and Serbia, and the eventual independence of Kosovo. This history is complex and full of essential details, so it is unfeasible to encompass it in its entirety within the confines of this brief chapter. However, the overview provided here handed an excellent starting point for

understanding the context and origins of Kosovo as a country, its civil war, and NATO Humanitarian intervention there in the late 1990s.

The Kosovo Albanians were a historically marginalized ethnic group that has faced discrimination and violence from the majority Serb population for centuries. The Kosovo War began in 1998 and lasted until 1999. The conflict in question pitted the Kosovo Albanian majority against the Serb minority government in Serbia. The global community was compelled to intervene because of the widespread human rights violations committed by both sides against innocent civilians. The USA had a pivotal role in the war, providing military support to the Kosovo Albanian forces and leading negotiations that culminated in the creation of the United Nations-administered Kosovo and, later on, its independence.

### Endnotes

9. In his publication entitled “The History of Kosovo in the History Textbooks of Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia,” the historian Shkëlzen Gashi presented the Kosovo history from the perspective of the history textbooks of the five neighboring countries. In this research, the ideas from mainly Kosovar’s history textbooks were relied on.

10. “Mission: NATO-KFOR’s mission is to contribute to maintaining a safe and secure environment as mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. In carrying out its mission, NATO cooperates and assists the United Nations, the European Union, and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable and peaceful Kosovo. To date, KFOR has also supported the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as an all-voluntary, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly-armed force which possesses no heavy weapons. Its basic missions are set out by the law on KSF and include crisis response, assistance to civilian authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and civilian protection. KFOR also supports the development of professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structures in Kosovo.” (*nato.int*)

[https://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor\\_placemat.pdf](https://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf)

11. “Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force: A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” (*legal.un*)

[https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1\\_1\\_1969.pdf](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf)

12. “Be in Kosovo is a private venture established to provide high quality tourism services and promote the newborn country of Kosovo globally as a remarkable and desirable destination for tourism, business, and foreign investment, all the while supporting the social and economic development in our country.

www.beinkosovo.com is the official promotional and informative portal of our company for Kosovo, attracting and delivering value to businesses, visitors, students, and organizations. Be In Kosovo was established conceptually and in practice by its CEO Alban Rafuna, who is an undergraduate of Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) New York through the American University in Kosovo (AUK) Campus.” (*BeInKosovo*) For further information, please refer to <https://www.beinkosovo.com/about-be-in-kosovo/>

13. “The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo exercises competencies in accordance with Article 65 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo: adopts the Constitution, laws, resolutions, declarations and other general acts, decides on amendments to the Constitution, announces referendum, in accordance with the law, ratifies international treaties, approves the budget of the Republic of Kosovo, elects and dismisses the president and vice-presidents of the Assembly, elects and may dismiss the President of the Republic of Kosovo, elects the Government and may express no confidence in it, oversees the work of the Government and other public institutions that report to the Assembly in accordance with the Constitution and the law, elects members of the Kosovo Judicial Council and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council

in accordance with the Constitution, proposes judges for the Constitutional Court, oversees foreign and security policies, gives consent to the President's decree announcing a State of Emergency, decides in regard to general interest issues as set forth by law..." (*Assembly-Kosova*) For further information, please refer to <https://www.assembly-kosova.org/eng/about-the-assembly/role-and-competencies-of-the-assembly/>

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# **Chapter Three**

## **U.S. International Relations with the Balkan Peninsula**

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## **Chapter Three**

### **U.S. International Relations with the Balkan Peninsula**

#### **Introduction**

Many people believe that the entire European continent is composed of only highly developed countries. They often overlook the Eastern portion of the continent, which is made up of many related regions, such as the Balkan Peninsula. This latter has experienced horrific ethnic and civil wars, making its political landscape more complex than the Western European countries, with numerous ethnic and religious groups vying for power and influence. As a result, countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia have experienced conflict and instability. Despite this, the Balkan Peninsula is, for the time being, home to many developing countries that are making significant strides in terms of development. This progress is partly because of the efforts of their governments and the international community, which have worked together to promote peace, economic growth, and social welfare in these nations.

In light of what has been stated above, the third chapter of this piece of research, under the title of “U.S. International Relations with the Balkan Peninsula,” is divided into two parts. The first one is considered a background history of this diverse Eastern European subcontinent before and after the Cold War, as it was the closest portion of Europe to the Soviet Union, the eminent rival of the USA. A fact that changed the region’s dynamics. Moreover, this part focuses too on the U.S. presence and relations with some Balkan countries. On the other hand, the United Nations has been instrumental in facilitating these relationships and getting these countries to agree to the United States’ involvement there, which is the reason why the principle of the UN’s intervention is dealt with in the second part

of this chapter. This final part also tackles the United States' interventionist policies in the region with a particular inclination regarding Kosovo, the case study of this piece of research.

### **3.1. A Country vs. Countries**

In international diplomacy, few issues have garnered as much attention and debate as the complex and multifaceted relationship between the USA and some of the Balkan countries. From the fierce conflicts of the 1990s to the ongoing efforts to foster stability and prosperity in the region, this ever-evolving relationship has been the subject of countless analyses, studies, and commentaries, which helped to gain a deeper understanding of this important geopolitical dynamic and the challenges that lie ahead.

In exploring the intricacies of the landscape of diplomacy between the USA and the Balkans, one must first recognize the historical and cultural nuances that have shaped this complex relationship while spotting light on the region's history at first. From the chaotic aftermath of World War II to the more recent conflicts in the region, the presence of the U.S. has shaped the course of events in stabilizing and exacerbating tensions in the Balkans. One of the critical factors shaping U.S.-Balkans relations is the region's strategic importance. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the Balkans has long caused contention between various powers. Throughout the Cold War, America considered the region a vital bulwark against Soviet expansionism and provided military and economic support to countries such as Turkey and Greece. During the Post-Cold War Era, America continued to view the Balkans as an essential partner in security and economic development.

Before delving into the topic of U.S. engagement with different areas of the Balkan Peninsula in varying ways, it is essential first to grasp a comprehensive understanding of the region's historical context.

### 3.1.1. Background History of a Subcontinent

Encompassing a vast region of the southeastern European continent, the Balkan Peninsula is embraced by the Adriatic Sea on its western front, the Black Sea on its eastern expanse, and the Aegean Sea on its Southern border. This remarkable region comprises many contemporary nations such as “Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey” (Hall xv), as well as smaller emerging nations like Kosovo. It is important to note that these countries have overlapping borders as their lands are either fully or partially within the region.



Fig. 3. Political Map of the Balkans from ResearchGate; “Map of the Balkans”;

researchgate.net, 18 May 2021, [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-the-Balkans-https-wwwquoracom-Who-werethe-Balkans-in-World-War-1-If-we-go\\_fig2\\_326710852](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-the-Balkans-https-wwwquoracom-Who-werethe-Balkans-in-World-War-1-If-we-go_fig2_326710852)

The cartographic representation of the Balkan regions in the map above delineates the political boundaries of the countries that either wholly or partly make up this region. This refined depiction is crucial in grasping the intricate geopolitical complexities that typify the area.

The geographic location of the Balkans in Europe is a testament to the many cultures, civilizations, and colonizing forces that had passed through the region over the years. This resulted in the diversity of the cultural heritage in this relatively small area in the Old Continent. With a surface that might be the same as a country like Algeria, the Balkans Peninsula contains many countries with different historical and cultural backgrounds and ethnic diversity.

Eastern European countries, including the Balkans, differ markedly from Western European nations in many ways though they are all part of the same continent. For example, Eastern European states are less urbanized and industrialized than Western countries, and the effects of historical events such as the Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientific Revolution are far less pronounced in these countries. Religion plays a much more important role in Eastern European society than in secular Western societies, and this difference is likely due to the region's unique history.

Regarding why Eastern Europe has fared differently than the West, there are two main explanations: external factors, which have affected the region negatively, or internal factors, which are intrinsic to the region and cannot be changed. Unfortunately, Eastern Europe's history has been primarily dictated by external factors as it has been subjected to outside forces that have prevented it from developing in the same way as Western Europe. Some claim that it is due to the Ottoman Empire's negative impact on these regions. The internal factors of the region, like its geography and culture, are also essential and cannot be ignored. Despite these limitations, the region has made progress in some areas and is currently on the

rise (Sowards). Still, considering these contrasts through a positive lens as a manifestation of distinctive cultural and historical variances will attain a more intricate comprehension of the progression trajectories of these nations. Thus, this perspective is both refined and compelling.

A vast array of differences within the Balkan Peninsula is even more extensive within its borders. The growth in technology has allowed people from all over the world to learn about different cultures and lifestyles. Media and social networking platforms, Instagram, for instance, made it easier to even ordinary people to notice through sarcastic reels and memes how different and dissimilar life of neighboring countries in the Balkans is. This is due to different historical and geopolitical factors.

Throughout its history, the Balkan region has been marred by numerous conflicts, notably the Balkan Wars at the turn of the twentieth century; and the 1990s Yugoslav Wars. These conflicts have influenced the region, shaping its political, economic, and social landscape in numerous ways. Despite these challenges, the Balkans have proven to be remarkably resilient and vibrant, boasting a wealth of cultural traditions and heritage and an entrenched sense of identity. Steven W. Sowards, Associate Director for Collections at the Michigan State University Libraries, has written a collection of courses published online as early as 1996 under the title “Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History,” covering the region’s ancient history to the late 1990s. The lectures provide an overview and an informative look at the region’s history, highlighting significant events and figures in the region’s past and formation.

In his first lecture, Sowards mentioned that many historians debate the geographic extent of the “Balkan” region. Some include only Communist states, connected to “Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany,” disregarding the inclusion of “Greece and ignoring Turkey and the Ottoman era.” Conversely, a subset of scholars disregards “Hungary,

Croatia, and other Habsburg lands” since they view them as more central European. This statement affirms the reality that the Balkan region possesses boundaries that intersect, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. It indicates that the demarcation lines of the Balkan as a region are not clearly defined as compared to those of most of its countries’ boundaries. The complexity of the Balkan borders is rooted in historical conflicts, power struggles, and cultural differences that have shaped the region’s political geography.

Steven W. Sowards further added that initially, the diverse ethnic groups in the Balkan peninsula were the descendants of Indo-European migrants, as well as very few traces of pre-Indo-European inhabitants. Nevertheless, there is still much debate about the early history of some of its composing groups, and this is especially true for matters related to political and territorial disputes that have arisen in the past few centuries, an issue that has already been tackled in the second chapter regarding the case of Kosovo and the origins of its people.

During the Balkans’ early modern era, two competing old regimes, namely the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, held sway over the region. This era was crucial in changing the mechanism and history of the area as the Habsburgs were mainly Catholic Austrians who ruled over the Balkans from Western and European Austria. At the same time, the Muslim Ottomans held sway over the area from Eastern and Asian Turkey (Sowards). Therefore, the Balkan countries were subjected to two separate and different groups of rulers. The Ottoman Empire took over southeastern Europe in the fourteenth century and brought relative peace for 300 years. However, after losing a battle outside Vienna in 1683, their power began to decline, and by the eighteenth century, they had lost control of southeastern Europe. This allowed Enlightenment ideas from Western Europe to enter the region, including the concept of nationalism, which eventually led to political unrest and conflict in the Balkans from the dawning of the nineteenth century until the twentieth century (Hall xvii). This marked a turning point in the Balkans’ history.

Accordingly, the common trait of these two back-then superpowers is that there was no political sense of “national identity” (Sowards). Nevertheless, the revolutions in the nineteenth century in the Balkans were driven by a developed sense of nationalism. Thus, throughout the period spanning the late 1700s to the late 1870s marking the Eastern Crisis, the main aim of Balkan nations was to gain independence from Ottoman and Habsburg occupation and establish their sovereign states. The great powers of Europe were primarily concerned with stopping Russian advancement and maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Despite several attempts in the eighteenth century, it was not until the nineteenth century, and after multiple insurgencies and external conflicts, that Greece, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria gained independence. However, once liberated, these nations focused on their national interests and served the competing great powers instead of working toward regional ideals (Pantev). This shift in priorities hindered their ability to establish a sense of collective purpose, and they failed to uphold their original goal of fostering regional unity. Those revolutions were driven by a desire on the part of the populace to assert their cultural and political autonomy.

Nonetheless, during the 1800s, the Balkans received political ideologies and novel economic concepts. Although these eventually led to improved communication and transportation infrastructure, higher agricultural productivity, more outstanding industrial production, and increased employment opportunities, they initially caused significant social upheaval and instability due to the rapid economic changes. Nevertheless, the region’s internal affairs were not only disrupted by the emergence of new social and economic factors but also due to the growing involvement of external political forces (Sowards). These disruptions set the stage for the violent civil wars that would occur in the following century leading to the balkanization of the region.

The notion of “balkanization” refers to the interaction of great powers and local countries with the Balkan people, resulting in political and economic fragmentation since 1878, especially after World War I. The Ottoman occupation and an unjust international legal order paved the way for this fragmentation. The main issues for new Balkan states were dividing the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian legacies, liberating the Balkan peoples, and integrating them into unified national states. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 created an unfair legal framework that led to the fragmentation of the region (Pantev). Overall, it is a complex and multifaceted concept that reflects the challenges and opportunities of fragmentation and diversity. While this balkanization can lead to conflict and division, it can also provide a platform for greater cooperation and collaboration.

The start of the twentieth century marked the eruption of the Balkan crisis of 1914, a significant event that had a lasting impact on the world. Unlike previous crises in Europe, the Balkans resulted in the outbreak of World War I. This was primarily due to the alliances established between the major powers in Europe, which meant that any conflict could quickly involve multiple nations. Furthermore, the crisis occurred during a period of heightened tension between these powers, with countries vying for power and territory (Sowards). Subsequently, this apprehension of a regional confrontation escalating into a worldwide catastrophe was realized through the Balkan crisis, culminating in the eruption of a global war.

After WWI, Woodrow Wilson’s political ideals and plans for Southeastern Europe fell short to propose a satisfactory outcome that prioritized the concept of individual nations determining their destiny. The U.S. was not powerful enough yet, to promote better relationships between nations and states in the Balkans, so European powers exploited internal divisions and exacerbated conflicts. This led to opportunistic nationalist behavior and economic struggles in the region during the inter-war period (Pantev). Consequently, during

this period, the Balkan states experienced a shift toward conservative ideologies due to various factors such as social disruptions, economic struggles, and a lack of support for parliamentary rule. Despite attempts by reformers to challenge the existing power structures, they were often ineffective due to a lack of resources, political acumen, or viable plans. As a result, any attempts at change often resulted in conflict, which was viewed with suspicion by Balkan authorities. As the advent of World War II approached, all the countries in the region had turned to authoritarianism, leaving significant issues unresolved in a time of impending crisis. Ever since the cessation of this worldwide conflict, it has proven to be a misrepresentation to construe Eastern Europe solely in light of Soviet Communist supremacy. This approach encompassed nations beyond the Iron Curtain, such as Greece, which did not fall within the boundaries of Eastern Europe. However, this way of thinking has now been challenged, as it is no longer accurate to consider these countries part of one large region. It is difficult to lump together countries like Poland and Yugoslavia, having different histories and experiences. It is also an oversimplification to label all Communist states in this way (Sowards). Overall, the Balkan Peninsula has long suffered from a steady decline in conditions, exacerbated by the turmoil of its ethnic conflicts and the World Wars.

In the following years from the 1950s to the 1980s, peace enveloped the Balkan region as Greece and Turkey embraced membership in NATO. Conversely, Bulgaria and Romania aligned themselves with the Warsaw Pact. In a display of sovereign independence, Albania and Yugoslavia chose to abstain from affiliating with any Cold War alliances. Nationalism was not as crucial as Ideology during this time. Nonetheless, following the resurgence of nationalism in Southeastern Europe, new governments desired to be part of larger European organizations. Other countries had also joined the EU and NATO, while others were in the process of doing so (Hall xx). This was seen as a hopeful sign for peace and prosperity in the

region, which had been torn apart by years of conflict and strife. The ultimate aim of these nationalist movements was to bring about a better future for their people.

The aftermath of the Cold War was marked by heightened ethnic tensions and clashes, especially following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This period in the Balkans is commonly referred to as the post-Yugoslav conflict era, given the magnitude and severity of the various conflicts that erupted (Pantev). Despite attempts to resolve these issues, ethnic discord remains a significant obstacle in the region.

To sum up, the Balkan countries went through significant changes due to the introduction of notions like “reason,” “rights of man,” and “nationalism”. People in the region aspired to imitate the achievements of Western European national states, leading to conflicts and wars as they established their own national identities and political systems. The European Great Powers also became involved, seeking economic and political benefits from these national conflicts. This process continued into the twentieth century, causing the First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War (Hall xv). These conflicts and wars inflicted severe damage upon the countries involved, with devastating outcomes.

Nonetheless, subjectivity is an inevitably common feature in the history course. This means there is no sole “correct” or “accurate” interpretation of past events and incidents since various politicians and historians can see them in different ways and perspectives. This can make it challenging to come to a clear understanding of particular historical affairs and agree on a single, definitive interpretation, especially when different groups, or individuals have different backgrounds, interests, or agendas in mind.

### **3.1.2. American Presence in the Balkans**

Despite being a fledgling nation, the United States of America exhibited remarkable foresight in organizing its international affairs to mainly safeguard its national interests at an early stage in its development. For many years, the United States has experienced a

fluctuation in its international policies, oscillating between diverse levels and degrees of convergence and divergence influenced by many factors. From the twentieth century onward, America emerged as a prominent player in global affairs, actively participating in various international events, initiatives, and organizations. Their level of involvement varied from remaining neutral, to actively participating and even being belligerent in some instances.

On another note, the cultural and ethnic diversity of the Balkan countries prompted the United States to adopt different levels of engagement in addressing particular incidents, or issues that emerge within the region. Nonetheless, the title “American Presence in the Balkans” pertains only to the commitment to addressing the various U.S. diplomatic and duplicitous presence in the Balkan region’s diverse nations, as other intricate interventions will be tackled later in the same chapter of this research.

“The U.S. Department of State’s Office of Historian” has meticulously compiled a collection of articles titled “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776”. This comprehensive guide presents all countries of the world in alphabetical order, allowing for easy access to their mutual history with the United States. In light of the above, an examination was conducted on designated Balkan nations to assess the similarity and divergence of the U.S. approaches employed when engaging with them.

Initiating with the oldest U.S. international relationship amongst the selected Balkan nations, which is with Greece, Europe’s cradle of civilization, the “Office of the Historian” mentioned that on November 7, 1837, the USA acknowledged the sovereignty of Greece, as demonstrated by the empowerment of the U.S. minister in London to commence diplomatic negotiations with this newly independent country. Accordingly, the first U.S. Consul to Greece was inaugurated in Athens on January 7, 1838, after being appointed on June 27, 1837. Throughout the vicissitudes of time, the bond between Greece and America reached its

pinnacle with the Truman Doctrine, a resolute stance against the Soviet Union amidst the Cold War Era. The Truman Doctrine was a plan by U.S. President Harry Truman to contain Communist aggression in 1947. He pledged American assistance to safeguard the freedom of people imperiled by the influence of armed factions or external forces. He beseeched Congress to extend military and economic support to Greece and Turkey, who battled the Communist ideology. Moreover, he envisioned dispatching advisors to nations grappling with political instability (Watts 300). During this pivotal historical moment, they solidified the enduring alliance between these two nations.

Concerning Montenegro, the United States established diplomatic ties with it on October 30, 1905, after it was acknowledged as an autonomous and self-governing state in 1878. However, after World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson rescinded Montenegro's independence recognition in 1920 following its incorporation into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Following the dissolution of the Federation of Yugoslavia in 1989, Montenegro emerged, on June 3, 2006, as a beacon of sovereignty, asserting its independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. On June 13, 2006, the United States extended its recognition to the Republic of Montenegro and forged diplomatic ties on August 15, 2006 ("A Guide to the United States' History"). This move marked a significant milestone in the country's journey toward autonomy and self-determination.

In the same vein, Bulgaria rebelled against Ottoman Turkish rule in 1876, and a treaty was signed to establish a sizeable Bulgarian state, but later a more minor principality was established instead. After World War I, Bulgaria's boundaries were finalized and became independent from the Ottoman Empire on October 5, 1908. On the third day of May 1909, the United States acknowledged Bulgaria's sovereignty and independence ("A Guide to the United States' History"). America, then, had a highly precarious relationship with Bulgaria, which proved to be the most volatile of all its international relationships in the Balkans. Yet,

in 1989, following the collapse of communism in Bulgaria, there was a significant enhancement in the bilateral relations between the two nations. The United States became an ardent supporter of the advancement of a market economy and multi-party democracy. As a result, the relationship between America and Bulgaria is built upon military and political collaboration, strategic security, and economic partnerships. During the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria allowed NATO aircraft to use its airspace and has contributed soldiers to various American military operations. Additionally, the two countries have signed numerous treaties and agreements (Kandilarov 1-2, 4) to bolster their alliances. This serves as a validation of the positive evolution and solidity of the relationship between Bulgaria and the USA at present.

Conversely, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Albania were established in 1922 but were interrupted during World War II when Italy seized control of Albania's foreign affairs. After the war, the U.S. sent a mission to Albania in 1945 to explore the possibility of reestablishing relations, but disagreements led to the mission being withdrawn in 1946. After Albanian nationalists successfully expelled Italian and German occupying forces, the United States entered into a treaty with the Albanian military authority, pledging to provide relief supplies through a military operation. Subsequently, Albania was isolated diplomatically under Communist ruler Enver Hoxha until his death and subsequent reforms. The U.S. and Albania reestablished diplomatic relations, and Albania was invited to join NATO in 2008 ("A Guide to the United States' History"). So, despite some challenges and disagreements over the years, the two countries have managed to sustain a positive and constructive relationship.

The most remarkable U.S. diplomatic policy with Serbia was in 1999, when the U.S. ended relations with Belgrade after the Serbs committed ethnic cleansing against Albanians in Kosovo (Morelli 13). Serbia was part of Yugoslavia which the U.S. had a normal relationship until 1992 when several republics seceded. Serbia and Montenegro united to form the new

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the U.S. did not recognize it as the successor state of the old Yugoslavia. The mission in Belgrade persevered despite the recall of the American Ambassador, as a temporary replacement was appointed. After the Kosovo crisis, diplomatic relations were restored in November 2000 and the U.S. ambassador was appointed in November 2001. On November 12, 2000, the governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forged full diplomatic relations. “The U.S. Embassy reopened in May 2001 and William Dale Montgomery was appointed Ambassador to Serbia on November 26, 2001” (“A Guide to the United States’ History”). The brief duration of this situation was brought to a close with the acknowledgment of the independence of Kosovo by the United States in 2008 (Morelli 13). Nevertheless, although there were issues in the past due to U.S. involvement in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, current relations between the U.S. and Serbia seem to have improved.

Macedonia, similarly, gained independence in 1991 when Yugoslavia peacefully broke up. Greece objected to Macedonia using the name “Macedonia,” causing a delay in recognition. In 1994, the United States acknowledged Macedonia, however, it was only in 2004 when the nation was referred to by its official name, the Republic of Macedonia. Recently, in 2019, the country underwent a name change to the Republic of North Macedonia (“A Guide to the United States’ History”). The bond between North Macedonia and the United States is one of cooperation, extending to a spectrum of areas, including politics, economics, culture, etc.

On April 7, 1992, the United States acknowledged Croatia, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as separate countries after they had been a part of Yugoslavia. The decision was made public through a statement released by the George H.W. Bush Administration at the White House (“A Guide to the United States’ History”). The collapse of the former

Yugoslavia was a profound event that reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Balkan Peninsula. Initially, the Bosnian conflict was regarded as a European issue, but it eventually impacted the involvement of America and NATO in European security following the Cold War. The U.S. played an essential part in resolving the conflict by leading NATO airstrikes, receiving assistance from European allies and Russia, negotiating a ceasefire, facilitating the Dayton Peace Agreement<sup>14</sup>, and deploying 20,000 soldiers to Bosnia (Garding 21). The U.S. has supported Bosnia's efforts to build a stable and prosperous democracy. Bosnia recognizes the indispensable alliance with the United States, viewing it as a pivotal collaborator in its ambitions to align with the EU and NATO. Thus, their relationship is founded on their mutual strategic significance.

While these diplomatic relations have been established, it would be remiss to disregard the multifaceted involvement of America in the Balkan Peninsula, especially as a unipolar power in the post-Cold War Era. The forthcoming second part of this chapter will delve into this matter.

As a final point, the USA established diplomatic relations in the Balkan region early because it is an essential area of interest for it. This is due to the region's strategic location between Western Europe, the Soviet Union (previously), Western Asia, and North Africa.

### **3.2. American Interventionism in the Balkan Peninsula**

Apart from the peaceful and mutually beneficial diplomatic relations between America and the Balkan countries, history is full of incidents where the U.S. marked its presence in this region differently. Throughout various epochs and in response to different global circumstances and its strategic and national interests, the United States has engaged in varying forms of interventionism within the Balkan Peninsula. The extent and nature of these interventions have ranged from direct military involvements, such as the intervention in Bulgaria during WWII, financial aid, such as the Truman Doctrine extended to Greece and

Turkey, to diplomatic negotiations. More recently, the focus has shifted toward humanitarian intervention, as evidenced by the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo Crisis in 1999.

The conclusion of the Cold War brought about an era of turbulence in the Balkan Peninsula. The United States, as a new significant global power, underwent a series of distinct stages as it became increasingly involved in the region, beginning with a period of restraint, followed by active participation in Bosnia, and ultimately culminating with a significant role in Kosovo (Đorđević 228). American Congress enacted the “Support for East European Democracies Act” (SEED) in 1989 to help establish “democratic institutions, political pluralism, and free market economies” in the Balkans. Money was given to enterprise funds and private organizations that offered grants, loans, and other investments to local initiatives. These funds were managed by independent boards of U.S. business executives and entrepreneurs and were funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (Kandilarov 1). The act has played a substantial role in supporting the transition of the region from communist dictatorship to democratic governance and market economies as it provided vital assistance to countries facing ongoing challenges in their democratic development.

Nevertheless, During the time of the FRY collapse, the concept of military engagement was perceived as a demonstration of leadership, which was not the White House’s desired approach. The triumphs of recent international collaborations and the paramount significance of being a cooperative ally instead of an authoritative figure have impacted Washington’s decision to adopt a more restrained stance (Walker, Goodby, Duffield qtd. in Đorđević 232). The trajectory of American engagement in the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era hinged on the viewpoints of two consecutive American Presidents, namely George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. This latter adopted a more interfering stance in the area during his two terms.

It is vital to acknowledge that the American involvement in specific Balkan nations was marked by collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, the mechanism applied by these contributing parts is discussed in this part with a specific emphasis on the events surrounding the case of the Kosovo Crisis in 1999.

### **3.2.1. The UN and NATO Intervention Principles**

As it is mentioned above, the involvement of the USA in certain Balkan regions is distinguished by the cooperation of the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The implementation of interventionism has been instrumental in shaping the political and social landscape of the region. The U.S. has worked, in one manner or another, with these international organizations to provide assistance and support to some subjugated regions in the Balkan Peninsula. This assistance has taken various forms, including military aid, economic aid, and political support. Nonetheless, this American involvement, similar to some other U.S. engagements in international affairs, has ignited debate owing to the diverse underlying factors that prompted this decision contingent upon a realist or idealist perspective on one side and the legitimacy extent of the organization's participation on the other.

Before delving into the Kosovo Crisis of 1999 and the U.S. role there, it is essential first to understand the functioning of international organizations like the UN and NATO to comprehend their involvement and their relation with the U.S. decision-making process.

The United Nations (UN) is a global organization that currently comprises 193 countries, and its main objective is to foster international collaboration, promote peace, security, economic and social development, and uphold human rights (Watts 306). The creation of the United Nations stemmed from the shortcomings of its predecessor, the League of Nations, with the noble objective of maintaining worldwide peace and creating favorable

economic, social, and political conditions. It was established through discussions between the U.S., UK, Soviet Union, and China during WWII and signed in 1945 with 51 members. The number of members increased to 179 in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Robertson 492, 493) and the creation of newly independent countries. The UN was established with significant contributions from the United States, which is still a member of the organization and holds a permanent seat in its Security Council (Watts 306). As the cornerstone of the United Nations, the Security Council plays a pivotal role in safeguarding global peace and security. It can call for peacekeeping forces to monitor conflicts and sanction military operations. The body has 15 members, five of whom are permanent and have veto power over resolutions. In the wake of the Soviet Union's dissolution, the world has embraced a greater recognition of global common interests and a reduction in using vetoes. The United States of America and its principal ally, the United Kingdom, have acted without a UN mandate, but they still try to obtain UN support for their activities (Robertson 493). As a founding member of the United Nations, the U.S. made decisions regarding certain global matters (the case of the 1999 Kosovo Crisis, for instance) that were not following the organization's preferences. This resulted in a conflict of interest between the two entities.

On the other hand, NATO is a political and military organization that stated that if any of the governments in Europe or North America were attacked, it would be considered an attack on all of them (Watts 209) because it was formed after World War II to protect non-communist countries from the perceived threat of the Eastern bloc. Its members include the United States of America, Canada, and most of Western Europe, but some have remained neutral, like Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland. NATO coordinates the military capabilities of its members for both peace and war. In times of war, all members fall under a unified international command structure headed by a U.S. general due to the high cost of NATO membership for the USA (Robertson 334). Therefore, the United States, as a leading member

of NATO, has been instrumental in implementing measures to stabilize the situation in Kosovo and promote peace in the region, especially since NATO's original purpose became obsolete by the Cold War's end. Nevertheless, members still value cooperation and want America to remain dedicated to European defense. The main goal of this organization became to protect member countries through political and military means, primarily focused on crisis management and peacekeeping efforts (Watts 209). The United States, as a consequence, did not halt itself from doing so, albeit it was at the expense of breaching the guidelines set out by the United Nations Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, begins with a preamble emphasizing the UN Charter as the overarching framework for the Alliance's operations. The Treaty's signatories express their unwavering support for the principles and objectives outlined in the Charter in its initial statements ("NATO's Relations"). This preamble, therefore, serves as a powerful reminder of the critical role that the UN plays in shaping the global community and promoting the pursuit of peace and security worldwide.

During the Kosovo Crisis, the UN, contrariwise and prior to NATO's Operation Allied Force, made the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 which expressed the Council's concern regarding the escalating violence and unrest in Kosovo. It acknowledged the humanitarian crisis unfolding due to the conflict and called for an immediate ceasefire. The Resolution also urged all parties to refrain from using violence and engage in dialogue and negotiations to resolve their differences. Additionally, Resolution 1160 established a series of measures to promote peace and stability in Kosovo, including deploying international monitors to monitor the situation on the ground. It called upon all parties to respect human rights and adhere to international law. In addition, it urged the authorities in Belgrade to investigate any alleged human rights violations in Kosovo. Furthermore, the Resolution implored the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians to denounce violence and take

steps to prevent further violence (“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160”). This Resolution was a significant step toward resolving the conflict in Kosovo, laying the foundation for a more comprehensive approach to addressing the conflict. It represented the global community’s dedication to promoting peace and harmony in a strife-ridden territory such as Kosovo by highlighting the importance of dialogue and negotiations in resolving conflicts.

Subsequently, the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 was crafted a few weeks later, on 23 September 1998, and noted strong demands for the Serbs. It refrained from granting consent to the force implementation, yet it deemed it necessary to place Kosovo under Chapter VII of the Charter. This designation highlights the prevailing reality of a threat to global peace and stability (Freedman 348). Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” is a robust set of guidelines consisting of thirteen articles, from 39 to 51, which outline the necessary steps that the international community should take to address any issues related to peace and security. It is imperative to note that any actions taken under Chapter VII must adhere to the principles of the UN Charter, which entails being proportional, necessary, and aimed at restoring peace and security. Additionally, it is imperative that the Security Council grants its authorization for any military intervention. If peaceful methods fail, the Security Council can take more aggressive action, such as economic sanctions and other non-military interventions. In some cases, military force may even be employed to restore peace and security (“United Nations Charter”). Thereby, Chapter VII highlights the importance of upholding global security and peace, which embodies the international community’s dedication to collaborating in preventing disputes and fostering harmony. Regrettably, the United States failed to heed these directives amidst the Kosovo Crisis in 1999.

After that, the United Nations was granted jurisdiction over Kosovo due to Security Council Resolution 1244, which created the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, the Resolution was somewhat contradictory and unclear, as it reaffirmed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's geographic unity and sovereignty while also demanding consideration of the Rambouillet Accords, which emphasized the importance of determining a definitive resolution that aligns with the collective desires and wishes of the populace (Judah 94). Therefore, as has already been explained in the second chapter of this piece of research, the Resolution established a global civilian and military presence in Kosovo and created a provisional administration to oversee its development. It acknowledged the rights of the Albanian community residing in Kosovo while affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included Kosovo at the time. This Resolution was an essential step toward resolving the conflict and bringing stability to the region without resorting to any form of hostility.

Through the integration of supplementary documents, perspectives, and condemnations, the United Nations diligently strived to address the situation in Kosovo in alignment with its core principles, displaying a steadfast commitment to spreading justice and peace.

Concerning NATO's intervention, it authorized air strikes in October 1998 to support diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Kosovo by removing Serbian forces, ending violence, and allowing refugees to return home. President Milosevic eventually complied, and the air strikes were canceled. Negotiations were held under international mediation but ultimately failed due to President Milosevic's refusal to change his policies, despite efforts by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. On March 24, 1999, Operation Allied Force commenced, and on June 10, it was suspended, lasting for 78 days. Attempts at resolving through talks in Rambouillet and Paris were unsuccessful, leaving no other diplomatic

options. NATO suspended its air campaign on June 10<sup>th</sup> after agreeing with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the same day, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 acknowledged that Yugoslavia had agreed to end violence and withdraw military forces. There would be an international security presence, with significant participation from NATO (“Kosovo Air Campaign”). The intervention in Kosovo poses significant legal and ethical concerns, as it lacked authorization from the United Nations Security Council and, consequently, deviated from international law’s fundamental principles.

As per the provision prescribed in Article 53 of Chapter VIII in the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may use regional arrangements or organizations to enforce laws and regulations when necessary. However, the Security Council must first authorize any enforcement actions by regional agencies or organizations (“United Nations Charter”). Despite this, the USA led NATO’s airstrikes without this authorization which entangled the situation in Kosovo.

The United Nations and NATO are dedicated to promoting international peace and security. Their working relationship was limited during the Cold War but increased in 1992 due to conflict in the western Balkans, leading to practical cooperation. During the Kosovo conflict, there was close contact between the UN and NATO’s Secretary Generals, and NATO took action in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 to provide security for peace and reconstruction in Kosovo, working closely with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (“NATO’s Relations”). NATO-KFOR’s purpose is to aid in upholding a safe and tranquil atmosphere in the region of Kosovo, as stated in the UNSCR 1244. Their mission involves cooperating with the UN, the European Union, and other international actors to promote stability and peace in Kosovo. KFOR has assisted in the development of the Kosovo Security Force, an unarmed force that helps respond to crises, natural disasters, and

other emergencies. It also supports professional, democratic, and multi-ethnic security structures' establishment in Kosovo ("Kosovo Force"). Thence, the UN and NATO's collaborative efforts have yielded remarkable progress toward a prosperous future for the region as it was striving for independence and autonomy. Nonetheless, NATO's initial airstrikes, named "Operation Allied Force," without UN Security Council's consent, are still a matter of contention and criticism.

### **3.2.2. U.S. Interventionism in Kosovo**

The previous title of this part of the third chapter delved into the function and legal texts of the United Nations and NATO as international organizations in the face of global crisis. Building on that, this title deals with the role of the United States of America in the international decision-making process concerning its different levels of participation in the 1999 Kosovo Crisis.

For centuries, the region where the modern-day Republic of Kosovo is has been plagued by turmoil. The roots of the ethnic cleansing of 1999 there, on the other hand, can be traced back to the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. As has been already discussed on different occasions in this piece of research, America has undergone various stages of engagement in the Balkan region in general, influenced by diverse factors. The Albanians of Kosovo believed that the U.S. government's disregard for their plight during the Bosnian Crisis created a delusion that their issues could be resolved later and that the Serbian administration, headed by Milosevic, could be reformed. The peace agreement of Dayton in 1995, which brought peace to Bosnia, triggered an armed rebellion in Kosovo as they were excluded from the negotiations. Meanwhile, other Yugoslav factions that had revolted were acknowledged and granted sovereignty (Hedges). In other words, Kosovars believed that they were responsible for misleading the United States into thinking

that there was no urgency to address the escalating tensions in their region as early as the Bosnians.

Nevertheless, as early as March 1998, with its allies, the United States came to a collective decision to implement some diplomatic and economic sanctions upon Yugoslavia due to President Slobodan Milosevic's actions against the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo. This decision occurred during "an emergency meeting of the Contact Group that monitors Yugoslavia" and its neighboring republics. The U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was satisfied with the decision but wanted to approach Serbia with a combination of diplomacy and punishment. If needed, more vigorous measures will be taken to pressure Milosevic to recognize the rights of the ethnic Albanians (Erlanger, *U.S and Allies Threaten*). Thus, in the U.S., Mrs. Albright felt it essential to prepare for the possibility of force use, while National Security Advisor Sandy Berger disagreed (Freedman 348). Regardless of their stance, the ultimate goal of these decisions was to steer clear of plunging into yet another tumultuous conflict in the Balkan region.

In April 1998, a senior State Department official made a statement<sup>15</sup> that could be comprehended as a warning to both France and Russia. He asserted that if the upcoming Rome meeting did not result in substantial new sanctions, the United States would take unilateral action regarding policy in the Balkans (Shenon). This declaration can be viewed as the United States of America's determination to lead the world as a unipolar power by independently taking decisive actions. Similarly, the president of the self-declared Republic of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, led a delegation to meet with U.S. President Bill Clinton on May 29, 1998. The purpose of their meeting was to urge the Americans to increase pressure on Milosevic to engage in serious negotiations with Albanians in Kosovo and to end the violence inflicted upon them. During the meeting, journalist and delegation member Veton Surroi reported that President Clinton offered assurances of American support and emphasized that

the mistakes made during the conflict in Bosnia would not be repeated. Surroi later interpreted this to mean that the West would take action before it was too late and not stand by passively (Erlanger, *Clinton Meets Delegation*). This highlights the early willingness of the United States to support the Kosovo Albanians in their quest for independence.

On June 12, 1998, the United States, Russia, and six other leading industrial democracies convened in London to reinforce the NATO alliance's resolve to halt the atrocities in Kosovo. A swift end to the Serb aggression against ethnic Albanian civilians was demanded. Russia, the Serbs' traditional ally, did not agree to the warning the group issued and, alongside France, has been insisting that a United Nation's Security Council Resolution was necessary before any NATO air strikes or peacekeeping missions could be undertaken in the Kosovo region (Whitney, *8 Nations Demand End*). This meeting brought to light the divergent perspectives of the major world powers regarding how to persuade Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to end his unjust treatment of the Kosovars.

In a compelling report released in October 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan revealed that Serbian security forces were still carrying out violent operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo Province. The report drew on accounts from various reputable sources, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, diplomats in the region, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ultimately reinforcing previous assessments made by NATO and American officials. NATO's Secretary-General, Javier Solana, underscored Milosevic's inability to fulfill the requirements set forth by the Security Council, thus compelling NATO to consider necessary actions should he persist in disregarding them (Crossette). Unfortunately, all of these adverse reports on the conduct of the Serbs confirmed their violation of not only human rights but also the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 that was promulgated a few weeks earlier.

Richard Holbrooke, the special envoy from the United States, revealed in October 1998 that an agreement had been reached with President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia. The agreement prevented NATO air strikes against Serbia and offered the possibility of autonomy for Kosovo Province. This accord required 2,000 international observers and NATO reconnaissance flights to oversee the withdrawal of troops and police from Kosovo, where Serbian forces had been suppressing the ethnic Albanian population (Perlez). Even though the agreement appeared to be an acceptable primary solution to tackle the ongoing crisis in the region, it fell short of quelling the escalating situation there. This was primarily attributable to Slobodan Milosevic's untrustworthiness<sup>16</sup>, who persisted in exacerbating tensions and impeding any chance of progressing toward a peaceful settlement.

In January 1999, NATO allies were poised to employ their military might to halt the violence in Kosovo caused by Serbian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels. The threat of force was deemed necessary by the UN Secretary-General to enable diplomacy to bring peace to the region. Britain and France expressed their readiness to deploy ground forces in support of a political resolution, and the Clinton administration was under pressure to commit troops to a NATO peacekeeping mission. All parties agreed that a political solution was necessary. France's President Jacques Chirac and UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair met in London. Afterward, France announced they were ready to join the military operation, including sending ground troops, to assist in a peaceful resolution with their Atlantic Alliance partners (Whitney, *NATO Says It's Ready*). Therefore, through the equitable attribution of responsibility to both disputing parties, the decision to resort to force, if still needed, would be made jointly.

In the coming two months of 1999, talks were held in Rambouillet, France, between different parties, but they were contentious and slow. Under the leadership of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, a mediation effort was undertaken. The outcome was the

signing of the Rambouillet Accords on March 18 by representatives from Albania, the USA, and Great Britain. These accords espoused the principles of democratic institutions, the protection of human rights, and the autonomy of Kosovo, all to be safeguarded by an international force. However, the delegations of Russia and Serbia declined to sign the agreement due to their radical alternative proposal, which even their Russian ally could not endorse (Hall 165). The international community made ongoing attempts to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, and the Serbian side was consistently reluctant. Accordingly, amidst a time of great turmoil and peril fraught with numerous threats, North Atlantic Treaty Organization took decisive action. It launched a series of airstrikes under the leadership of the USA.

The United States led NATO's Operation Allied Force without the United Nations Security Council's consent. Disregarding the approval of the UN and proceeding with these attacks was "because both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did, however, reference the U.N. Charter's Article VII, which includes the use of military force to maintain international security. This has been taken by some, including the United States, to be sufficient U.N. authorization" (Donfried 15). In addition, despite facing significant criticism, the United States defended its role as leader of NATO's Allied Force operation in Kosovo by citing a growing trend toward humanitarian intervention in its foreign policy decision-making. This also prompts a ramifying inquiry into the identity of the key players involved in the NATO airstrikes on Kosovo within the United States of America's administration.

In the first chapter of this piece of research, the U.S. foreign policy decision-making was discussed concerning the constitutional powers of its legislative and executive branches

of the government. The Clinton administration, as the executive, did not seek approval from the legislative Congress for using military force in various situations. Instead, the President relied on the need to fulfill commitments to the United Nations or NATO. Despite Congress' refusal to authorize using military force, President Clinton asserted his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief to deploy American troops into the conflict. While he would have liked congressional support, he proceeded with military plans without it and ignored the War Powers Resolution. As a result, the War Powers Resolution has become ineffective under the Clinton administration (Yoo 1674). The executive branch of the United States has undertaken numerous acts of humanitarian intervention in various global conflicts without the U.S. Congress's consent. In this prospect, United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Wesley Clark advocated for a comprehensive military approach to complement diplomatic initiatives, citing the Bosnian conflict as a gained lesson. Conversely, American Secretary of Defense William Cohen and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger evoked the cautionary lessons of Vietnam and Somalia in order to limit U.S. involvement (Barthe and David 85). This substantiates that the Kosovo airstrikes, carried out by NATO, were attributable to the Clinton cabinet members.

In the end, throughout Kosovo's pursuit of independence, the international community has remained steadfastly committed to offering its assistance no matter how. The U.S. officially acknowledged this small country as an independent nation and agreed to establish diplomatic ties on February 18, 2008. This decision was announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on behalf of President George W. Bush ("A Guide to the United States' History"). This act symbolizes the United States' dedication to supporting Kosovo in its quest for independence until the very end.

## Conclusion

The Balkan Peninsula holds a vital place in the European continent and is commonly viewed as a traditional ally of Russia. Thus, the U.S. decision-making concerning this region is monitored by this assumption. On one side, since it is part and parcel of Europe, the ally of the U.S. in most of its influential international organizations, Americans have to do whatever it takes to support its people. On another side, it is seen by many as an ally of the Americans' frenemy. This requires the U.S. to approach any decisions regarding the region with caution and careful consideration.

The Balkan peninsula has a rich and varied history that, unfortunately, resulted in violent conflicts and civil wars between different ethnic groups. These conflicts became so severe that international intervention was required to help bring forth a harmonious and stable environment in the area. America was at the forefront of spearheading decisive measures during the various conflicts in the Balkans. Nonetheless, the extent of the United States' involvement in these crises varied significantly based on many factors.

The case study of this piece of research delves into the 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which impact U.S. foreign policy significantly. It was the first time the USA engaged in a military campaign for humanitarian reasons, indicating its willingness to intervene in global conflicts to promote democracy and human rights. The U.S.-led NATO Operation Allied Force, involving a sustained air campaign against Serbian military targets, aimed to prevent further atrocities against the Albanian population in Kosovo. Despite criticism claiming the operation violated international law and lacked United Nations' authorization and even U.S. Congress consent, supporters contend it was necessary. In addition, it can be contended that the actions of America in this matter epitomize duplicity in its foreign policy conduct.

The conflict hurt the stability of the Balkan region, further exacerbating the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Despite the American acknowledgment of the independence of Kosovo in 2008, the persisting animosity between the two nations continues to be a pressing issue.

### Endnotes

14. “The Dayton Peace Accords brought temporary peace between the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. In November 1995, after more than three years of war in Bosnia, President Bill Clinton (1946–) helped the leaders of these states negotiate a peace treaty. With estimates of 100,000 to 400,000 people dead and the country of Bosnia in ruins, the process of nation-building under the auspices of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began. Since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 161 people have been indicted on charges of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and other acts” (Hall 91).

15. ““If the meeting goes well, we will continue to use the contact group as the principal mechanism,” he said. “If it doesn’t go well, then we’ll operate a bit more independently.”” (Shenon)

16. The New York Times journalist Jane Perlez added in her article of October 1998 that “[B]efore heading home to New York, Holbrooke was asked if Milosevic could be trusted to fulfill the agreement worked out over nine days of sessions that often ended after midnight. The question of trust and Milosevic is a favorite theme of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She has repeatedly said he cannot be trusted.”

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**Chapter Four**

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## **Chapter Four**

### **American Idealism vs. Realism in Kosovo**

#### **Introduction**

At first glance, it may seem that the United States of America intervened in Kosovo solely out of a deep sense of concern for the humanitarian crisis in 1999. However, upon deeper analysis, it becomes apparent that this involvement was far more nuanced and complex, driven not only by lofty ideals but also by realist considerations and pragmatic concerns.

The idealism principle in American foreign policy has long been a longstanding tradition. However, adopting a pragmatic approach in the late twentieth century must be addressed. The conflict between the notions of American idealism and realism shows up in different situations of American humanitarian interventions in different world hotspots. Upon initial observation, the idealistic approach stands to promote democracy and human rights, while the realistic approach is to prioritize national interests and stability. In Kosovo, the United States has attempted to balance these two approaches by supporting the establishment of a democratic government while also working with other countries and international organizations to maintain regional stability. However, this has led to some tension and criticism from both sides. Supporters of idealism argue that the U.S. should prioritize its values and principles, while supporters of realism argue that national interests should come first.

During the Post-Cold War Period, there was a discernible uptick in civil and ethnic conflicts throughout the various continents and countries. America has struggled to decide whether to intervene in these countries' affairs. This decision involves balancing the sovereignty of the state with the moral obligation to intervene in instances of human rights

violations (Kaufman 138). This dilemma requires weighing the pursuit of lofty goals against the practical constraints of international relations. Though not a pioneering case of U.S. humanitarian intervention, the juxtaposition of realpolitik and idealism regarding U.S. intervention in Kosovo presents an intriguing discourse. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to addressing this particular issue.

The fourth chapter of the present research study is thereby bifurcated into two distinct parts. The first part is entitled “Consideration-Worthy Political Principles.” It delves into the fundamental terminology associated with the subject matter, supplemented by specific case studies from the United States’ implementation of humanitarian interventions across various global regions. The second part of the chapter similarly, tackles the matter of the United States’ adherence to idealistic principles vis-à-vis the use of realpolitik during the Kosovo Crisis of 1999. This complex situation required a refined approach that considered the competing interests and priorities of various actors involved in the conflict, which led to other prospects in U.S. foreign policy conduct.

#### **4.1. Consideration-Worthy Political Principles**

Throughout the Post-Cold War Period, American leaders and policy-makers drew upon the fundamental doctrines of idealism, realpolitik, and humanitarian interventions to guide their strategic decision-making and establish the nation’s foreign policy. Each of the aforementioned principles possesses inherent strengths and weaknesses and has significantly influenced the formation of the U.S. foreign policy, which has undergone significant changes and evolution throughout the years.

The issue of U.S. humanitarian intervention engenders multifaceted inquiries pertaining to the validity, efficacy, and inadvertent implications of military intervention. Some scholars posit that this ideology is a sub-constituent of the idealistic underpinnings of the United States, which strives to protect civilians from large-scale atrocities and promote

human security. The approach in question is grounded in the assertion that the international community possesses a moral imperative to undertake intervention efforts where a nation, either due to incapability or unwillingness, fails to adequately safeguard its citizens from distinctive sorts of wartime crimes and infringement. Critics have levied accusations of duplicity against the United States in relation to its actions taken in Kosovo. The proponents opine that the United States' primary focus was the pursuit of its strategic interests rather than just promoting democratic values and human rights in the region. Consequently, it succumbed to the principles of *realpolitik* too.

The amalgamation of *realpolitik*, idealistic thought, and the concept of humanitarian interventions ultimately resulted in the adoption of a perception of duplicity within the context of Kosovo. Therefore, this topic necessitates an in-depth examination, and it is comprehensively addressed under this title, which illuminates the semantic significance of these political concepts and explores their practical application in various regions across the globe.

#### **4.1.1. Scope and Meaning**

In contemporary years, the foreign policy pursued by the American nation has been marked by a concerted emphasis on realistic and practical considerations, more commonly referred to as *realpolitik*, and a concomitant aspiration to actively advance the cause of human rights and democratic governance by engaging in humanitarian intervention efforts in several parts of the world. Nonetheless, the compatibility between these two approaches is occasionally impeded, leading to allegations of duplicity leveled against the United States pertaining to its operations in Kosovo. Simultaneously, the United States has exhibited a strong proclivity toward advocating for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. This position is predicated upon the notion that the ethnic Albanian population was experiencing oppressive conditions, including ethnic cleansing and genocide, due to the actions undertaken by the

Serbian government. The present intervention was executed in the guise of NATO, with the United States taking a foremost part in the armed conflict that resulted in the eventual evacuation of Serbian military troops from Kosovo. The actions undertaken by the United States in Kosovo were impelled by an aspiration to foster stability, security, and the observance of human rights within the region. However, these pursuits were also influenced by strategic reasoning and political exigency. The rationale behind this assistance was partly stimulated by the intention to mitigate the sway of Russian assertiveness in the vicinity, in conjunction with a focus on upholding equanimity and safeguarding safety, not only in Kosovo but also, in the Balkan peninsula. Apart from these strategic justifications, there were various other reasons for implementing such an intervention, including domestic and individual motives.

Given the foregoing and before delving into the practical applications of these political principles in the case study at hand, it is of utmost importance to first grasp a comprehensive understanding of their respective definitions. This will serve as a fundamental basis for any subsequent analysis and ultimately aid in the attainment of a thorough examination of the subject matter.

#### **4.1.1.1. Realpolitik**

Realpolitik, a political realism concept that originated in Germany during the nineteenth century, is linked to Karl Otto von Bismarck<sup>17</sup> and emphasizes unbiased assessment devoid of emotions (Robertson 420). To make sound judgments, politicians must have clear and rational thinking. Moreover, it is a:

Political science theory stresses international anarchy, human and national egoism and self-interest, the priority and superiority of power and security, and the need to exclude considerations of morality and ethical principles from foreign policy—a sort of international political Darwinism<sup>18</sup>. In practice, it means every state can do

whatever it wants or thinks it can get away with based on its power or alliances. The theory is based on practical and material factors, mainly motivated by national self-interest, not theoretical legal or ethical principles. (Condé 254)

In alternative parlance, it focuses on the practical considerations of politics rather than moral or ethical concerns. Accordingly, the concept of “Realpolitik” has taken a darker turn, characterized by a skeptical mindset that uncovers concealed intentions behind expressed ideas. In its most radical form, it prioritizes personal or national benefits over ethical principles while anticipating the adversary to adopt a similar stance (Robertson 420). That is to say; the opposing party is expected to reciprocate with a comparable approach.

In addition to the details above, realism ideology emphasizes the considerable importance of power in determining the conduct of diverse actors, wherein power is defined as the capability to effectuate decisions and choices. Joseph Nye states that power can be classified as “hard” or “soft.” Hard power refers to the use of military and economic strength to achieve desired outcomes, while soft power involves the persuasion of others through cooperation and persuasion. Soft power emphasizes the importance of values over brute force. On the other hand, Walter Russell Mead divides power into four categories: military, economic, cultural/ideological, and hegemonic. The combination of military, economic, and cultural/ideological power can lead to a higher level of power known as hegemony (Kaufman 10). Thus, the realism approach underscores the fundamental centrality of power dynamics in shaping the comportment of individuals, institutions, and nation-states within the global sphere. The capacity to exert influence and sway over others is widely regarded as an important factor in achieving success. Countries like the United States of America, which possess a higher degree of power, are typically considered to be more effective in accomplishing their objectives and attaining their desired outcomes. In this particular theoretical context, power is regarded not only as a mechanism for accomplishing sought-after

objectives but also as a mechanism for protecting one's interests and ensuring security.

Realist ideologies emphasize the utmost significance of cultivating and preserving power capabilities as an imperative mechanism for securing survival and triumph within the intricate global realm.

In the same vein, Jacksonians are the basis for American realism in foreign affairs. Jacksonian realists are the closest American school to classic European *realpolitik* due to their suspicion of international law. They align with Jeffersonians against global meliorism in foreign policy. Jeffersonians and Jacksonians oppose humanitarian and world-order interventions. Jeffersonians favor minimalism in defining and defending U.S. interests, while Jacksonians prioritize honor, reputation, and military institutions in foreign policy (Mead 244-245). The principle of the Jeffersonian philosophy is to handle foreign matters cautiously, prioritizing conflict avoidance and fostering friendly ties with other nations of the world. On the other hand, adherents of the Jacksonian philosophy embrace an assertive and aggressive stance, prioritizing the deployment of military force to safeguard the nation's interests and reputation.

The Kosovo case, which transpired during the Clinton administration, elicited a dichotomous interplay between the concepts of realism and idealism. Accordingly, the fundamental components of President Clinton's foreign policy were founded on the principles of "humanitarian intervention, liberal hegemony, and democratic enlargement," all of which align with the concept of multilateralism, emphasizing the use of smart power (Paterson 45). Overall, the approach adopted by Clinton's administration with respect to the Kosovo crisis of 1999 was significantly influenced by the principles of Wilsonianism, which greatly emphasized the imperative of advancing democratic ideals and safeguarding human rights on a global scale. Though it contradicts the principles of realism, it is worth considering whether or not President Clinton's administration acted solely on idealistic motives.

Proponents of the theory of realism advocate that modern politics often involves the idea of *realpolitik*. However, thinking that people always act this way is probably not accurate. This goes against what *realpolitik* really means. *Realpolitik* is a way of doing politics that tries to avoid really bad things from happening, even if it does not get the best outcome possible. *Realpolitik* is an updated way of thinking about how countries interact with each other in the world. It was primarily developed in the United States. This idea says that a country always puts its interests first, even if it ignores international laws (Robertson 420). Those who support *realpolitik* advocate a practical approach to politics that prioritizes national interest and power over ideology and morality. These individuals believe in the importance of maintaining a strong and stable government, even if it means making difficult decisions or compromising specific values.

#### **4.1.1.2. Idealism**

The definition of the political term idealism is, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, “the doctrine that the external world must be understood through consciousness” (337). This means that the experience of reality is shaped by thoughts, emotions, and perceptions, rather than by the objective reality of the physical world around. The liberal/idealist school sees countries as a collective body where working together brings better security than competition; unlike realism, idealism/liberalism values cooperative work among people and nations. Liberalism emphasizes unity and promotes international organizations like the United Nations. This approach emphasizes collaboration among nations for mutual benefit. Soft power is essential to the cooperative policies of this tradition. This perspective gained credibility in the Post-Cold War Era as capitalism and democracy spread through former Eastern Bloc countries (Kaufman 11). The two terms, idealism, and liberalism, thus, can be used interchangeably. Accordingly, resorting to soft power is crucial in achieving the United States’ diplomatic goals and promoting its national interests through

non-violent means. This non-coercive approach involves utilizing cultural, economic, and ideological influence to achieve diplomatic goals and enhance the country's image abroad. Ideological diplomacy is also a key component of soft power. By promoting human rights and democratic values, the United States can earn the trust and respect of other nations. This can include offering foreign aid, creating economic partnerships, and promoting free trade. By fostering economic growth and stability in other countries, the U.S. can build stronger relationships and promote stability in the global community, or at least; this is what the idealists advocate.

“During the Cold War, U.S. policy-makers had to decide between two difficult choices: realist requirements such as stability and security or idealist values such as democracy and human rights” (Paterson 22). Maintaining a balance between these conflicting objectives was an extremely challenging task. It necessitated meticulous evaluation of an expansive spectrum of elements, encompassing domestic and international considerations. In the final analysis, the decisions pursued by the United States were of critical importance. During the Cold War period, policy-makers significantly influenced the trajectory of historical events and the prospective developments of global diplomatic interactions. However, such circumstances were not invariably favorable. The proponents of the cessation of warfare following WWI, who espoused the ideals of collective security and the League of Nations, were frequently subject to unfavorable public opinion, with an inclination toward a derogatory denotation of them as “liberals”.

Additionally, they have faced charges of advocating that the mere desire for peace can prevent the occurrence of armed clashes, disregarding factors like human nature, national interests, security concerns, and past events. Realist scholars, exemplified by E. H. Carr advocated a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that is rooted in a nuanced recognition of historical developments. The assertions put forth by many scholars were significantly

impacted by the transcendental idealism posited by Immanuel Kant, alongside the notion of universal history as elucidated by both G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. In seeking to do so, they endeavored to challenge the prevalent idealistic concepts that held sway during their epoch ("Idealism", 337-338). Hence, this confirms that advocates of idealism within the realm of foreign policy have faced criticism for their purported belief in the efficacy of a mere wish for peace to stave off military hostilities and for being unrealistic or overly optimistic while overlooking the complex array of factors emphasized by proponents of realism.

Within the post-Cold War Period, America made a concerted effort to enhance its global involvement during the tenure of Presidents Clinton and Bush. This shift in foreign policy represented a departure from the nation's historically prevalent approach of isolationism and neutrality. To a certain extent, both Heads of State directives were informed by an idealist, liberal ideology rather than the traditional realist approach frequently adopted by American leaders (Paterson 45). This suggests that they prioritized values like equality, freedom, and human rights over pragmatic considerations like national security or economic gain. By embracing this approach, Bush and Clinton may have sought to promote a more just and equitable world, even if it meant taking on greater risks or challenges. However, this also meant they were more vulnerable to criticism or backlash from those who disagreed with their vision or doubted their ability to achieve it. Ultimately, the success or failure of their policies depended on how well they could balance their ideals with the practical realities of governing and diplomacy.

In conclusion, idealism can be seen as escapism or denial of reality. By claiming that the physical world is illusory or unimportant, idealists may be ignoring the real problems and challenges facing the world. The American foreign policy has been subject to criticism for its idealistic approach. This means that America has often pursued its foreign policy goals based on moral principles and values rather than practical considerations. Critics argue that this

approach is unrealistic and can lead to unintended consequences, such as conflicts and instability in some areas of the world.

Furthermore, the U.S.'s idealistic approach to foreign policy can also be seen as hypocritical. While the U.S. espouses democratic values and human rights, it has also supported authoritarian regimes and engaged in military interventions resulting in civilian casualties and human rights abuses. For example, the U.S. has often supported democratic movements and human rights initiatives in countries where these values are not widely shared. While these actions may be well-intentioned, they can also be seen as interference in the internal affairs of other nations. They can lead to backlash from governments and groups that feel threatened by United States' influence.

#### **4.1.1.3. Humanitarian Intervention**

Humanitarian intervention emerged in the late twentieth century during the Post-Cold War Period. Foreign powers used force to aid suffering populations with non-military assistance. The suffering may stem from civil war, insurgency, or state collapse (Robertson 231). It is a method to address the humanitarian needs of those affected by such situations. This can include providing aid, mediating negotiations, and supporting local institutions. In some cases, however, external actors may resort to more coercive means, including military power, to address a crisis or protect civilians from violence or abuse. The decision to intervene, and the method used, are generally based on a thorough analysis of the conflict dynamics and a comprehensive evaluation of the potential advantages and drawbacks of different options.

Moreover, the concept of humanitarian intervention entails the deployment of military personnel from one nation to another to halt severe atrocities perpetrated by the government of the host nation against its civilians. In situations where the severity of the mistreatment is exceptional and sufficiently egregious to elicit a global outcry, this practice is permissible

according to international law principles (Condé 144). These international law principles recognize the rights of individuals and the responsibility of states to protect those rights. Notwithstanding, the legality of humanitarian interventions remains a topic of ongoing scholarly debate.

Humanitarian intervention is criticized that aid deliverers needing protection by an independent military presence to carry out relief work safely. This can apply when law and order collapse, leaving no state to stop genocidal attempts. In addition, it is limited due to the world system still valuing national sovereignty, preventing outside institutions from forcibly intervening in a state's affairs. During the Cold War, neutrality and limited intent of an intervening force were impossible due to associations with superpowers of countries' contributing forces. There is suspicion about the neutrality of these forces, and Russia needs to be appeased before accepting any U.S. or NATO intervention (Robertson 231). As such, the humanitarian intervention issue raises complex ethical and legal questions regarding the balance between state sovereignty, human rights protection, and the consent of some superpowers, especially in the Cold War Era. It underscores the exigency for a more nuanced approach to international politics.

Another critique of this foreign policy approach is that some countries used this belief as a reason to remove a leader or change how the government works. According to several specialists, the UN Charter forbids countries to employ military might to assist those suffering from human rights abuses. Instead, countries should work together through the U.N. to stop or resolve those problems (Condé 145). Therefore, advocates of humanitarian interventions have been viewed as transgressors who have violated the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter to advance their political agenda, prioritizing their interests and endeavors at the expense of international norms and obligations. This indicates that categorizing humanitarian interventions within *realpolitik* is an evident matter.

In contrast to the precedent, even if the tradition of the U.S. foreign policy follows realism, not liberal idealism, a certain level of contention existed. Realism states that the world is centered around states and their sovereignty rather than liberal collective governments. The United States system advocates for individual rights and limited government power, and it guards its sovereign rights and is defensive against external interference. The U.S. has occasionally favored liberal internationalism, like with Wilson's League of Nations and Clinton's humanitarian intervention. However, when given a choice between *realpolitik* or idealism, the U.S. public consistently chooses security and autonomy (Paterson 9). Thus, the American public opts for measures, policies, and actions that ensure their interest and priorities. Yet, Pat Paterson categorized Clinton's humanitarian interventions in various regions of the world as an embodiment of idealistic political assumptions.

In the same prospect, humanitarian intervention is justified by moral principles and has limited goals. Not the same as taking sides in a civil war to pick a winner. It aims to provide safe havens, supply routes, and refugee centers without addressing the root political and power struggles (Robertson 231). Ethical considerations guide this type of intervention and seek to address the systemic subjugation of groups in need of assistance. The goals of such interventions are carefully defined and focused on improving the situation for those affected by the crisis rather than pursuing broader political or military objectives. Adopting a limited intervention approach aims to minimize harm and maximize the positive impact on the lives of disadvantaged citizens. Ultimately, the ethical rationalization for humanitarian intervention situates it within the sphere of idealism in politics.

Concerning the American nation, it sought to increase global involvement after the Cold War period, diverging from its traditional isolationist tendencies. U.S. Presidents Clinton and Bush pursued idealist rather than realist policies. The inadequacies observed in

Clinton's endeavors aimed at achieving "humanitarian intervention" and the shortcomings of Bush's "nation-building" undertakings posed a critical challenge that necessitated an urgent adoption of a foreign policy anchored in discretion and limited involvement. This development culminated in the introduction of policies implemented during the tenure of Presidents Obama and Trump (Paterson 45). In other words, the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were characterized by their ideological approaches toward the promotion of humanitarian intervention and the pursuit of nation-building endeavors; however, various limitations and constraints inevitably hindered the realization of their respective agendas. As a result, the need for a foreign policy that prioritized prudence and minimal interference was recognized, and it became the guiding principle for future American governments as this approach was ultimately embraced and implemented by subsequent administrations.

#### **4.1.2. Instances of U.S. Humanitarian Intervention Implementation**

The interventionist inclination demonstrated by U.S. President Bill Clinton during the Post-Cold War Era was primarily substantiated by the concept known as "Droit d'Ingérence." This term is of French origin and refers to the legal right of intervention. The notion maintains that the global community and individual nations are entitled to intercede in the internal matters of sovereign states in instances of grave and systematic human rights transgressions, should the state in question prove incapable or unenthusiastic to terminate them. The concept has triggered apprehension among some politicians, particularly in developing nations, who perceive it as a manifestation of imperialism. It is essential to separate the idea of the prerogative to intervene from historical colonial actions. The proposition of conducting humanitarian intervention as a means to preclude human rights violations advocates the deployment of an objective and global task force operating under the auspices of international bodies. The objective is to establish a legal entitlement to intervene in the affairs of sovereign

nations to avert a surge in infringements on human rights (Condé 71). Critics argue that powerful countries can abuse it to interfere in weaker countries' affairs. It may cause unintended consequences and destabilize the region. No clear intervention guidelines cause inconsistency in international relations. "Droit d'Ingérence" stems from humanitarian intervention, where neighboring countries intervened to safeguard citizens or allies. Proponents argue that protecting human rights is a universal responsibility that transcends territorial and national boundaries. The international community should also intervene if a government cannot protect its citizens.

President Clinton's military operation in Kosovo (1999) exhibited a broader scope and more destructive consequences; however, it conformed to the customary patterns of humanitarian intervention observed in former operations, inclusive of Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan (1998), as well as Macedonia and Rwanda (Yoo 1673- 1674). Thus, the U.S. is a strong proponent of humanitarian intervention, arguing that safeguarding innocent civilians from harm is a moral duty. America has been a significant force in conducting a multitude of humanitarian interventions, particularly during the Post-Cold War Period. As such, it is important to deal with a few of these instances to understand the operative mechanics of such interventions compared to the case of the Kosovo Crisis of 1999.

#### **4.1.2.1. Somalia**

The initially selected instance of U.S. humanitarian intervention concerns a country located in the African continent, Somalia. It can be traced back to the George H. W. Bush presidency.

The Somali civil war started in 1991 when the military dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, was ousted after losing the Ogaden conflict to Ethiopia, which the USSR supported. Siad Barre's defeat led to the country being left without a central government due to ethnic,

religious, and political differences. Regional warlords fought for control, leading to a devastating famine and thousands of deaths. U.N. recognized Somalia's crisis and, in April 1992, established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to provide humanitarian aid via Security Council's resolution 751 (Raza). The mission came with its challenges. The U.N. forces faced significant resistance from local militias, who saw them as threatening their power. The situation escalated when the U.S. military got involved.

The United States military's participation in Somalia was initiated in the early 1990s as a humanitarian intervention. This was done as part of a United Nations-led mission to provide relief from famine (Hathaway and Hartig). Food delivery was difficult in Somalia due to warlord conflicts, leading to the failure of the U.S. and U.N. missions. In November 1992, President Bush proposed deploying U.S. troops in Somalia to protect U.N. aid workers. The U.N. passed Resolution 794, allowing the U.S. and others to use force for aid distribution in Somalia. This led to Operation Restore Hope starting on December 9, 1992 (Raza). The United States undertook an intervention in the region to mitigate the urgent humanitarian crisis and promote peace in the area. The intervention encountered considerable controversy and confronted multiple challenges, including opposition from local warlords and militants.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Bush administration, with particular emphasis on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Colin Powell, steadfastly rejected proposals for American use of military force to address humanitarian crises in Somalia and other regions in the world. This stance was based on the reasoning that none of these conflicts aligned with the United States' interests. Such a position was upheld for over a year because these events were categorized as mere humanitarian crises (Western 112- 113). This decision underscores the prioritization of the national interest of the United States above all other considerations. Nevertheless, when Bill Clinton became president, things got worse in state politics in the capital, and it seemed like there was no good solution to Operation Restore Hope. Clinton

reduced U.S. troops by formally giving control to the U.N., but the situation worsened. U.N. Security Council passed the resolution for military action against General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. U.S. and U.N. troops failed to capture Aidid after multiple attempts in two months. This latter downed 2 Black Hawk Helicopters, resulting in numerous fatalities and injuries. Four days after “Black Hawk Down,” Clinton withdrew U.S. troops from Somalia under pressure from Congress. The United Nations withdrew forces from Somalia, leaving it with tribal clans and warlords (Raza). The operation is seen as a turning point in the American military strategy, highlighting the dangers of conducting interventions in complex and politically volatile regions.

The humanitarian intervention, Operation Restore Hope, was plagued by the well-known bureaucratic occurrence of “mission creep.” This phenomenon involved the gradual transformation of a comparatively narrow goal centered on famine alleviation into a much more expansive endeavor to rebuild the Somali government (Gibbs 50). Initially grounded in a humanitarian reason, the U.S. intervention in Somalia eventually evolved into a U.S. stance against terrorist activities, with particular emphasis on the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Hathaway and Hartig). The humanitarian mission in Somalia was short-lived and ultimately culminated in a disaster, as the U.S. troops were attacked and forced to withdraw from the region. Consequently, the United States of America has transformed and intensified its endeavors to create a definitive position regarding counterterrorism.

#### **4.1.2.2. Haiti**

The second chosen instance of the United States humanitarian interventions pertains to the nation of Haiti, located on the American continent. The origin of the incident can be traced back to the tenure of the former American Presidents George H. W. Bush along with Bill Clinton.

The 1991 coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first elected president. President Bush urged democracy and enforced an embargo (excluding medicine and food). In 1992, Clinton slammed Bush's refugee return policy and vowed to strengthen sanctions on the military junta (Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995). Although the two presidents held divergent stances, they ultimately advocated for the intervention.

In September 1994, a U.S.-led troop force arrived in Port-au-Prince to reinstate President Aristide and remove the military junta. Operation Restore Democracy aimed to guarantee the democratization of Haiti and the development of its economy in the long term, as supported by U.S. President Bill Clinton and the U.N. (Girard 20). The significance of the resolution lies in its historical milestone as the U.N. approved the deployment of military force to reinstate the election of a democratic government in a sovereign state with the help of world power and other countries.

Clinton's administration laid the groundwork for this operation in the summer of 1994, culminating in this U.N. Security Council Resolution to remove the Haitian military regime via UNSCR 940, which also gave United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) a six-month mandate for maintaining order (Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995). The United States intervention in Haiti in 1994 continues to hold a critical stance as a noteworthy instance of humanitarian intervention, highlighting the intricacies of ethical and political issues associated with such interventions.

#### **4.1.2.3. Bosnia**

The third and last chosen U.S. humanitarian intervention instance is geographically located in Eastern Europe and is a neighboring country to the case study of this research, namely Bosnia.

After Yugoslavia's dissolution, the U.S. and E.U. conducted operations that improved ethnic conflicts in the mid-1990s. Clinton's decision to enter the Bosnian war sparked domestic confusion due to unclear potential outcomes. The intervention of the U.S. and its Western counterparts in the Bosnian conflict was to stop aggression from Bosnian Serbs against Muslims and Croats. This engagement in Bosnia impacted the Western Balkans (Watson 19). The Post-Cold War Western Balkans witnessed three distinct phases in American foreign policy that spanned over two presidential administrations. The first phase involved hesitancy to intervene in what was perceived to be a predominantly European issue. The second phase sought to use diplomatic means to address the situation. Finally, the third phase involved a military intervention (Klemenčič qtd. in Watson 2). So, although there were initial reservations, the United States of America ultimately proceeded with a humanitarian intervention in Bosnia under the auspices of international organizations like the United Nations and others.

In the initial two war years, the Bosnian government, Croats, and Serbs battled. Despite the continued tension, the Bosnian government and Croat forces ceased hostilities in March of 1994, thanks to the Washington Agreement, which led to the establishment of the Muslim-Croat Federation (Cutts 1). The war erupted in 1992 and lasted until 1995 and was characterized by acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and various war crimes. During this time, the Bosnian people were subjected to unspeakable atrocities and acts of inhumanity, including mass rape, torture, and murder.

At first, no one could contest the U.S. administration's view of the Bosnia conflict. In 1992, there was no precedent for Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, and few organizations were present in Yugoslavia due to its prior economic and political stability. Few congress members understood Yugoslav events, so they relied on the administration's policies. Opponents had no support to oppose the Bush administration's policy (Western 9).

Similarly, the United Nations Security Council played a key role in the Bosnian conflict. From 1992-1995, 46 Security Council resolutions addressed Bosnia. These and other international laws formed the legal foundation for humanitarian intervention (Cutts 1). Later on, despite opposition, President Clinton supported NSC's strategy and sent an adviser to persuade allies and Moscow for a Bosnian resolution. The message of Anthony Lake was embraced in the capitals of the allies, marking a pivotal moment in U.S. leadership. While some had doubts about military action, all backed the strategy as the final chance to resolve the Bosnia conflict. Through a masterful combination of strategic military maneuvers and decisive NATO airstrikes, the American negotiating team was able, on November 21, to secure the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, ending the conflict in Bosnia. Thanks to the tireless efforts of 60,000 U.S. and NATO troops deployed to enforce the peace, the region achieved a newfound sense of tranquility by the close of 1995 (Daalder). Consequently, one of the most significant events during this intervention was the Dayton Accords, which marked a conclusion to the war in Bosnia. The Accords were a product of the diplomatic efforts of the United States and other parties involved in the conflict and aimed to create lasting peace in Bosnia. The gravity of the crisis in Bosnia was acknowledged by the U.S. and the international community, which promptly intervened by providing humanitarian aid and assistance. The United States' government, under the leadership of President Bill Clinton, played a crucial role in this intervention by providing military and financial aid to the Bosnian people.

At the outset of the 1990s, the United States of America's stance toward Somalia and Yugoslavia was predicated upon the notion, held by President Bush and his cabinet members, that these areas no longer constituted significant strategic priorities for America during the Post-Cold War Era (Western 118). As the presidency of Bill Clinton commenced, a shift in

perceptions occurred as the level of American engagement with global affairs progressively intensified.

During the Clinton administration, military actions were carried out overseas under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” without the necessary approval from the U.S. Congress. The president defended these interventions by citing obligations to the U.N. or NATO instead of relying on congressional authorization. As the commander-in-chief, he believed it was within his constitutional powers to deploy American troops to regions in need of protection, even if Congress did not approve it. While open to congressional support, he clarified that military plans would proceed regardless. Clinton chose to overlook War Powers Resolution restrictions to pursue what he believed was necessary for the greater good (Yoo 1674). Nonetheless, as previously discussed in this piece of research, President Clinton also disregarded the United Nations’ consent during the U.S. intervention in Kosovo in 1999, positioning himself as the sole decision-maker in these cases. This raises the question of whether these interventions were motivated by idealistic assumptions or realpolitik.

The objectives of the Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions were “not conquest, security, or economic gain, nor even to achieve some form of recognizable military victory, but to provide relief, democratize, and pacify” (Girard 20). The stated objectives of the worldwide humanitarian interventions were rooted solely in idealistic principles. Yet, the question of whether alternative pragmatic and realistic motives were also at play emerged for debate.

#### **4.2. Idealism or Realism in Kosovo?**

The formulation of foreign policy decisions is predicated upon national interest considerations. Policy-makers are subject to the influence of their individual perspectives, which serve as a framing mechanism for their policy decisions. The foreign policy pertains to the determinations made within a nation that is molded by and, in turn, mold actors and

determinations originating beyond its confines. An imperative aspect of comprehending such interactions is comprehending some overarching theoretical concepts that decision-makers employ. The decisions made by various presidents and policy-makers have been influenced by the overarching theoretical domains (Kaufman 10). That is why concepts such as *realpolitik*, idealism, and humanitarian interventions have been previously elaborated.

During the Kosovo crisis, the United States led a NATO bombing campaign against Serbian military targets, which helped Serbia withdraw its forces from Kosovo. Simultaneously, the United States worked to foster stability in the area by supporting the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The decision-making process of whether to pursue idealism or realism in the United States' involvement in Kosovo in 1999 was a complex one that prompted the use of the notions of duplicity in international relations. The concept of idealism, which emphasizes moral and ethical considerations, clashes with realism, which prioritizes practical and strategic concerns. There is a continuing debate on whether the United States opted for just one or a mix of the two, with a focus on upholding human rights and promoting stability in the region. However, some practical concerns influenced the U.S. decision-making process. After facing significant challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States exhibited a certain level of reluctance toward becoming too embroiled in yet another Balkan conflict.

Additionally, there was a fear that intervening in Kosovo could further destabilize the region and lead to a wider conflict involving neighboring countries. The U.S. involvement in Kosovo remains controversial. Some contend that the United States could have taken more proactive measures to prevent the occurring human rights abuses, while others believe that the intervention was unnecessary and ultimately destabilizing.

#### **4.2.1. American Idealism during the Crisis of Kosovo**

The U.S.'s idealistic approach toward intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was significant in international relations history. It demonstrated the American willingness to promote human rights and democracy through military force. It marked a departure from the *realpolitik* approach that had dominated international relations for much of the twentieth century. The international community was grappling with the issue of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which the Serbian government was perpetrating against the ethnic Albanian population. Under President Bill Clinton's leadership, the U.S. government recognized its moral responsibility to intervene in the conflict and prevent further atrocities. While the U.S.'s intervention in Kosovo was controversial and met with opposition from some countries, it ultimately achieved its intended goal of preventing ethnic cleansing and promoting stability in the region. The NATO bombing campaign, led by the United States, successfully compelled the Serbian government to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. This pivotal action facilitated a U.N. peacekeeping mission established in the area, which played a crucial role in restoring stability and preventing further violence against the ethnic Albanian population.

It is worth mentioning that, however, at the onset of the Kosovo crisis in 1998, the Clinton administration was preoccupied with the weighty Monica Lewinsky scandal and its potential impact on impeachment proceedings. As a result, President Clinton's moral authority and persuasive abilities were diminished, making it challenging to garner public or congressional support for deploying ground troops or taking unilateral military action. Nevertheless, American Secretary of State Albright, known for her idealism and commitment to promoting liberal values, took charge and advocated for using force. As someone originally from Eastern Europe, she had a deep understanding of the region's complexities (Chang 174-177). The Kosovo crisis was a significant event in Madeleine Albright's career as it

demonstrated her peace-promoting and stability commitment to the Balkan Peninsula no matter how.

In order to legitimize the exertion of American power, President Clinton asserted that it was employed as a deterrent against an anticipated and potentially more devastating Serbian campaign targeting civilian populations in Kosovo (Yoo 1680). This asserts that the American approach toward Kosovo was driven by idealistic notions of promoting human rights and democracy in the area. The United States believed that it had a duty to safeguard the people of Kosovo from the brutalities of the Serbian government and that military intervention was necessary to achieve this goal. This idealistic approach starkly contrasted with the *realpolitik* approach that had dominated international relations for much of the twentieth century.

The “new interventionism” under the Clinton Doctrine justified military force in Kosovo in 1999. This doctrine echoes American Presidents Jimmy Carter and Woodrow Wilson’s ideals of prioritizing human rights in U.S. foreign policy (Kaufman 133). Wilsonianism continued to influence American foreign policy in the decades that followed, particularly during the Cold War Period and its aftermath, when the United States sought to promote democracy and freedom as a way to withstand the Soviet Union’s legacy and influence.

As the Clinton Administration reached the height of its influence in the Security Council, it encountered obstacles from the likes of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the U.N. Secretary-General, as well as the delegations of Russian and China, who seemed to hinder the attainment of the American foreign policy objectives (Carey 73). The U.S. government’s idealistic approach toward Kosovo was met with mixed reactions from the international community. While some countries supported the U.S.’s lead in the intervention, others condemned it as an intrusion and an act of aggression toward a self-governing nation. Russia,

in particular, was strongly opposed to the U.S.'s intervention in Kosovo, viewing it as an international law violation.

Contradictorily, the scholar Michael Mandelbaum called Clinton's foreign policy "social work" and argued that interventions in countries like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia did not align with American interests. He added that foreign policy should prioritize national interests over goodwill, even if it means difficult choices. Maintaining strong relations consistent with national interests should be the ultimate goal of American foreign policy (Chang 81). In this regard, the aspirations of philanthropic idealism, which may prioritize humanitarian aid and development projects, are not compatible with the objectives of foreign policy which may prioritize national security, economic interests, and geopolitical influence. This means that the desire to do good and promote human welfare may clash with the practical considerations and interests of a country's foreign policy agenda. It is often challenging to balance these two ideals, as they may require different actions and priorities. As such, it is important for policy-makers to carefully consider the implications of their actions and make strategic decisions that balance these competing objectives. Failure to do so would inevitably lead to the practice of duplicity.

#### **4.2.2. American Realpolitik during the Crisis of Kosovo**

The U.S. approach to the Kosovo conflict was controversial, but it reflected a realist understanding of the situation and a willingness to use force to achieve practical objectives. The conflict demonstrated the significance of realism in American foreign policy and the challenges of balancing national interests with humanitarian concerns. Many argued that a realist understanding of the situation drove the U.S. approach to the conflict. Realism is a foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes pursuing national interests and using power to achieve them. In the case of Kosovo, the United States saw the conflict as a threat to stability in the Balkans and its strategic interests in the region. Americans initially tried to resolve the

conflict through diplomacy and sanctions. However, when these measures proved ineffective, the U.S. and its NATO allies launched a military campaign against Serbia in March 1999. Therefore, the United States demonstrated a readiness to employ military force to achieve its objectives.

The controversy surrounding the U.S. intervention in Kosovo raised questions about the legality of such actions and whether or not the U.S. had the right to use military force without the approval of its Congress and the United Nations. The UN Charter, Treaty, law and customary practice do not permit individual states or the U.N. Security Council to engage in humanitarian intervention. However, during the era of the Post-Cold War, the Security Council expanded its interpretation of Chapter VII to address humanitarian crises. This approach remains contentious, and the prevailing view is that it needs to be legally permissible. Chapter VII outlines specific scenarios in which the utilization of force may be justified, with Article 39 addressing threats to peace and Article 42 allowing for more forceful measures if needed (Hehir 246- 247). Notwithstanding, the United States did not require authorization from any of these bodies to vindicate the legitimacy and legality of its actions in the 1999 Kosovo Crisis.

In the same vein, countries like Haiti and Bosnia set new precedents in international law. Haiti authorized Chapter 7 invasion and removal of government based on human rights violations and democracy. Bosnia sanctioned dual-key joint decision-making on force, while NATO's attacks received unauthorization. U.N. removed from peacemaking in Bosnia. NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 set a new precedent for intervention. Russia and China opposed it in the U.N. Security Council; the attacks were the first on a sovereign state without its authorization (Carey 73). These events exemplified a seismic shift in global power dynamics and highlighted the importance of responsible and strategic international actions.

Regarding the case of Kosovo, it became apparent that solely humanitarian motivations were inadequate to warrant the deployment of military forces to protect lives in far-off lands. Instead, a confluence of secondary considerations, including the preservation of stability and security in Europe, the maintenance of the credibility of NATO, and the imperative for American leadership, ultimately compelled the Clinton administration to take action in Kosovo (Chang 183). This explains the pragmatic reasons that drove the United States to intervene in Kosovo, which is grounded in the principles of realism. Furthermore, many argued that humanitarian interventions may have been more self-interested than altruistic. Consequently, the United States' intervention in Kosovo was driven by maintaining its influence in Europe and strengthening NATO. The intervention in other regions, such as Somalia, was criticized for deflecting attention from the controversial non-intervention policy in Bosnia (Ward 71-72). Frequently, it is stated that the United States was determined to avoid replicating the errors made in Bosnia when dealing with Kosovo in the late 1990s.

Chris O'Meara, on the other hand, concluded that international law should prioritize human rights and security, with legal protections strengthened. States that violate these rights should face the consequences, but military enforcement should be resisted. The focus should be on peaceful responses by relying on the U.N. Security Council (14). The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect was then formulated. It emphasizes the importance of opting for a real idealistic approach in foreign affairs rather than pragmatic *realpolitik*. Consequently, it underscores the necessity of prioritizing ethical considerations over short-term gains.

To sum up, the realist approach was controversial, as some critics argued that it violated international law and that the U.S. had no business intervening in the affairs of another country. This approach focused on achieving practical objectives and a willingness to employ force, if required, to accomplish them. The U.S. also saw the conflict as an opportunity to demonstrate its leadership and commitment to global stability. By intervening

in Kosovo, the U.S. sent a message to other countries that it was willing and able to use force to protect its interests and promote peace. The U.S. saw its intervention in Kosovo as a necessary measure to prevent further violence and instability in the region. The conflict had already displaced hundreds of thousands and threatened to spread to neighboring countries.

### **Conclusion**

The Kosovo Crisis of 1999 is a prime example of the complex interplay between U.S. idealism and realpolitik in foreign policy. While the United States has historically been viewed as an idealistic nation, this conflict highlights the importance of balancing idealism with practical considerations in foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, the U.S. government chose to intervene militarily in Kosovo, aiming to protect innocent civilians and prevent further human rights violations. This decision was made despite opposition from some other nations and concerns about the legality and morality of military intervention.

In general, the principle of idealism underscores the promotion of American values and the dissemination of democratic ideals and unrestricted liberty across the globe. On the other hand, realpolitik is an approach to policymaking that prioritizes pragmatic considerations such as national interests, power, and security. Humanitarian interventions are typically motivated by a humanitarian impulse to mitigate human suffering and safeguard fundamental human rights, frequently through the application of military or alternative methods of intervention.

Through its efforts, the United States of America has sought to promote stability and democracy in the region, combat human rights abuses, and prevent further conflict. The U.S. has been instrumental in advancing the cause of peace negotiations and reconciliation efforts between warring factions in the Balkans. Overall, U.S. interventionism in the Balkans has been guided by a desire to promote peace, stability, and democracy in the region, and has

been a significant factor in shaping the political and social landscape of this complex and troubled area.

In pursuing idealistic goals in Kosovo, the United States sought the support of NATO. However, NATO violated Geneva Conventions<sup>19</sup> during this war. Despite using highly accurate weapons, NATO's military operations were tarnished by infractions of international humanitarian law. NATO transgressed provisions of "Part IV, Section I of Additional Protocol I" which pertains to safeguarding civilians. These regulations apply to any conflict, whether on land, sea, or air, that can potentially impact innocent civilians (Erogov 184). The actions of NATO, thus, served to exacerbate the situation. These actions significantly impacted the conflict and ultimately contributed to its escalation. The involvement of NATO forces was highly controversial at the time and remains a contentious issue. While some argue that NATO's intervention was necessary to prevent further violence and human rights abuses, others maintain that it only further destabilized the region and prolonged the conflict.

Consequently, a possible reason behind the atrocities committed against Albanian refugees is the desire for revenge. According to accounts from numerous refugees, government forces directed their anger toward the civilian population, telling them to seek help from NATO. However, the organized and deliberate nature of the expulsions suggests that there was a premeditated plan to remove Albanians from their homes forcefully. Revenge may have played a role in motivating the troops, but it was not the sole driving force behind the ethnic cleansing (Abrahams et al. 77). This research has brought to light a multitude of underlying factors that were instrumental in the unfolding of this tragic ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

In contraposition to the previous, in chapter four of his book titled "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World," Walter Russel Mead introduced a biblical verse mandating that U.S. politicians adopt a balanced approach to their

decision-making, one that is characterized by shrewdness akin to that of serpents and peacefulness reminiscent of doves. In practice, American foreign policy may integrate the concepts of Hamiltonian realism and Wilsonian idealism, wherein Hamiltonian realism may embody a romantic and idealistic dream while Wilsonian idealism may disguise a pragmatic and occasionally selfish evaluation of national, ethnic, and factional interests (99-100). This led to the development of new, interconnected theories that expanded upon the original idea, such as neo-Wilsonianism. “One manifestation of this neo-Wilsonianism is the rise of humanitarian intervention. It appears that the post-Cold War era has finally inaugurated a world order where great powers use their military force not as an expression of *realpolitik*, as was true earlier, but as a technique to restore democratic governance, overcome famine, or protect minorities” (Gibbs 41). The neo-Wilsonian doctrine embodies an innovative approach to international relations underscored by a preference for human rights and democratic principles. Frequently leveraging military force, this approach challenges established conceptions of sovereignty and non-interference. An essential element inherent in this ideology is the notion of humanitarian intervention.

When it comes to humanitarian interventions, there are a multitude of factors that must be taken into consideration in order to determine the most appropriate and effective course of action. The article of the academic Henry F. Carey, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo,” provides a comprehensive explanation that the decision of the Clinton Administration to intervene in humanitarian crises was primarily driven by domestic factors, including “mass media, public opinion polls, and election cycles”, rather than the commonly held belief of international norms and institutions. Carey’s analysis sheds light on the true motivations behind these interventions and highlights the importance of considering domestic politics in shaping foreign policy decisions. Additionally, numerous academics have posited that the CNN effect was a compelling

impetus for the major American participation in the NATO air strikes, intending to deflect blame onto the United States and other nations. However, due to the limited coverage and media-marginalization of the Kosovo crisis, the U.S. public remained largely apathetic toward their government's actions in the region.

Overall, the U.S. government initially adopted a cautious approach to the crisis, calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and urging both sides to negotiate a settlement. However, as the violence escalated and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, the U.S. shifted its position, advocating for military intervention to protect the civilian population. The U.S. government's handling of the Kosovo crisis has been the subject of much scrutiny and criticism, with some observers accusing it of acting hypocritically by intervening in Kosovo while ignoring other instances of ethnic conflict and human rights abuses worldwide. Others have argued that the U.S.'s actions were motivated by a genuine desire to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to foster stability and peace in the region. In the end, within the complex interweaving of American idealism and realpolitik, the United States' actions during the Kosovo crisis have exposed duplicity in their regional foreign policy decisions.

### Endnotes

17. “Otto von Bismarck was a Prussian politician who became Germany’s first-ever chancellor, a position in which he served from 1871 to 1890. Through a series of wars, he unified 39 individual states into one German nation in 1871. His policies as chancellor were aimed at holding the newly-formed state together in the face of religious, political and social divisions – all while trying to maintain the fragile peace in Europe” (Hoyer).

18. The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics explained Darwinism as “it is firmly in the camp of materialism and physicalism suggesting, as it does, a single universal law governing all animate phenomena. Just as late Victorians tended to believe in one fundamental law of association for all mental activity, so Darwinism suggested one natural law of development for all forms of life” (184).

19. “In particular, during the course of its operations NATO forces violated provisions of Part IV, Section I of Additional Protocol I, on the general protection of civilians against effects of hostilities. In the terms of its Article 49, para. 3, the provisions of Section I “apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land”” (Erogov 184).

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# **General Conclusion**

## General Conclusion

The current research project delves into the intricacies of the polarizing debate surrounding the United States' humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, which has fluctuated between the noble pursuit of idealism and the pragmatic consideration of realpolitik and led to other assumptions of duplicity.

The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 was a horrifying event that resulted in the displacement and mass killings of thousands of people. It was a tragic chapter in the history of the Balkans, marked by brutal violence and deep-rooted ethnic tensions. The ethnic cleansing campaign aimed to rid Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population, viewed by the Serbian government as threatening their authority and control. During this period, the Kosovo War persisted as a fierce battle between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a faction striving for autonomy in the predominantly Albanian district of Kosovo. Serbian military and paramilitary forces systematically targeted Albanian villages and towns, destroying homes, burning crops, and committing widespread acts of violence, including torture, rape, and murder. As the conflict escalated, so did the atrocities committed against the civilian population.

The U.S. government, along with its NATO allies, launched a military campaign aimed at forcing the Serbian military to withdraw from Kosovo and cease its attacks on the Albanian population. The campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, involved sustained airstrikes against Serbian military targets, as well as the deployment of ground troops to secure key areas. The intervention was deemed necessary due to the severity of the situation, which entailed egregious human rights transgressions and the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of people. Despite the controversy, the intervention ultimately succeeded in achieving its announced objectives. The Serbian military withdrew from Kosovo, and a

peacekeeping force was deployed to the region to maintain stability and protect the rights of the local population.

The international community, led by the U.S., driven by a sense of moral duty and responsibility, found it imperative to partake in humanitarian intervention and halt the ongoing atrocities in several parts of the world, including Kosovo, with varying levels of intervention. David N. Gibbs asserted that “[A]dvocates of humanitarian intervention too often assume altruistic motivations, without demonstrating their salience through empirical research. Realists, in contrast, tend to be so skeptical of humanitarian motivations that they avoid the question altogether” (43). The U.S. humanitarian intervention in Kosovo drew controversy due to its unauthorized nature, as it did not receive approval from the United States Congress and the United Nations Security Council, thereby violating international law. It is proclaimed that the U.S. intervention created a precedent for future interventions in other countries, which could destabilize the international order. In addition, detractors argued that America acted unilaterally to advance its interests, disregarding international norms and institutions. Nonetheless, “Congress had a full opportunity to prevent President Clinton from deploying the armed forces in Kosovo. It simply chose, as a political matter, not to” (Yoo 1674). Thus, this case underscores the complex and contentious nature of employing humanitarian interventions as a foreign policy instrument.

The classic dichotomy between the practicality of *realpolitik* and the idealism of interventionism is exemplified by the United States’ participation in Kosovo. The debate regarding this interference is further intricate due to multiple elements. First, there are questions about the legality of the intervention. As already mentioned, some contend that the U.S. violated international law by intervening in the conflict without the approval of the United Nations and even declaring war without the consent of the U.S. Congress. Others argue that the United States of America had a moral obligation to intervene in the face of

atrocities and human rights abuses as it followed idealist assumptions. Idealism is a political philosophy that stresses the importance of moral and ethical principles in foreign policy. Idealists assert that, in the case of Kosovo, the U.S. prioritized promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law above all else. They further stipulate that the intervention paved the way for the independence of Kosovo in 2008, which is a positive development for the Kosovar Albanians.

Realpolitik, on the other hand, embodies a political doctrine that places pragmatic concerns above ethical values. This strategic philosophy accentuates the paramount significance of power and self-interest within international relations. Proponents of this philosophy assert that the Balkan region holds significant strategic importance for the United States. This importance is driven by an amalgamation of geopolitical and economic factors which impact the United States' approach to the region and its relationships with various actors. Overall, American strategic interests in Kosovo are multifaceted, representing a crucial component of Europe's stability and security. The U.S. aims to achieve this through military, political, and economic initiatives, promoting stability and prosperity while advancing broader geopolitical goals. One such goal is to counter Russian influence and uphold Western values and interests in the region, given the critical role that Kosovo plays in the ongoing struggle between the West and Russia for dominance in Eastern Europe. The U.S. also aims to prevent conflict and promote peace in the Balkans, plagued by instability and tension for many years. To this end, the U.S. has invested heavily in supporting the Kosovo government and promoting democratic institutions. Additionally, Kosovo's strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia offers significant economic potential, making it a key player in promoting economic development and investment in the region.

From an alternative angle, the Kosovo Crisis demonstrated that the United States' efforts to aid the region under humanitarian interventions were merely an extension of the

Cold War ideology. Throughout history, Russia has maintained a strong alliance with the Serbs, which has necessitated careful consideration of international actions to punish them. Despite this, American officials expressed satisfaction with Moscow's efforts in early 1998, even though they acknowledged that Russia might not fully support an arms embargo in the Security Council. Nevertheless, a prominent German diplomat acknowledged the challenges that Russia has faced in navigating this complex issue (Erlanger) and despite being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, opted to align with Serbian aggression. In contrast, the U.S. chose to challenge its long-time adversary by opposing its stance and displaying its power in Kosovo, and challenging the UN decisions.

Beyond the discussion of American idealism and realpolitik in Kosovo, the analysis of the different events and strategies surrounding this crisis led to the conclusion that the U.S. used a form of duplicity in its foreign policy conduct toward this case in 1999. While the U.S. government may have presented itself as a champion of democracy and human rights, its true intentions were far more self-interested, and its actions were marked by a certain degree of duplicity. Behind the scenes, U.S. officials engaged in several questionable tactics, including providing military aid to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This group was widely regarded as an outlaw organization. As the conflict in Kosovo escalated, the U.S. government saw an opportunity to further its interests by intervening there. At the time, the U.S. government was heavily invested in the Balkans region, both economically and strategically. U.S. companies had significant business interests in the area, and the U.S. military established a heavy presence in the Balkan region as part of its broader global military strategy as a unipolar power in the Post-Cold War Era.

Additionally, many saw the American government's actions during the Kosovo conflict were marked by a significant degree of hypocrisy. While the U.S. government was

criticizing Serbia for its human rights abuses in Kosovo, it was simultaneously supporting other regimes elsewhere that were engaged in similar or worse abuses. Overall, the United States' behavior during the Kosovo conflict highlights the complex and often contradictory motivations that generally underlie international intervention.

As an attempt to avoid future misconduct, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has put forth an appeal for renewed and innovative deliberation on the subject of humanitarian intervention in light of the legal inadequacies evidenced by the Kosovo and NATO incidents. In 2001, *The Responsibility to Protect* was published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to establish a harmonious consensus on matters about humanitarian intervention. The report emphasizes that the collective community of states bears an enduring obligation to safeguard individuals, which occurs when a state demonstrates reluctance or incapacity to fulfill its responsibility or is directly involved in transgressions. The Responsibility to Protect lies within the state that directly bears the impact on its people ("The Responsibility to Protect"). The Kosovo Conflict was a turning point in the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. It exemplified the imperative for the global community to assume its duty of safeguarding societies from widespread atrocities, even if it entailed resorting to armed forces. The Responsibility to Protect principle acknowledges that sovereignty is not an infallible entitlement, and nations must safeguard their citizens from harm. In instances where states fall short of fulfilling their obligation, it becomes necessary for the international community to intervene to avert any potential escalation. However, this measure must be implemented systematically and consistently to comply with international law.

In the end, the maxim that says "the end justifies the means" raises pertinent questions regarding the United States intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Meaningful actions, even morally questionable, can be justified if the result is beneficial. This philosophy is helpful in conflicts

between achieving a positive outcome and following ethical principles. However, it can be dangerous if taken too far and disregard for others' rights. Ultimately, it is undeniable that the U.S. and its allies were able to alleviate the immediate humanitarian needs of the affected Kosovar population. Their given humanitarian aid allowed displaced individuals to return to their homes and rebuild their lives in a more stable environment. In addition, it helped remove Milosevic from power, paving the way for democratic reforms and establishing a more inclusive and tolerant society.

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# **Appendices**

# Appendix A

## United States Constitution

### Article 1, Section 8

**The Congress shall have power** to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

**To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;**

To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

To establish post offices and post roads;

**To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;**

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

*(Emphasis added.)*

Source: [https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/15-628j-patents-copyrights-and-the-law-of-intellectual-property-spring-2013/acb316e99ff79ef7d4717ac39237b242\\_MIT15\\_628JS13\\_read02.pdf](https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/15-628j-patents-copyrights-and-the-law-of-intellectual-property-spring-2013/acb316e99ff79ef7d4717ac39237b242_MIT15_628JS13_read02.pdf)

## **Appendix B**

### **United States Constitution**

#### **Article 1, Section 2**

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Source: <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/>

## Appendix C

UNITED  
NATIONS

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### Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/1244 (1999)  
10 June 1999

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#### RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,  
on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on

2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

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8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

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(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

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17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting  
of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre  
on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;

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- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
  - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
  - Marking/clearing minefields;
  - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
  - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other

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countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.<sup>1</sup> A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);

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- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

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## Appendix D

UNITED  
NATIONS

S



### Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/1160 (1998)  
31 March 1998

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#### RESOLUTION 1160 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting,  
on 31 March 1998

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 (S/1998/223 and S/1998/272), including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo,

Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998 (S/1998/246),

Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training,

Noting the declaration of 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the political process in Kosovo and Metohija (S/1998/250),

Noting also the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community to non-violence,

Noting that there has been some progress in implementing the actions indicated in the Contact Group statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further progress is required,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

98-09023 (E)

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1. Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately to take the further necessary steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement the actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998;

2. Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;

3. Underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process;

4. Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues, and notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a dialogue;

5. Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the proposal in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, and the Charter of the United Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration;

6. Welcomes the signature on 23 March 1998 of an agreement on measures to implement the 1996 Education Agreement, calls upon all parties to ensure that its implementation proceeds smoothly and without delay according to the agreed timetable and expresses its readiness to consider measures if either party blocks implementation;

7. Expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Kosovo, including through the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who is also the Special Representative of the European Union, and the return of the OSCE long-term missions;

8. Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities there;

9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the

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members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;

(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by any State concerning violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;

(d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;

(e) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 below;

10. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, and stresses in this context the importance of continuing implementation of the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control signed in Florence on 14 June 1996;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee established by paragraph 9 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

12. Requests States to report to the committee established by paragraph 9 above within 30 days of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;

13. Invites the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo and on measures taken by that organization in this regard;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report on the situation in Kosovo and the implementation of this resolution no later than 30 days following the adoption of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter;

15. Further requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate regional organizations, include in his first report recommendations for the establishment of a comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, and calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to extend full cooperation in this regard;

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16. Decides to review the situation on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-General, which will take into account the assessments of, inter alia, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the European Union, and decides also to reconsider the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, including action to terminate them, following receipt of the assessment of the Secretary-General that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cooperating in a constructive manner with the Contact Group, have:

(a) begun a substantive dialogue in accordance with paragraph 4 above, including the participation of an outside representative or representatives, unless any failure to do so is not because of the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities;

(b) withdrawn the special police units and ceased action by the security forces affecting the civilian population;

(c) allowed access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations as well as representatives of Contact Group and other embassies;

(d) accepted a mission by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a new and specific mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the OSCE long-term missions;

(e) facilitated a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;

17. Urges the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal established pursuant to resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 to begin gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction, and notes that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and that the Contact Group countries will make available to the Tribunal substantiated relevant information in their possession;

18. Affirms that concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prospects for normalization of its international relationships and full participation in international institutions;

19. Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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## Appendix E

UNITED  
NATIONS

S



### Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/1199 (1998)  
23 September 1998

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#### RESOLUTION 1199 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting,  
on 23 September 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add.1),

Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact Group's meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and the further statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998 (S/1998/657),

Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/526),

Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal,

Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,

Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so,

Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),

Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,

Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo are respected,

Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,

Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe;
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at facilitating such a dialogue;

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4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998:

(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;

(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;

(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;

(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo;

5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:

(a) to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo;

(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population;

(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions on representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;

(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;

(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed homes,

and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;

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6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998);
8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission;
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved;
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160 (1998);
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo Crisis;
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to bring to justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the mistreatment of civilians and the deliberate destruction of property;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);

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16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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## Appendix F

UNITED  
NATIONS

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### Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1999/682  
15 June 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach a copy of a letter dated 10 June 1999 addressed to me by Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), transmitting a copy of the military-technical agreement concluded by NATO military authorities with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the procedures and modalities for the withdrawal from Kosovo of security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex).

I should appreciate it if this letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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A standard 1D barcode representing the document's identification number.

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Annex

Letter dated 10 June 1999 from the Secretary-General of  
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the  
Secretary-General

Please find attached for your information a copy of the military-technical agreement concluded by NATO military authorities with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the procedures and modalities for the withdrawal from Kosovo of security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Enclosure

Military-technical agreement between the international security force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia

Article I

General obligations

1. The Parties to this agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the Federal Government on 3 June 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further note that the United Nations Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences.

2. The State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy following the adoption of the Security Council resolution referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.

3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below:

(a) "The Parties" are those signatories to the agreement;

(b) "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency or organization of the Parties;

(c) "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces" includes all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia personnel and organizations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the international security force (KFOR) commander;

(d) The air safety zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia territory. It includes the airspace above the 25-kilometre zone;

(e) The ground safety zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone;

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(f) Entry-into-force day (EIF) is defined as the day this agreement is signed.

4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

(a) To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the ground safety zone and the air safety zone described in article I, paragraph 3, without the prior express consent of the international security force (KFOR) commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.

The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian personnel, which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article;

(b) To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force (KFOR) and in particular to authorize the international security force (KFOR) to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this agreement and protection of the international security force (KFOR), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence and other international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations (details in appendix B).

## Article II

### Cessation of hostilities

1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces shall immediately, upon entry into force of this agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not encourage, organize or support hostile or provocative demonstrations.

2. Phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces (ground). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to a phased withdrawal of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. The entry and deployment of the international security force (KFOR) into Kosovo will be synchronized. The phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:

(a) By EIF + 1 day, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces located in zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement). Once it is verified that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces have complied with this

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subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this article, NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with and provided that the Security Council adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force (KFOR) so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided;

(b) By EIF + 6 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 1 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement). Establish liaison teams with the KFOR commander in Pristina;

(c) By EIF + 9 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 2 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement);

(d) By EIF + 11 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 3 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement);

(e) By EIF + 11 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5-kilometre GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF+11), the senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia force commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force (KFOR) commander that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The international security force (KFOR) commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces as provided under article II. The international security force (KFOR) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this agreement;

(f) The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia will cooperate fully with the international security force (KFOR) in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ;

(g) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces withdrawing in accordance with appendix A, i.e., in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack;

(h) The international security force (KFOR) will provide appropriate control of the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* until the arrival of the civilian mission of the United Nations.

3. Phased withdrawal of Yugoslav air and air defence forces:

(a) At EIF + 1 day, no Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aircraft, fixed wing or rotary, will fly in Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force (KFOR) commander. All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missiles and aircraft of the Parties will refrain from

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\* Turkey recognizes Macedonia by its constitutional name.

acquisition, target-tracking or otherwise illuminating international security force (KFOR) air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ;

(b) By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defence systems) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25-kilometre ASZ;

(c) The international security force (KFOR) commander will control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international security force (KFOR) commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as unauthorized flight or activation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia integrated air defence within the ASZ, are subject to military action by the international security force (KFOR), including the use of necessary force. The international security force (KFOR) commander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate Federal Republic of Yugoslavia institutions to monitor operations, deconflict international security force (KFOR) air traffic movements and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system. It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian authorities as soon as practicable.

### Article III

#### Notifications

1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately communicated to all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces.

2. By EIF + 2 days, the State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces:

(a) Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglement, or physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo laid by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces;

(b) Any further information of a military or security nature about Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in the territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international security force (KFOR) commander.

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Article IV

Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission

A Joint Implementation Commission shall be established with the deployment of the international security force (KFOR) to Kosovo, as directed by the international security force (KFOR) commander.

Article V

Final authority to interpret

The international security force (KFOR) commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.

Article VI

Entry into force

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Appendices:

- A. Phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo.
- B. International security force (KFOR) operations.

For the international security  
force (KFOR)  
  
Lieutenant General Mike Jackson  
Commander, KFOR

For the Governments of the Federal  
Republic of Yugoslavia and the  
Republic of Serbia  
  
Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic  
General Staff of VJ  
  
Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanovic  
Ministry of Internal Affairs  
of the Republic of Serbia


9 June 1999

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Appendix A

Phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces,  
routes and assembly areas

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Appendix B

International security force (KFOR) operations

1. Consistent with the general obligations of the military-technical agreement the State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.
2. The international security force (KFOR) commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the international security force (KFOR) and the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities inherent in this military-technical agreement and the peace settlement which it supports.
3. Neither the international security force (KFOR) nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this agreement. The Parties will agree on a status-of-forces agreement as soon as possible.
4. The international security force (KFOR) shall have the right:
  - (a) To monitor and ensure compliance with this agreement and to respond promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. This includes necessary actions to:
    - (i) Enforce withdrawals of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces;
    - (ii) Enforce compliance following the return of selected Federal Republic of Yugoslavia personnel to Kosovo;
    - (iii) Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or otherwise authorized by the Security Council;
  - (b) To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities and with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian civil and military authorities;
  - (c) To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo that the international security force (KFOR) commander believes has or may have military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this agreement.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement, the Parties understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) commander has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal or relocation of specific forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international security force (KFOR) commander determines a

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potential threat to either the international security force (KFOR) or its mission, or to another party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the international security force (KFOR) shall be subject to military action by the international security force (KFOR), including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance.

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## Appendix G

### CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

#### Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

#### Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

#### Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

#### Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

#### Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

#### Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

#### Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.

The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 46**

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 47**

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

**Article 48**

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

**Article 49**

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

**Article 50**

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

**Article 51**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

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## **Appendix H**

**PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL  
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,  
AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION  
OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS  
(PROTOCOL I), OF 8 JUNE 1977**

**PART IV  
CIVILIAN POPULATION  
SECTION I  
GENERAL PROTECTION AGAINST EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES  
CHAPTER I  
BASIC RULE AND FIELD OF APPLICATION**

**Article 49 — Definition of attacks and scope of application**

1. “Attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.
2. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a Party to the conflict but under the control of an adverse Party.
3. The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.
4. The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly in Part II thereof, and in other international agreements binding upon the High Contracting Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the effects of hostilities.

## Résumé

Les États-Unis sont devenus une superpuissance mondiale à l'époque de l'après-guerre froide, tandis que les pays de l'ex-union soviétique souffraient de conflits régionaux et ethniques entraînant de nombreuses crises. Face à ces enjeux internationaux, les États-Unis sont intervenus de diverses manières, notamment par le biais d'interventions humanitaires. Cette étude se concentre sur la crise du Kosovo de 1999, qui a donné lieu à des opinions divergentes concernant les motifs fondamentaux qui ont poussé les États-Unis à cette intervention, que certains considèrent comme une manifestation de bonnes intentions et un engagement en faveur des droits de l'homme et de l'indépendance, tandis que d'autres prétendent qu'elle est motivée par des considérations réalistes pour son propre bien. Cette idée a été formulée parce que les États-Unis ont propulsé l'OTAN à lancer des attaques aériennes sans demander l'approbation du Congrès ou des Nations Unies. L'objectif de cette étude est de rechercher les raisons de ces interventions humanitaires des États-Unis, en particulier au Kosovo en 1999 en identifiant les mécanismes, la légitimité et les motifs réels qui motivent ces interventions, en plus d'aborder les facteurs qui ont influencé la décision d'intervenir au Kosovo aux dépens d'autres pays. Dans cette recherche, on s'est appuyé sur l'approche descriptive et historique, à travers l'utilisation de sources primaires et secondaires, pour recueillir des points de vue historiques liés au sujet étudié. Les principales sources de collecte de données comprenaient la Constitution des États-Unis, des documents officiels du Congrès américain et des agences gouvernementales, ainsi que des rapports de l'ONU et de l'OTAN. Les sources secondaires comprenaient divers livres historiques, encyclopédies et publications en série. Les résultats de cette recherche ont émis l'hypothèse que l'intervention humanitaire américaine au Kosovo était une extension de l'idéologie de la guerre froide, et que les États-Unis utilisaient une forme de duplicité dans leur politique étrangère en prétendant être idéalistes tout en pratiquant la *realpolitik*.

Mots clés : politique étrangère des États-Unis ; intervention humanitaire ; guerre du Kosovo ; idéalisme ; le réalisme ; *realpolitik*.

## ملخص

برزت الولايات المتحدة كقوة عالمية عظمى خلال حقبة ما بعد الحرب الباردة في حين عانت دول الاتحاد السوفيتي السابق من نزاعات إقليمية وعرقية مؤدية إلى أزمات عديدة. لمعالجة هذه القضايا الدولية، تدخلت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بطرق مختلفة، خاصة من خلال التدخلات الإنسانية. تركز هذه الدراسة على أزمة كوسوفو لعام 1999، والتي انجر عنها تباين آراء العلماء والخبراء والسياسيين فيما يتعلق بالدوافع الأساسية التي دفعت أمريكا إلى هذا التدخل الذي يعتبره البعض على أنه إظهار للنوايا الحسنة والتزام بحقوق الإنسان والاستقلالية، في حين يزعم البعض الآخر أنه مدفوع باعتبارات السياسة الواقعية تحقيقاً لمصلحتها. وجاء هذا الادعاء على خلفية قيادة الولايات المتحدة لحلف الناتو في شن غارات جوية دون السعي للحصول على موافقة الكونغرس أو الأمم المتحدة. الهدف من هذه الدراسة هو البحث عن الأسباب الكامنة وراء هذه التدخلات الإنسانية لأمريكا، وتحديدًا في كوسوفو في حقبة ما بعد الحرب الباردة. كما تسعى إلى تحديد الآليات والشرعية والدوافع الحقيقية التي تقود هذه التدخلات إضافة إلى معالجة العوامل التي أثرت على قرار التدخل في كوسوفو على حساب دول أخرى. تم الاعتماد في هذا البحث على المنهج التاريخي الوصفي من خلال استعمال مصادر أولية وثانوية لتجميع وجهات النظر التاريخية ذات الصلة بالموضوع المدروس. تضمنت المصادر الأولية التي تم الاعتماد عليها في جمع البيانات دستور الولايات المتحدة، والوثائق الرسمية من الكونغرس الأمريكي والوكالات الحكومية، وتقارير الأمم المتحدة وحلف شمال الأطلسي. وشملت المصادر الثانوية كتب وموسوعات ومنشورات تسلسلية تاريخية متنوعة. افترضت نتائج هذا البحث أن التدخل الإنساني الأمريكي في كوسوفو كان امتداداً لإيديولوجية الحرب الباردة، وأن الولايات المتحدة استخدمت شكلاً من أشكال الازدواجية في سياستها الخارجية من خلال التظاهر بالمثالية في حين ممارسة السياسة الواقعية. الكلمات المفتاحية: السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة؛ التدخل الإنساني؛ حرب كوسوفو؛ المثالية؛ السياسة الواقعية.